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


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NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
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AD A 070 456



12 194 p.

9 Masters

THESIS

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JAPANESE NATIONAL INTERESTS AND THE
SINO-JAPANESE PEACE AND FRIENDSHIP TREATY.

by

10 Joseph Michael Mazzafro

11 March 1979


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SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (When Data Entered)

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE		READ INSTRUCTIONS BEFORE COMPLETING FORM
1. REPORT NUMBER	2. GOVT ACCESSION NO.	3. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER
4. TITLE (and Subtitle) Japanese National Interests and the Sino-Japanese Peace and Friendship Treaty		5. TYPE OF REPORT & PERIOD COVERED Master's Thesis; March 1979
7. AUTHOR(s) Joseph Michael Mazzafro		6. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER
9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California 93940		8. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER(s)
11. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California 93940		10. PROGRAM ELEMENT, PROJECT, TASK AREA & WORK UNIT NUMBERS
14. MONITORING AGENCY NAME & ADDRESS (if different from Controlling Office)		12. REPORT DATE March 1979
		13. NUMBER OF PAGES 193
		15. SECURITY CLASS. (of this report) Unclassified
		15a. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE
16. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of this Report) Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.		
17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of the abstract entered in Block 20, if different from Report)		
18. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES		
19. KEY WORDS (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) Sino-Japanese Peace and Friendship Treaty Japan China		
20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) The signing of the Treaty of Peace and Friendship opened a new era in Japanese foreign policy. By improving relations with Peking, Tokyo gained the latitude of action necessary to play a central role in creating a pattern of regional stability compatible with Japan's national interests in security, prosperity, and prestige. The decision to sign the treaty underscores the determining influence these traditional national interests have on		

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SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE/When Data Entered:

✓ #20 - ABSTRACT - CONTINUED

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Japanese National Interests
and the
Sino-Japanese Peace and Friendship Treaty

by

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
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

from the

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

March 1979



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ABSTRACT

The signing of the Treaty of Peace and Friendship opened a new era in Japanese foreign policy. By improving relations with Peking, Tokyo gained the latitude of action necessary to play a central role in creating a pattern of regional stability compatible with Japan's national interests in security, prosperity, and prestige. The decision to sign the treaty underscores the determining influence these traditional national interests have on contemporary Japanese foreign policy, and it highlights the dichotomy between Japan's culturally induced xenophobic proclivities and its economic needs for greater access to foreign raw materials. Reflecting Japan's departure from its post World War II international reticence, the Peace and Friendship Treaty, as a function of national interests, is a useful analytical tool for assessing the impact of a more vigorous Japanese foreign policy on the Sino-Soviet dispute, the application of the Nixon Doctrine, the stability of Southeast Asia, the reunification of Korea, the future of Taiwan and the allocation of resource rights in the East China Sea.

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I. INTRODUCTION

In the 1970s it has become a cliché to point out that Japan can no longer pursue a passive foreign policy driven primarily by economic expediency and reliance on the United States for security. Japan's emergence as the third strongest economy in the world¹ is succinct testimony to its successful adaptation to Washington's dominant influence in the post-World War II bipolar era. But bipolarity, except in a nuclear strategic sense, is passé and so is Japan's trading company approach to foreign policy. No longer does the American dollar or Minuteman ICBM dominate the international scene; instead, Tokyo must be prepared to face a world where the Soviet Union has achieved nuclear parity with the U.S., where Cold War conditions have been dissipated by more pragmatic interests, and where Japan, along with the Western Europe and the resource producing states, enjoys an increasing degree of economic influence.

Undoubtedly, the Nixon Shocks of 1971, the Oil Crisis of 1973-74, and the dramatic events in Southeast Asia since 1972 have all coalesced to convince the Japanese that they must develop a more activist foreign policy, independent of but in conjunction with the U.S., in order to maintain Japan's new position in today's multipolar world.² Nonetheless, Tokyo is finding it difficult to abandon, for any number of domestic and international reasons, the low keyed ad hoc

economically oriented approach to foreign affairs that has served its interests so well since the end of the Occupation in 1952.³ Clearly, Japan's circumspect attitudes on negotiating a peace and friendship treaty (PFT) with China, as called for in the Chou-Tanaka communique of 1972, can be justified in terms of the serious ramifications such an agreement would have on the Asian security equation, but this high degree of caution also suggests that Japan is not adjusting easily to the contemporary need to broaden the basis of its foreign policy beyond economics and the American security alliance.

In many ways, Tokyo's approach to the PFT synthesizes the inherent cultural and political difficulties Japan is experiencing in transitioning from a passive to a more activist foreign policy. Not only does the study of Japan's decision to sign the PFT on 12 August 1978 highlight these tensions but it also shows the linkage between Japanese domestic party politics and Japan's foreign policy output. Furthermore, because the PFT has implications for all the major security issues in Asia, an analysis of Japan's position on such an agreement should provide some insight on what direction a more vigorous approach to international relations might take the Japanese with regard to the Sino-Soviet dispute, the future of Taiwan, the continuance of the American alliance, peace in Korea, resource rights in the East China Sea, and Japan's economic survival.

Assuming the PFT to be a valuable analytical construct for identifying Japanese national interests and their effects on Japan's emerging foreign policy, this study will use the treaty as a reference point for focusing on the nature and meaning of national interests. From this framework the cultural context to Japan's search for a more independent foreign policy through improved relations with China will be developed. After establishing this cultural context, the question of whether closer ties with China and the conclusion of the PFT is in Japan's best interest will be used as a backdrop to scrutinize the interaction between Japanese domestic politics and foreign policy. With this foundation, the positive and negative implications of the PFT on Japan's current problematic situation of bolstering its security, maintaining its economic prosperity and enhancing its international status can be addressed.⁴

II. THE PHILOSOPHY AND MEANING OF NATIONAL INTERESTS

The negotiations called for in the Chou-Tanaka communique "aimed at the conclusion of a treaty of peace and friendship" took six years to complete even though a prima facie case exists showing that China and Japan have, since reestablishing diplomatic relations in 1972, both perceived the PFT to be in their national interests.⁵ If complete normalization was a policy goal of Peking and Tokyo, why did this issue remain unresolved for so long, and why was 1978 believed to be a time "ripe for negotiations on the treaty"?⁶ The answer to these questions lies to some degree in understanding the affects of national interests on the behavior of nation states.

Consequently, before examining the potential impact of the PFT on the specific national interests of Japan, a more precise analysis of the metaphysics of national interests is needed. Using the evolvement and Japan's movement toward the completion of its peace and friendship treaty with China as a case in point, an endeavor will be made to build a conceptual framework for understanding the relationship between national interests and foreign policy. Elements to be examined include the amorphous nature of the concept, the major analytical methods for studying national interests, and the important criticisms of using national interests as a basis for making or understanding policy. From this

examination an operational definition of national interest which can be used to assess the impact of the Sino-Japanese peace and friendship treaty will be presented.

A. NATIONAL INTERESTS: THEIR AMORPHOUS NATURE

Thought of axiomatically and loosely used, the term national interest is not easy to define and "political and scholarly discussions on the national interest have tended to produce either simplistic generalizations or scholastic sophistry."⁷ This difficulty with definition can be traced to two inherent characteristics of national interest.

First, national interests "are highly generalized abstractions that reflect each state's basic wants and needs."⁸ The Chou-Tanaka Communique's statement that "The normalization of relations and the development of good neighborly and friendly relations between the two countries are in the interests of the two people, and will also contribute to the relaxation of tension in Asia and the safeguard of world peace" is a typical example of the vague tautological style used to express national interests. Consequently, there is a legitimate concern among students of the subject that the "great generalities" of the phrase "national interest" may obscure the fact that nations often conduct their foreign policies on the basis of achieving specific often short term goals, and that these identifiable policy objectives are a more accurate gauge for analyzing a nation's political behavior than the vague abstract concept of national interest.⁹

Besides its abstractness, a second characteristic contributing to the perplexity of national interest is its dynamic nature. National interests are not immutable, but are shaped by the interaction of a nation's cultural value system with the constantly changing international environment modified by the state's material wants and capabilities. Of course, none of these factors affecting national interests are themselves static making the combinations and permutations of their interaction difficult to empiricize.

The unadulterated fact that both China and Japan have stated that the conclusion of a peace and friendship treaty is in their mutual national interests demonstrates how radically national interests can change. In the early days of the Cold War both China and Japan formally aligned themselves against each other via superpower surrogates in order to protect their national security interests, promote their economic recovery, and prevent external interference with their domestic political institutions. With the shift from bipolarity to multipolar world, due in great measure to their own political and economic resurgence, China and Japan's national interests have become more complementary and better served, since the Sino-Soviet split and American rapprochement with Peking, by pragmatic cooperation than by ideological based antagonism. The point being, that the international environment has changed considerably since the early 1950s and so has Japan's national interests.

Difficult though the concept of national interest may be to pin down because of its abstractness and dynamic nature, it must be remembered that these are essential qualities in its composite makeup. As in the physical sciences, problems associated with measurement are not sufficient grounds for dismissal of the phenomena. Not only does the term "national interest" remain in the lexicon of foreign policy, it is used by ruling elites and political scientists alike for discerning and explaining a country's foreign policy.

B. NATIONAL INTEREST: TRADITIONAL METHODS OF ANALYSIS

Traditionally, two approaches have been used to fix the characteristics of a national interest, though neither is without defect. One school contends that national interests are most accurately defined by deducing them from a careful empirical study of a nation's policy output.¹⁰ For example, China's steadfast refusal to accept anything but minimum short term credit arrangements, despite the advantages of a more liberal debt policy for achieving rapid industrialization¹¹ demonstrated not only the dynamic interaction of interests but also leaves little latitude for concluding other than that economic independence is an important Chinese national interest. Turning to Japan, Tokyo's former reluctance to enter into any peace and friendship treaty with China that included an anti-hegemony clause is a positive display of Japan's interest in a policy of equidistance

between China and the Soviet Union to keep from being sucked into the vortex of the Sino-Soviet dispute.¹²

A major deficiency of the deductive method for defining national interests on the basis of actual policy output is that it takes no account of what a nation's interests and policies should be. For instance, perhaps China's long term interests might be better served by a more enlightened attitude toward borrowing, or Japan's security and economic position improved by tilting towards one of its communist neighbors, but the deductive method avoids such normative questions by concentrating on what a nation does as the key indicator of what its interests are. Furthermore, this approach not only exaggerates short term objectives at the expense of long term interests, it also infers that a nation's interest are limited by the government's ability to bring them to fruition.

A second methodological approach for getting a grip on national interests is analysis based on logical induction.¹³ This school postulates that there are certain irreducible national interests such as physical survival, territorial integrity, political independence, economic subsistence, etc., from which a nation's interests can be inductively extrapolated. If one postulates that China's "primary interest" is survival, both politically and physically,¹⁴ then Peking's seeking an anti-hegemonic peace and friendship treaty with Japan is a logical manifestation of this irreducible national interest because it would both thwart

Soviet efforts to contain China while making Japanese capital and technology more accessible for the modernization of the People's Republic. Accepting the proposition that free trade is essential to the existence of lightly armed and resource poor Japan, then the emphasis Tokyo has placed on assuring its access to raw materials and export markets, while also promoting a stable political environment to minimize the need for armed forces, is not surprising.¹⁵

Inductive reasoning suggests that because free trade and political stability are irreducible Japanese interests, improved relations with China, through the conclusion of the PFT is a logical policy alternative for achieving these goals. Not only can China provide Japan with needed raw materials and possible export markets, but closer political ties between Asia's most populous nation and its most economically developed state could provide a forum for defusing potentially explosive Asian issues such as the superpower's role in regional security, control of the East China Sea shelf resources, the status of Taiwan, and competition for expanding Southeast Asian markets.¹⁶

The obvious difficulty with the inductive approach is determining and defining what the value laden term "irreducible interests" means. Because of their near universal applicability and relativistic nature, meaning different things to different nations at different times, phrases such as survival, international stability and economic development

are actually just synonyms that shed little light on the meaning of national interest. As Sonderman suggest, "such terms as survival, self-preservation, independence, sovereignty --- usually said to constitute the rock-bottom purpose of the foreign policies of states --- will be found, upon closer inspection, to hide a host of ambiguities."¹⁷

This leads to the observation that both the deductive and the inductive methods provide only a lens for focusing on the nature of national interest; but neither provides a denotative definition as to which approach is more efficacious, it clearly depends on which interest is under consideration and what evidence is available. By their quantifiable nature, certain economic goals may be more prone to deductive analysis than security interests which are more affected by perceptions. Regardless of whether or not the interest is quantifiable, the absence of sufficient policy output or where there is no discernable pattern to a nation's policy in a given area, the inductive method may be the only viable avenue open. The significance here is that even the analytical methodology for studying the concept of national interest is infected to some degree by the abstract and dynamic nature of the phenomena under investigation.

C. NATIONAL INTERESTS: ARE THEY RELEVANT?

Since neither methodology adequately cuts through the ambiguities associated with the abstract and dynamic nature of a nation's national interests, many observers reject the

concept of "national interest" as a means for explaining national behavior because of the lack of clear casual links between a state's interests and its foreign policy. Those who see the concept of national interest as devoid of relevance usually level one of five criticisms.

1. The concept of national interest is too broad and all inconclusive to be meaningful. George and Keohane reckon that "in practice ... national interest has become so elastic and ambiguous a concept that its role as a guide to foreign policy is problematical and controversial."
2. The traditional difficulty in distinguishing ends from means confuses the specifics of the national interest concept, which is meant to elucidate the ends or purposes of foreign policy.
3. There is no clear method or formula in most governments for determining national interests. The legitimacy of the national interests can be quickly eroded by questioning not only what the national interests are, but who determined it and how it was reached.
4. Because of its positive rhetorical appeal, the concept of national interest is a political tool which can be retroactively applied to policy outputs in order to justify action, hide mistakes, rationalize policies, and disarm the opposition.
5. The concept of national interest is anachronistic in the growing interdependence of the modern world. J. Martin Rochester contends that the national interest in today's world "runs squarely up against what a number of observers believe to be major new forces in world politics" such as multinational

corporations, international organizations, ideological influences, concern for the environment, allocation of dwindling resources, etc.¹⁸

Certainly a case can be made that all these criticisms are germane to any consideration of China and Japan's interest in concluding a peace and friendship treaty. The careful wording of the Chou-Tanaka communique, which is accepted by both nations as the basis for their relations, is written in language open to broad interpretation since it places no obligations on either party. Furthermore, Japan's reconsideration of China's demand for the inclusion of an anti-hegemonic clause in the treaty and Peking's acceptance of the third country caveat infers a degree of elasticity in both nation's interests.¹⁹

Questions can also be raised about whether improved relations between China and Japan are in the long term national interest of either nation or merely a means for achieving immediate ends in Asia such as containment of the Soviet Union for China, or diversification of resource supplies for Japan. The motives of each side can also be imputed as representative not of national interests but of special interests. A reasoned argument can be made that there are factions within China's ruling elite that do not support Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping's pragmatic non-ideological approach of seeking foreign technology for the modernization of China, and are particularly opposed to more intimate ties with Japan.²⁰ In Japan, the Asian Problems

Study Group, which represents Japanese financial interests in Taiwan, has historically opposed other factions in the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) that favor increased Sino-Japanese political and economic intercourse.²¹ Naturally, supporters of the treaty in both Peking and Tokyo claim that the pact is essential to the national interests of both countries, but it is difficult to differentiate the rhetoric from the substance.

There is also the problem of determining to what degree China's public statements about Japan are influenced by the machinations of the Sino-Soviet dispute and concurrently, how Japan's position on the PFT is affected by its relations with the United States, Taiwan or the Soviet Union. Finally, the willingness of both sides to defer the question of sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands and associated ocean resources can be seen as supporting Rochester's contention that even classically obvious national interests may be of little value in explaining nation-state behavior in today's context of dwindling resources.²²

Even so, these criticisms about the relevance of national interests to real politics seem hollow despite their academic soundness. There remains an intuitive connection between a state's national interests and its policies, which is as difficult to dispell as it is to prove. Because of its value as conceptual scheme within which goals can be arranged, policy makers continue to use the term "national interest" to at least explain, if not determine their decisions.²³

Consequently, the relationship between national interests and foreign policy can be questioned but not ignored.

D. NATIONAL INTERESTS: AN OPERATIONAL DEFINITION

Because of this apparently innate relationship between interests and policies, identifying the elements that make up this linkage may reduce the abstractions and dynamics associated with the concept of national interests. As some observers insist, the meaning of national interest can most accurately be discerned not by simply looking at a nation's "policy output" or reasoning a priori from certain "irreducible interests," but by scrutinizing the interaction of a state's cultural context with the problematic situations it faces through the political system it has developed.²⁴

This approach infers that rather than concentrating on the epistemology of national interest, as the deductive and inductive methods do, it would be more productive to develop an operational definition of national interest by focusing on what the concept should mean to have functional validity.

First to be a useful construct for determining or understanding a government's foreign policy, a nation's national interests should reflect its basic philosophic and pragmatic values. Concomitantly, these values should also be indicative of what means are acceptable to the nation for pursuing these interests. As an example, China and Japan both are ethnocentric nations that place a high premium on cultural integrity. This primarily is a result of China's preponderant influence

in East Asia over time and Japan's insular geography. Regardless of its origin, cultural integrity has a thoroughly documented subliminal value to each society which need not be articulated to bias the policies of either China or Japan. It would seem that Japan's administrative barriers to foreign manufactured goods and China's reluctance to become dependent on foreign capital, despite their economic soundness, are in actuality manifestations of a deep concern for maintaining cultural purity. As for the importance of values in establishing acceptable parameters of action, clear examples exist in Japan's constitutional rejection of the right of war and China's past resistance to mortgaging its dependence to accelerate modernization.

Besides fundamental values, a nation's national interests are also generated by its more immediate needs which provide a rubric for prioritizing them. Unquestionably, problematic needs associated with the vitality of the state demand solutions and these crystalize interests. If resources and export markets are needed, these will create an interest in free trade; a need for a more modern industrial plant will engender an interest in acquiring foreign technology. Concerning the peace and friendship treaty, the intersection of Peking and Tokyo's desire for political stability in East Asia coupled with Japan's need to diversify its sources of raw materials and China's need for foreign technology²⁵ explain in large part their mutual interest in the PFT. But

a nation's needs may be at cross purposes with each other, or more importantly in conflict with the state's basic value system, thus creating a serious policy dilemma for the governing elite. For instance, stability and economic development are obviously not China and Japan's only needs, hence the deliberate pace of the treaty negotiations. Certainly, questions of security and the reaction of the United States and the Soviet Union to closer Sino-Japanese ties have influenced Tokyo's position on the advisability of seeking closer ties with Peking. Likewise, China's policy on a treaty of this sort has been more affected by a need to neutralize Moscow's influence in Asia and to reassert sovereignty over its "lost territories", particularly Taiwan, than by its need for fully normalized relations with Japan. The criticality of these competing needs to the survival of the state as an effective international unit, however, does provide a ready formula for placing these derive interests in priority order.

Even so, values and needs remain nebulous abstractions until translated into policy by a nation's formal and informal political institutions. In fact, the political process is really the cybernetic link between a nation's long term values and more immediate needs. Essentially, a nation's political institutions and decision making process evolve from the continuous impact of the state's cultural context on its current problematic situation and vice versa.²⁶

The lesson to be gleaned is that the bureaucratic hierarchical nature of the Chinese system and the factional consensus methodology of policy formation in Japan not only identifies significant philosophical traits that differentiate the two societies, these non-congruent political systems also infer that a mutuality of need may not necessarily result in a commonality of interest or policy. Briefly then, a nation's political system is, in effect, its perceptual equipment for both identifying and reacting to its national interests.

Summarizing these particulars, an operational definition of national interests is suggested by this subjectively perceptible, if not fully understandable, linkage between a nation's values, needs and political system. Certainly this definition can be faulted because it says little or nothing about how these three variables interact to form national interests, but it does specify which elements are essential to the concept. It also has the advantage of implicitly recognizing the abstract and dynamic character of national interests; nor does it require a quantitative analysis of a qualitative subject. Furthermore, it is as equally useful to the decision maker in formulating foreign policy as it is to the analyst trying to ferret out the purpose of the policy.

Asserting that national interests drive foreign policy, the succeeding analysis will make use of this operational definition as point of departure for examining the potential

impact of the PFT on Japan's national interests. An attempt will be made to isolate and analyze how the treaty relates to the values deprived from Japan's cultural context, to the Japanese methodology for policy making, and to the current problematic challenges facing Japanese foreign policy. Hopefully such an exercise will identify what Japan's national interests are. Heuristically, this study should italicize the major sources of international friction in Northeast Asia and provide a case study understanding of the influence national interests have on Japanese foreign policy.

III. THE CULTURAL CONTEXT TO JAPANESE FOREIGN POLICY

It is often argued that Japan's post-World War II capacity to discern its own interests and act accordingly has seriously atrophied under the prevailing influence of the American alliance, resulting in the current atmosphere of confusion amongst Japanese decision makers.²⁷ This assertion has appeal because it provides both a plausible explanation for Japan's present policy dilemma and is easily documented. While America's patronage has certainly allowed Japan to avoid tough questions of security and international politics during its "economic miracle", it would be inaccurate to infer that this is the root cause of Japan's discomfiture in today's multi-polar environment. Actually Japan's awkward response to its need for a more independent foreign policy does not stem from American domination; rather, it has its origin in the clash between what Japan as a modern nation-state requires for a successful foreign policy and the historically developed attributes of Japanese society.²⁸

Because of this tension between Japan's pragmatic foreign policy needs and its introverted societal traits, an understanding of Japan's cultural context is essential to gauging the impact of the PFT on Japan's foreign policy. This can be done by cataloguing the more significant premises of Japanese culture and presenting an historical survey of how these traditional traits have manifested themselves in Japanese policy.

A. THE CULTURAL PREMISES OF JAPANESE NATIONAL INTERESTS

With the possible exception of Great Britain, Japan's cultural context is uniquely molded by the amalgamation of insular geography, cultural homogeneity, and foreign influences. Besides this almost unparalleled combination of cultural determinants, their impact on the modern Japanese psyche is magnified by their uninterrupted interaction for almost twenty centuries. As a result, periods of intensive borrowing from other nations have not torn the fabric of Japanese culture.²⁹

Turning to the impact of geography, Edwin Reischauer unequivocally states "the chief reason for Japan's distinctive role in East Asian civilization is probably its location as a relatively remote island country."³⁰ Not only has insularity permitted Japanese cultural and economic development to proceed unfettered by mass migrations or unwanted foreign philosophies, it also, until the advent of strategic nuclear delivery systems, effectively protected Japan from foreign invasion. Blessed with a well protected hospitable environment, but one racked by periodic natural disasters such as typhoons and earthquakes, the Japanese, reenforced by Buddhist and Shinto beliefs, have developed a passive philosophical outlook for dealing with nature. According to this "awase" perspective man is best served by adapting to nature rather than trying to manipulate it.

Adapting to its moated geography, Japan has traditionally not perceived the need for a large military establishment to

insure security. Imbued with the kamikaze spirit and the experience of Tokugawa isolation, the Japanese have not generally exercised themselves about the physical protection of their island homeland.³¹ Even though missiles and aircraft have antiquated Japan's oceanic shield, and access to international sea lanes has become mandatory for the functioning of its industrial society, the Japanese people remain content with a constitution that questions the advisability of using military force and an alliance that delegates Japan's strategic defense to the United States.³²

Another natural derivative of Japan's insularity is the homogeneity of its people. Physically detached from the Asian mainland, assimilation of Japan's early inhabitants into a racially pure stock with its own distinctive language was completed by the ninth century A.D.³³ Coupling ethnic and linguistic homogeneity with the natural geographic boundaries of their landfall, the Japanese people developed an early sense of national identity -- modern nationalism. As a result, the Japanese are acutely aware of their racial heritage and have historically placed the well being of society above the pursuit of individual welfare.³⁴ This nationalistically motivated submission of the individual to the needs of society also explains in part Japan's continuing stress on acquiescence to authority, the importance of conformity, and a predilection for group action versus singular endeavors. Japan's strong Confucian identification with a

hierarchical mode of interpersonal relations has also shown itself in a sensitivity to Japan's status in the international community and an inability to deal with other states as equals.

Despite the obvious advantages of racial and linguistic homogeneity for encouraging the evolution of an orderly society and promoting relative economic prosperity, these same factors have also led to a pronounced sense of ethnocentric conservatism in the Japanese people. Not only does this ethnocentricity make the Japanese naturally suspicious of anything foreign, but because of a lack of external stimuli the Japanese have experienced difficulty in understanding the attitudes and actions of other peoples.³⁵

As a result of this unchallenged homogeneity, Japan has an introverted tradition in the field of foreign affairs, which has been abetted by the complexities of the Japanese language. Furthermore, this geographically spawned cultural sameness has produced a schizophrenic sense of separateness among the Japanese people. Over time this schizophrenia has manifested itself in both an exaggerated perception of national superiority and an agitated sense of isolation.³⁶

Neither Japan's geographic remoteness nor its ethnocentric conservatism, however, could dim the brilliance of China's T'ang Dynasty (612-907) to the Japanese court at Yamato. Titillated by the gradual introduction of Buddhism from China, Japan's intellectuals and ruling class showed a precocious pragmatism about borrowing selected attributes

from a culture in order to strengthen Japan. Historically, Japan's tradition of examining foreign models for useful traits of a transferable nature can be traced back to Prince Shotoku's (578-621) embassies to the imperial capital of Ch'ang-an and continued by subsequent Japanese rulers until 894.³⁷ As a consequence of these three centuries of tutelage, Chinese advances in government, philosophy, religion, architecture, art, literature, and semantics were incorporated by the Japanese into their collective knowledge, and a lasting affinity for Chinese culture was forged.³⁸

Perhaps more important than the substantive contributions to Japanese culture resulting from this early emulation of China is the precedent it established and the subjective impact such cultural borrowing continues to have on Japan's collective personality. Despite an almost one thousand year hiatus since the high point of aggressive cultural borrowing from China, the mid-nineteenth century challenge of European and American influence in Asia induced progressive elements in Japan to end the feudal Shogunate in 1868 and gird their homeland against western encroachment by actively modernizing Japan's military, economic, social, and governmental institutions by applying Occidental learning.³⁹ The next significant period of cultural borrowing after the Meiji Restoration occurred during the Cold War, when the U.S. must have appeared as a modern T'ang dynasty to war-damaged Japan. The Occupation (1945-1952) certainly directed the Japanese towards the American economic and political system as the

most appropriate model for the successful reconstruction of their nation,⁴⁰ but there can be little question about the positive effects U.S. industry, technology, and financial assistance have had on Japanese society. As with China, this felicitous absorption of American principles resulted in a Japanese fondness for things American and a desire for expanded bilateral relations.

In assessing the Japanese approach to cultural borrowing it is interesting to note that the cultures selected for emulation -- China, Western Europe, and the U.S. -- were at the time not only more advanced than Japan, but also capable of dominating East Asia militarily. By learning from these particular cultures Japan hoped not only to strengthen its own society, but in the process to gain the esteem of these more powerful potential adversaries.⁴¹ Most Japanese scholars infer that this borrowing created a subliminal sense of inferiority aggravated by Japan's racial homogeneity. According to this interpretation, the very act of borrowing represents a tacit self-acknowledgement by the Japanese of the superiority of the foreign culture, and this realization has historically created a natural tension with Japan's strong sense of cultural identity, which in turn has motivated the Japanese to vigorously improve upon the items appropriated from abroad in order to assuage this feeling of inferiority.⁴² In brief, the Japanese record of successfully adapting foreign advances to its cultural moorings has affected the collective

national psyche by simultaneously arousing positive feelings about Japan's superior uniqueness from other nations, while also generating a subtle sense of inferiority.

The interaction of Japan's insular geography, ethnic homogeneity, and receptivity to foreign innovation has synthesized a traditional outlook towards international relations characterized by:

1. A deep rooted sense of national identity and uniqueness from other cultures.
2. A hierarchical understanding of international relations which stressed authority and conformity.
3. An intense concern about improving Japan's international status, which has motivated periods of extended cultural borrowing from more advanced societies.
4. A submerged fear of isolation and subliminal inferiority complex.
5. A passive attitude about world events which recommends adapting to the international situation instead of trying to change it.
6. An abbreviated diplomatic experience and historical freedom from security threats due to Japan's geographic setting.
7. A premium on decision by consensus, resulting from Japan's authoritarian traditions and cultural homogeneity.

Collectively, these traits have defined the parameters of Japanese thinking about foreign affairs, and the new demands of today's multipolar world, withstanding, they are still germane to the development of Japan's contemporary foreign

policy. Tokyo's mixed reactions towards negotiating the PFT with China reflect this continued relevance, but they also demonstrate the incompatibility between Japan's cultural context and its present problematic situation.

For example, Japan's long term desire since the days of Prime Minister Yoshida for its own identifiable China policy has been thwarted by a need for conformity to America's post World War II China policy and more recently by the Sino-Soviet dispute. Tokyo's interest in political and economic access to China has been balanced by fears of antagonizing the Soviet Union and alienating the United States. In fact, Japan's passive attitude and resultant concern about Soviet, American and Taiwanese reaction to the PFT caused the Chinese to wonder during the course of the negotiations about Japan's sincerity in seeking such a pact.⁴³

The xenophobic dynamics of Japanese culture are further sensitized by Japan's growing dependence on overseas resources and markets and the threat posed to the Japanese Islands by modern weapons technology. In essence, the cross pressures between Japan's need for external connections and its insular ethnic homogeneity have produced a foreign policy that lacks direction and is not completely synchronized with the needs of a modern nation state. This lack of synchronization was apparent in the erratic course Japan followed in negotiating the PFT.

B. THE HISTORICAL MANIFESTATIONS OF JAPAN'S NATIONAL INTERESTS

Regardless, Japan's entrenched cultural context remains the qualitative norm against which today's generation of Japanese judge the acceptability of their foreign policy. But a nation's cultural context is not a static given; rather, it is both shaped and modified by the state's historical experience. In Japan's case the accelerated transition from a feudal agrarian society to a modern industrial state in less than a century underscores this point. The historical forces affecting Japan since the Meiji Restoration, though tempered by the Japanese cultural context, have contributed significantly to the formation of current attitudes on foreign policy in general and the PFT in particular.

For purposes of analysis, Japan's modern history can be divided into four periods based on the type of foreign policy goals pursued. The Tokugawa era (1603-1868) isolated Japan from the threatening effects of foreign influence; during the Meiji Restoration (1868-1889) Japan successfully became competitive with the west through modernization and industrialization; in the age of intense nationalism (1889-1945) Japan pursued its political and economic interests through a policy of imperialistic expansionism; finally the Showa generation (1945-present) has concentrated on an economic non-political approach to foreign policy.

Individually, each of these periods is important because of the substantive influence they have had on the evolvement of today's Asian security calculus, and Tokyo's current

attitudes about the conduct of foreign affairs. Collectively, this history shows the wide range of fluctuation in Japanese interests over time and Tokyo's pragmatic, non-doctrinaire approach to international relations.

Briefly, the renowned isolation of Japan by the Tokugawa Shoguns was not a foreign policy but a domestic program designed to prevent any changes in the social order that might threaten the ascendancy of the ruling family.⁴⁴ Fearful of Christian missionaries with their allegiance to the Pope, western traders who could disrupt the Japanese economy,⁴⁵ an edict was issued in 1636 terminating all Japanese activity abroad, enjoining the construction of seagoing ships, promising death to any Japanese who returned from a foreign country and restricting foreign shipping (primarily Dutch and Chinese) to Nagasaki.

By all accounts, the Tokugawa Shogunate was supremely successful in maintaining its rule by arresting change. Besides sealing Japan off from the technological advances of industrial revolution, the isolation also conditioned the Japanese to view foreign involvement and change as detrimental to Japan's national interests. Furthermore, the isolation demonstrated that Japan could deal with difficult foreign policy issues by avoiding them.

The persistence of these attitudes is reflected in Japan's post-World War II aloofness from controversial international issues. During the Tokugawa era Japan isolated itself from the international community in order to protect

the power base of its ruling elite; since 1945, Tokyo has routinely deferred taking any foreign policy initiatives for fear of their negative impact on Japan's economic strength. Japan's cautious approach towards concluding the PFT can be explained in terms of dodging the Sino-Soviet dispute and a concern about the long term economic effects of being foreclosed from Soviet resources and markets.

Commodore Perry is commonly popularized for ending Japan's isolation in 1854. More accurately, his forceful representation of American military and economic interests in the Western Pacific was a catalyst for unleashing the latent forces of commercial and social change pent up by the anachronism of Tokugawa rule. The Tokugawa imposition of political stability created a favorable environment for the rapid expansion of a modern urban economy. This resulted in wealth being transferred from the land-holding daimyo to the merchant class without a commensurate shift in political power because of a strict Confucian social ordering.⁴⁷ In this milieu of economic and political change, enlightened Japanese were also growing more apprehensive about the ease with which modern military technology allowed the western powers to carve up China into spheres of influence.

The ensuing Meiji Restoration⁴⁸ brought the industrial revolution to Japan and associated the modernization of the Japanese state with the national interest, an association that is not spent even today. Impressed by the formidable firepower displayed by the western fleets in their bombardment

of Kagoshima and Shimonoseki, and resentful of the political humiliation Japan was forced to endure because of its military backwardness, the ruling clique of the Meiji Restoration became resolute about transforming Japan into a nation that could hold its own in the modern world. Perceptively, Japan's new samurai leaders realized that to match the west's military power, Japan would need a complete economic, social, political, and intellectual renovation. In short, this program of rapid modernization represented a revolution, but not one fomented on the streets. Instead, it was masterminded in the corridors of government and guided by a handful of energetic leaders united in their desire to make Japan the equal of any major power. Certainly, one purpose of this revolution was to prevent a repetition in Japan of China's post-Opium Wars experience with the west.

The Charter Oath taken by the Emperor on 8 April 1868 set the tone for the Meiji Restoration and effectively countermanded the isolationist traditions of Tokugawa. Besides declaring feudal customs to be outmoded and legitimating consultative assemblies, the Charter Oath recognized the need for assimilating western knowledge. In the fifth article of the oath the Emperor proclaims, "knowledge shall be sought throughout the world and thus the welfare of the Empire will be promoted."⁴⁹

Clearly, the events of the 1850s and 1860s gave the Japanese a healthy respect for occidental power, convincing

the Empire's new ruling elite that the only defense against western encroachment was to adopt western industrial skills and military technology. Unable "to expell the barbarians" with Japan's outdated economy and military, the rallying cry of the Meiji court became "rich country, strong army." Like the Meiji Restoration, the conclusion of the PFT also represents a transition from a passive to a more activist foreign policy. Both the Restoration and the PFT have in common the quality of compromise with the security and economic realities of Japan's external environment.

Within a generation, the Meiji Restoration had transformed Japan into a modern military industrial power. This spectacular metamorphosis was possible because of the social and economic foundation left by Tokugawa; because Japan could simply borrow proven technological advances and economic principles from the west; and because the modernization process was astutely managed by the Meiji leadership. Industrialization was encouraged through access to foreign technology, easy credit and government subsidies, all supervised and coordinated by the new Ministry of Industry. Universal military conscription, instituted in 1873, not only strengthened Japan but also tempered the frictions of class distinction by involving the masses in Japan's esteemed samurai tradition. The Restoration's insistence on universal education also made Japan the first nation in Asia with a literate population, an essential element for developing a technocratic society. Each of these government innovations, it should be noted,

were not meant to benefit the individual citizen, but to improve Japan as a whole. The goal of the Meiji Restoration was not Jeffersonian democracy but "rich country, strong military."

The Meiji Restoration is important to Japan's current foreign policy because the Japanese association of technological prowess and economic capacity with the survival of the state has its genesis in this era. More significantly, it demonstrates, in unison with the Tokugawa isolationist policy, that when Japan senses a serious external challenge it can adapt with alacrity and in such a way as to take advantage of the situation instead of being threatened by it. This point seems particularly germane to Japan today as current patterns of security and economics change with increasing international interdependence. It would seem that Japan's closer alignment with China through the PFT may be a signal that Tokyo again sees the world changing and is ready to embark on a major reassessment of its security and economic policies. Events subsequent to 1868 show how drastically such reassessments can change Japan's foreign policy posture.

In the twenty years of social, political, and economic change that followed the Meiji Restoration, the Japanese also developed an imperialistic mentality. Looking to the west as a model for modernization, the Japanese were struck by the correlation between colonial holdings and Great Power

status. If Japan was to achieve its goal of "rich country, strong military" and be accepted as an equal by the western powers, an overseas empire seemed a prerequisite in the later part of the nineteenth century. Not only would control over resource-rich areas in Manchuria and Korea stoke Japan's growing industrial machine; such holdings would also enhance Japanese security by curbing the expansion of the western powers, particularly Tsarist Russia, into East Asia.

Besides practical considerations of security and economics, Japanese imperialism was fueled by the nation's lingering samurai traditions and a strong resurgence of emotional nationalism associated with Tokugawa self-sufficiency. Furthermore, the disintegration of dynastic China provided the Japanese with a natural power vacuum within which to exercise their expansionist ambitions. In essence, Japan's imperialistic pattern of behavior can be explained in terms of economic and security needs, a cultural desire not be dependent on foreigners, a Confucian proclivity for dominant-subordinate relationships, and a reasonable opportunity for national aggrandizement.

With China's influence fading and Japan's imperialism maturing, Tokyo embarked on a strategy aimed at regional supremacy.⁵⁰ Obviously the decision to seek its goals of security, prosperity, and status by emulating western imperialism meant Japan's hegemonic designs would come into conflict first with China and then with the interests of the western powers in Northeast Asia.

In 1874 the Japanese dispatched a punitive expedition to Taiwan, forcing the Chinese to pay an indemnity for the death of some Ryukyu Island fishermen shipwrecked there some years earlier. This expedition was the first major overseas Japanese military action since Hideyoshi's aborted Korean offensive (1592-1598) and established Japan's claim to sovereignty over the Ryukyus, an issue of no small moment in today's current debate between Peking and Tokyo over ownership of the East China ocean shelf resources.⁵¹

Turning north, in 1875 Japan returned Sakhalin to Russia in exchange for sovereignty over the entire Kuril Island chain. The Treaty of Saint Petersburg, which forms the legal basis of Japan's present claim against the Soviet Union for possession of the disputed "Northern Territories",⁵² at the time amicably resolved Japan's border issues with Russia. This freed both nations to pursue their newly awakened desires for empire building in more lucrative parts of Asia.⁵³ Given the geography of Northeast Asia, it was only a matter of time before Japanese and Russian imperialism became mutually exclusive with violent results.

Having secured its northern and southern seaward flanks, Japan focused on peacefully detaching Korea from the Chinese tributary system. Using the same tactics as Perry, the Japanese deployed a naval squadron to Inchon in 1876 and forced the Korean king to sign a treaty opening peninsula ports to trade on terms favorable to Japan, while declaring Korea to be an independent state. For the next two decades

Tokyo limited itself to political intrigue in Korean politics as a means of replacing Peking as the suzerain power on the peninsula. Finally, in 1894, tiring of its rivalry with China for dominance in Korea and fearful of Russia's growing interest in an ice-free Korean port as a possible southern terminus for its planned Trans-Siberian Railway, Tokyo precipitated the Sino-Japanese War.⁵⁴ Japan's devastating victory contrasted the effects of China and Japan's differing attitudes about modernization and set in motion a series of socio-political events that eventually led to China's revolution in 1911.

In the meantime, the Treaty of Shimonoseki that ended the Sino-Japanese War in 1895 not only established Japan as a world power but also as Russia's major competitor for control of Manchuria and Korea. Besides a large indemnity and a favorable commercial treaty, which strengthened Japan's fiscal position, the Treaty of Shimonoseki also forced China to recognize Korea's independence and to cede Taiwan, the Pescadores and the Liaotung Peninsula to Japan.

With constructions of the Trans-Siberian Railway underway since 1891, Moscow could not allow Japanese possession of the Liaotung Peninsula go unchallenged, since this strategic finger of land between the Yellow Sea and the Pohai Gulf controlled the maritime approaches to southern Manchuria. Because this threatened the accomplishment of Moscow's long term goal of acquiring an Asian ice-free port connected by rail with Europe, Russia in concert with France and Germany

forced Japan to rescind its demand for the Liaotung Peninsula shortly after the Shimonoseki agreement was signed. Infuriated by this Triple Intervention, Tokyo was in no position, however, to resist the demarche of three western powers.

Anxious about the threat posed by Japan's growing economic and military capacity, and fearing an armed attack to redress the Triple Intervention, Russia enticed China into a secrete mutual assistance pact against Japanese aggression. This Li-Lobanov Treaty of 1896, the historical antecedent of the 1950 Sino-Soviet alliance, provided the basis for Russia's increasing influence in Manchuria through the construction of the Chinese Eastern Railway and the eventual leasing of the Liaotung Peninsula in 1898.⁵⁵ The duplicity in taking Liaotung after denying it to Japan and the threat presented to Japanese interests in Korea by Russia's military occupation of Manchuria's three eastern provinces during the Boxer Rebellion (1900) made a Russo-Japanese war predictable.

Moscow's determination to have its way in Manchuria was also becoming alarming to British interests in maintaining a balance of power in the Far East. The resulting Anglo-Japanese Treaty of 1902, not unlike Japan's current treaty arrangement with the United States, provided a security umbrella for Japanese action against Russia.⁵⁶ Not only did the Anglo-Japanese alliance lay the foundation for Japan's crushing defeat of the Russian Navy at the Battle of Tsushima (27 May 1905), it also represented Japan's first

modern security treaty with any foreign power and established the pattern of alliance with Russia's major adversary.

The Treaty of Portsmouth, which was negotiated with American assistance in 1905,⁵⁷ ended the Russo-Japanese War, acknowledged Japan's paramount interests in Korea, transferred the Liaotung lease and the southern portion of the Manchurian Eastern Railway from Moscow to Tokyo, and ceded the southern half of Sakhalin back to the Japanese. This treaty unquestionably certified Japan's credentials as an expanding world power with an industrial machine to nurture and an image to maintain.⁵⁸

To be sure, Japan's victories over China and Russia vindicated the Meiji modernization program, but these successful wars also awoke Japan to its almost total dependence on foreign supplies for strategic raw materials and exchange capital. Since 1905, Japanese foreign policy has concentrated its attention on how best to cope with these handicaps.

Internal dissension, leading towards revolution, was sapping both Chinese and Russian strength as the first decade of the twentieth century came to a close. Devoid of competition, Japan annexed Korea in 1910 and in this relaxed security environment began to concentrate on economic development and exploitation of its new possessions.

World War I presented Japan with a virtually risk-free opportunity to consolidate both its security and economic interests in East Asia. With only minimal participation in

the war effort as an ally of Great Britain, Japan successfully sought as a spoil of war Germany's concession on China's Tsingtao Peninsula and its island possessions in the northern Pacific. Additionally, in 1915 with the other major powers diverted by the fighting in Europe, Tokyo presented strife-torn China with an opprobrious list of "Twenty-one Demands", which if acquiesced in would reduce China to a Japanese protectorate. Because the western powers were either unable or unwilling to guarantee China's sovereignty, President Yuan Shih-kai was forced by a Japanese ultimatum to submit to certain territorial demands that assured Japan a commanding position in China.⁵⁹ The war also strengthened Japan economically; products from European cotton mills and factories were no longer able to reach the lucrative Asian markets, allowing Japanese industrialists to take advantage of this situation to supplant these non-Asian suppliers.⁶⁰

Epitomizing the aggressive opportunism of Japanese foreign policy in the World War I era was Tokyo's energetic response for a joint expedition with the U.S. against sovietized Russia. Seeing Russian resolve depleted by its costly defeat in central Europe, the Bolshevik Revolution, and the ensuing White Russian Civil War, Japan believed the time was at hand to eliminate this formidable threat to Japan's interests in Asia. As a result, 72,000 Japanese troops were deployed to Siberia from 1918 to 1922 with the

objective of destroying the Russian threat to Japanese security, extending Japanese economic interests, and preventing the spread of political influence by the new Russian communist regime.⁶¹ Tokyo's ultimate goal of harnessing China and a non-Bolshevik Siberia to Japanese leadership in East Asia was, however, frustrated by the collapse of the White Russian resistance. In view of mounting international criticism and increasing dissatisfaction at home, Japan terminated its Siberian adventure in October 1922.

Militarily secure and economically prosperous after Versailles, but fearful of being isolated, Japan joined the great powers at the Washington Conference of 1921-1922 in an attempt to stabilize the world through diplomatic action. By calling for consultations between Japan, Britain, France, and the U.S. in the event of any East Asian crisis, Washington and London saw the Four Powers Treaty of 1921 as a graceful way of ending the potentially embarrassing Anglo-Japanese Treaty. Since the U.S. had replaced Russia as Japan's most likely rival in the Pacific, there was considerable anxiety in the western camp that, in the event of a U.S.-Japanese confrontation with the Anglo-Japanese alliance still in effect, London would be forced to support the Japanese against the Americans. The PFT raises a similar possibility today. In the event of a Sino-American dispute, Japan might have difficulty fulfilling its obligations under both the PFT and its security treaty with the U.S.

Upon completion of the Washington Conference, which the Soviet Union was not invited to, growing interest in Siberian resources and a diplomatic strategy of using Russia to balance China's resurging strength under Chiang Kai-shek caused the Japanese to reconsider their strained relationship with Moscow. As a result, Japan accorded diplomatic recognition to the Soviet Union in 1925 after two years of protracted negotiations.⁶² Today the PFT performs a similar function but the roles of China and Russia are reversed. The 1978 treaty counters growing Soviet power in Asia while creating a favorable political environment for increased Japanese access to Chinese raw materials and markets.

A final manifestation of Foreign Minister Shidehara's "soft policy" of the 1920's was Japan's agreement in 1928 to the Kellogg-Briand Treaty, which "condemned recourse to war for the solution of international controversies."⁶³ Representing the zaibatsu's⁶⁴ interest in a stable international order conducive to profitable trading relationships, Shidehara pursued a policy of conciliation and adjustment -- particularly with China. The crux of Shidehara's policy was a serious effort to reconcile China's aspirations for modernization with Japan's interests.⁶⁵ This is essentially the same motivation behind Japan's decision to sign the PFT.

Throughout the 1920's Shidehara's internationalist approach to Japan's problems of maintaining its security and prosperity were opposed bitterly by the military and certain bureaucratic

industrialist elements. Baron General Tanaka was the central figure espousing the concept that Japanese interests could only be protected by strong, unilateral military expansion. The world-wide economic depression of 1929, inducing a capital shortage which sharply curtailed the demand for Japanese exports, meant Japan no longer had sufficient funds available to purchase the raw materials needed for its industrial production. Faced with economic ruination and increasing challenges to its dominant political position in resource-rich Manchuria by Chiang's China and Stalin's Russia, Tokyo turned quickly from its flirtation with a conciliatory diplomacy to a military strategy for insuring Japanese self-sufficiency in raw materials and markets. This policy of imperialism manifested itself in the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931, full-scale war with China in 1937, announcement of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere in 1941 and, ultimately, war with the United States.

Under the growing influence of the ultra-national militarists, the Japanese ruling oligarchy saw a politically rejuvenated China, the land power of the Soviet Union, and the sea power of the United States as major obstacles to Japan's design for achieving economic self-sufficiency and military security through hegemony in East Asia. The Japanese apparently hoped to overcome these obstacles by striking swiftly against China, neutralizing the Soviets through treaty arrangements, and convincing the U.S. that Japanese expansion

was crucial to the survival of Japan but not a threat to American interests in the Pacific.⁶⁶

Through alliance with Germany,⁶⁷ Tokyo was able to take advantage of Moscow's fears of a two-front war and maneuvered Stalin into a five-year Neutrality Pact. As a pattern which reemerges with the PFT, it should be noted that Japan was successful in diplomatically protecting its interests from Russian interference by allying itself with Moscow's strongest adversary.⁶⁸ Japan's other strategies of quickly subduing China and avoiding war with the U.S. met with decidedly less success. A recapitulation of Japan's imperialistic period shows a foreign policy grounded in the militant pursuit of security, prosperity, and recognition for Japan. Based on performance, there seems little doubt that after the catharsis of the Meiji Restoration Japan's new ruling elite became bent on reestablishing the Tokugawa sense of independence on terms amenable to the twentieth century. The ultimate purpose of this foreign policy was to have China and the western powers acknowledge Japan as the dominant nation in the western Pacific. This goal, which the Japanese associated with national survival, led to the disastrous results of World War II, the effects of which continue to shape the Asian power equation. The U.S. and USSR were established as the world's only superpowers, China fell to communist control with an opposition regime set up on Taiwan, Korea was divided, the European powers were shorn of their colonies,

and Japan renounced the use of force as a viable foreign policy option.

In terms of the PFT, this era of military expansionism demonstratively associated Japan's security interests with the maintenance of friendly regimes in Taiwan and Korea; the preservation of strong ties with China; and the containment of Russian influence in Asia. These issues, of course, form the core of Japan's contemporary security problems and the PFT can be expected to have an impact on each of them. More to the point, throughout this period Japan and the Soviet Union came to view each other with growing mistrust, particularly where China was concerned.

Unquestionably, Japan's decision to sign the PFT and Moscow's intense opposition to the Sino-Japanese friendship pact can be explained in terms of contemporary issues, but the genesis of both Tokyo's and Moscow's policies can be traced to the 1890's and the beginning of the Russo-Japanese rivalry for preeminence in China. The conclusion that Japan's imperial behavior between 1889 and 1945 has significantly fashioned the nature of today's triangular relationship between Tokyo, Peking, and Moscow is unescapable.

The utter defeat in World War II, the American occupation, and the emergence of the Cold War all worked in unison to convince the Japanese people that military power was neither a guarantee of security, prosperity, or status in the nuclear age. If Japan was to regain its vitality and be readmitted to the world community as an accepted nation-state, Tokyo's

post war leaders realized they would have to rely on the U.S. for security while they concentrated on economic development and the promotion of a peaceful world environment conducive to international trade. Demilitarized by the Occupation and having (under American tutelage) constitutionally renounced in 1947 the use of armed force for solving international disputes, Japan returned to the Shidehara approach of the 1920's of insuring security and access to needed raw materials and markets through a "soft policy" of avoiding international confrontations.

Given the realities of the Occupation and the bipolar nature of the international arena, Japan had little choice in the early 1950's but to turn to Washington for needed strategic protection and economic stimulation. With the anti-Japanese Sino-Soviet alliance having been signed on 14 February 1950 and the Korean War in progress since June of that year, Japan formally moved into the American orbit on 8 September 1951, when it signed the San Francisco Peace Treaty and concluded a bilateral security treaty which committed the U.S. to defend Japan in the event of attack.

Insulated from the pressures of realpolitik by the American security alliance and with the commanding strength of the U.S. and USSR providing only limited opportunities for substantive foreign policy initiatives, Japan rapidly developed a trading company approach to foreign policy.⁶⁹ The criteria for foreign policy decisions became "enlarging overseas

contacts for the purpose of maximizing economic well being."⁷⁰ This economic perspective was further abetted by Washington's containment policy, which saw Japan's economic recovery as indispensable for protecting Japan from Cold War communist subversion. As a result, the U.S. fueled the Japanese economic miracle by relieving Tokyo of a burdensome defense budget, stimulating the advance of technology, by exchanging raw materials for finished products on terms favorable to the Japanese, and by sponsoring Japanese membership in such international economic organizations such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Coupling these factors with a skilled, industrious labor force and a large supply of investment capital available from an extraordinary high rate of savings, Japan's gross national product (GNP) began to grow at approximately nine percent a year between 1955 and 1960; from 1960 to 1970 it accelerated to twelve percent per annum and firmly established Japan as the third leading economy in the world.

With its defense and economic needs being underwritten by the U.S., Tokyo retreated into a self-imposed Tokugawa type isolation policy geared towards rebuilding Japan's industrial capacity.⁷¹ The basic principles of Japanese post World War II foreign policy can be summarized: avoid issues which might weaken the American commitment to Japan, broaden economic relations with other states while minimizing

political interactions, and quietly encourage a peaceful world order supportive of free trade. By defining its national interests throughout the bipolar era in terms of continued economic growth, Japan's foreign policy became progressively more passive and couched in pragmatic economics with little regard for the broader political implications of such behavior.⁷² Furthermore, Japan's "economic miracle" tended to confirm for the Japanese people the appropriateness of separating economics from foreign affairs and closely associated an attitude of international passivity with Japan's continuing postwar boom.

Japan's diplomatic interaction with both the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union prior to the 1970's clearly demonstrates Tokyo's economically driven desire to avoid an activist foreign policy. Neither the PRC nor the USSR signed the San Francisco Peace Treaty in 1951 and at the time this seemed of little consequence, since Japan's Prime Minister Yoshida had no identifiable foreign policy other than increasingly integrating Japan's security and economic interests with those of the U.S. This lack of formal contact with either Peking or Moscow tended to reenforce Tokyo's close bipolar identification with Washington and further reduce Japan's foreign policy options.

The intimacy of Japanese-American relations was brought into focus by the Yoshida Letter of 24 December 1951, which pledged Japanese recognition of Chian Kai-shek's Nationalist

regime and committed Japan to the American policy of containing the PRC.⁷³ The Yoshida letter remained the cornerstone of Japan's China policy until the Chou-Tanaka communique of 1972.

By keeping economics separate from politics Japan was, however, able to enter into some lucrative non-official trade agreements with the PRC as early as June 1952.⁷⁴ As late as 1969, America's continued domination of Japan's China policy was reflected in the Sato-Nixon communique of 21 November. To obtain the return of administrative control over Okinawa, the Japanese Prime Minister acknowledged in this communique the importance of Korea for the security of Japan. This essentially was a reaffirmation by both Washington and Tokyo of the containment policy aimed at Peking.

As for the Soviet Union, Japanese policy, encouraged by the previous century of Russo-Japanese competition in Asia and the security pact with the U.S., remained through the 1950's and 1960's in consonance with Washington's position. The only major policy initiative pursued by the Japanese was the 19 October 1956 joint declaration officially ending World War II hostilities with the Soviet Union and reestablishing regular diplomatic relations. Though not enthusiastically welcomed by the Eisenhower administration, this settlement extracted Soviet acceptance of the Japanese security arrangement with the U.S. As with China, Japan's official support for Washington's containment policies did

not prevent Tokyo from seeking improved economic relations with Moscow in the 1960's.

To summarize, Japan adapted well to the realities of the bipolar era, using the American security shield to remain aloof from international imbroglios while also relying on American economic strength to prevent any serious disruption in the world economic order important to Japanese trade and recovery. As a defacto American satellite, however, the natural evolution of Japan's diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and particularly China were arrested. This passive, American encouraged neo-isolationist, approach towards its most important neighbors set the stage for Japan's major policy dilemmas of the 1970's. Being Asia's only industrial power, Japan represented both a threat and an opportunity to Moscow and Peking, but as the 1970's opened Japan was confused about how to respond to the new stimuli associated with multipolarity. The decision to conclude the PFT would indicate that Japan's confusion is beginning to abate.

As the 1970's opened, America's superiority in defense and economic spheres was diminishing. The announcement of the Nixon Doctrine in 1969, the economic shocks of 1971,⁷⁵ followed in rapid succession by Nixon's trip to China, the U.S. military withdrawal from Vietnam in 1972, and the Arab oil embargo of 1973, all served as warnings to the Japanese that they would have to modify their dependence on the U.S. in

order to insure Japan's continuing security and prosperity. In short, Washington's response to multipolarity caused Japan to question the firmness of the American commitment to Japan.⁷⁶

As in the early days of the imperialistic period, Japan began to see the fragility of its security and economic miracles. It became apparent that, because of Japan's growing international influence and expanding economic needs, the minimalistic foreign policy of a trading company was no longer acceptable. Ironically, the very success of Japan's "economics-first policies" was the cause of their demise. As an international economic power, Japan could no longer be content with merely adapting to world economic trends; instead, continued prosperity demanded that Japan contribute directly to the smooth functioning of international trade and commerce.⁷⁷ Japan's economic requirements for raw materials and markets became so crucial to the Japanese state of well being that economic arrangements with suppliers and buyers had to be reenforced by political accords.

With the U.S. seeking accommodation with China and the Soviet Union, Japan's fears of being isolated politically and economically grew to the point where Tokyo for its own self-protection was forced to augment its relationship with the U.S. by seeking closer ties with Peking and Moscow. Realizing that a more activist foreign policy would be counter-productive to its goals of shaping a world framework

for security and prosperity if it resulted in Japan being dragged into the Sino-Soviet conflict, Tokyo contemplated a policy of "equi-distance."

Trying to put aside past political differences and establish firm economic ties, Prime Minister Tanaka traveled to Peking in September 1972 to normalize relations, and to Moscow in October 1973. At each summit the question of a bilateral peace treaty between Japan and the host country was discussed. Such treaties were considered necessary by all concerned to close the books on World War II, for regenerating diplomatic ties damaged by Cold War animosities, and for symbolizing Japan's independence from the U.S. The complex unfolding of events since 1972 that blocked the conclusion of a Soviet-Japanese peace treaty and led to Foreign Minister Sonoda's initialing the PFT are manifestations of Japan's uneasiness about transitioning to a more involved foreign policy.⁷⁸

Historically, Japan has steadfastly pursued the goals of security, prosperity, and status. The strategy for achieving these goals has, however, shifted dramatically with changes in Japan's environment and relative power. In the short time since the Meiji Restoration these adjustments have transformed Japan from an isolated self-sufficient agrarian island nation into a cosmopolitan, interdependent modern industrial state. Throughout this transition, Japan's ruling elite linked security, prosperity, and status with the successful emulation of the western model of industrialization.

Industry's constant requirement for raw materials and markets has in turn forced Tokyo to deal with the dichotomy of foreign dependency and cultural insularity. From 1868 to 1945, with the brief exception of the 1920's, Japan relied on power politics and military intervention to procure its industrial needs; from 1945 until 1971 Japan rejected force, avoided diplomatic polemics, and turned to the United States to guarantee its access to raw materials and markets. In each period, the Japanese leadership accurately assessed the constellation of challenges threatening the achievement of Japan's national goals and responded with efficient pragmatism. Despite the obvious philosophical differences between Japan's pre-and post-World War II policies, it is significant that both sought to relieve Japan's dependency by keeping political commitments to a minimum. This should not have been totally unexpected phenomenon, given Japan's cultural context.

The PFT as a political accord, entered into by Japan "for the purpose of solidifying and developing relations of peace and friendship"⁷⁹ with China, represents a major departure from Tokyo's past philosophy of minimizing political commitments to maximize economic flexibility. The events of the 1970's have apparently shown the Japanese that closer bilateral political linkages with potential economic partners are required in today's environment of dwindling resources and market protectionism. In tune with

Japan's historical development, the PFT is an accommodation to the challenges that interdependency and multipolarity pose to the Japanese attainment of security, prosperity, and status.

Because Japan negotiated the PFT without the overt support of the U.S., and in the face of strenuous Soviet opposition, there can be little question that Japanese foreign policy is becoming more independently oriented. More subtly, the PFT may also mean that after a hundred years, Japan's almost complete dependence on foreign suppliers and buyers is modifying the Japanese cultural proclivity towards isolation. As the American-Japanese Treaty of 1858, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902, the Triparte pact of 1940, and the U.S.-Japanese Security Alliance of 1952 were all harbingers of significant changes in Japanese foreign policy, so might the case be with the Peace and Friednship Treaty of 1978.

IV. THE PFT AS A FUNCTION OF THE JAPANESE DECISION MAKING PROCESS

Before examining the impact of Tokyo's new ties with Peking on the achievement of Japan's traditional interests in security, prosperity, and status, the value of the PFT for illuminating the mechanics of Japanese foreign policy decisions should not be overlooked. As a major foreign policy issue, Prime Minister Fukuda's decision in March 1978 to press for the immediate conclusion of the PFT,⁸⁰ reflects a national consensus that took six years to build due to the cumbersome nature of Japanese politics. That this much time was required, even after both sides had agreed in the Chou-Tanaka communique of 1972 "to hold negotiations aimed at the conclusion of a treaty of peace and friendship", supports the frequent observations that Japanese foreign policies are strongly shaped by a "tangled web of domestic political forces."⁸¹

A. THE PFT AS AN EXAMPLE OF CONSENSUS BUILDING

Under its parliamentary system, the formal responsibility for policy determinations rests with the Japanese Diet; but in actuality, before the Diet acts on any issue a clear consensus must exist within the ruling Liberal Democratic Party, (LDP) which is also acceptable to the government's bureaucracy, the business community, the opposition parties, and public opinion. Because the Japanese decision making

process is premised on a consensus model, each of these elements has a potential veto on any major policy question. Tokyo's long delayed decision to conclude the PFT shows the unique political blending of feudal factionalism and western style parliamentarianism in post World War II Japanese politics. Needless to say, such traits are conducive to neither decisive leadership nor rapid decision making.⁸²

In the case of the PFT, most observers agree, the primary obstacle to forming a consensus was the right-wing pro-Taiwan lobby within the LDP.⁸³ Japan's foreign ministry experts, the business community, the opposition parties (with the exception of the pro-Moscow Japanese Communist Party), and the average Japanese citizen, each to varying degrees, favored signing the PFT.⁸⁴ This meant the domestic debate over whether or not to seek closer relations with PRC at the expense of Taiwan and the Soviet Union was confined to LDP intra-party politics. Since May 1974, when Tokyo and Peking began preliminary negotiations, LDP Hawks have opposed the PFT because of the serious impact it might have on Japan's lucrative economic ties with Taiwan and the antagonizing effect the anti-hegemony clause could have on Japanese-Soviet relations. China's territorial claim to the Senkakus and Peking's failure to abrogate its anti-Japan alliance of 1950 with Moscow were other high visibility issues used by LDP opponents of the treaty. Furthermore, the PFT was also a political football amongst LDP faction leaders for control of the party and thus the government.

After replacing Miki as Prime Minister in later 1976 Fukuda consistently sought to improve relations with China, but early attempts to initiate negotiations for a peace and friendship treaty in January and May of 1977 were aborted due to disagreements within the LDP. Cabinet Secretary Sonoda's attempts in early 1977 to convey to the Chinese leadership the enthusiasm of the new Fukuda government for the PFT by characterizing former Foreign Minister Miyazawa's "Four Points" for Japanese acceptance of the Chinese anti-hegemony clause as private opinion and not an official negotiating position. The Miki faction protested this interpretation through the bureaucracy of the Foreign Ministry and Sonoda was forced to retreat. Since Miyazawa's Four Points (which stipulated that the anti-hegemony clause was not to be directed at any third country; that it was not restricted to the Asian-Pacific region; that it would not entail joint Sino-Japanese action; and that it must be compatible with the United Nation's Charter) were unacceptable to Peking, these treaty negotiations were broken off because the LDP could not reach a consensus on the anti-hegemony issue.

In May 1977, Fukuda made another attempt to get PFT negotiations underway by asking Lower House Speaker Hori (who was scheduled to visit Peking) to take a personal message to Hua Kuo-feng that Japan was ready to sign a treaty as soon as possible.⁸⁵ Party hawks and elders, as

well as those in the bureaucracy and business community counseling prudence, forced Fukuda, by withholding their consensual approval, to back off from his optimistic predictions about expediting the conclusion of the PFT. At a press conference on 10 June 1977, Fukuda noted that, being preoccupied with many important political events since assuming office, he had not had sufficient time to consider the contents of the treaty or a realistic schedule for negotiations with the PRC.⁸⁶ Fukuda was admitting it would take time to fabricate at least a passive consensus (i.e., one where there are at least no strenuous objectors) amongst the LDP factions on the general question of closer relations with China and the particular issue of the anti-hegemony clause.⁸⁷

Sensing that the successful conclusion of the PFT would boost his sagging political stock, which was being driven down by Japan's faltering domestic economy and growing international criticism of Tokyo's protectionist trade and currency practices, Prime Minister Fukuda began defusing LDP opposition to the PFT in order to set the stage for reopening bilateral negotiations with Peking. In December 1977, he drastically reshuffled his cabinet, primarily to take a fresh look at Japan's economic difficulties with the U.S., but he also appointed Cabinet Secretary and Sino-ophile Sonoda as Foreign Minister. A vocal advocate, for the PFT, as well as a staunch Fukuda faction member, Sonoda was an ideal choice to run interference for the treaty. He

seemed to be the type of Foreign Minister who would negotiate the treaty, take the flak, and give the credit to the Prime Minister.⁸⁸

During a policy speech on 21 January 1978. Fukuda told the Diet that improved relations with China were linked with the prompt conclusion of the PFT.⁸⁹ On 14 February, Japan's ambassador to Peking, Shoji Sato met with Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Han Nien-lung to begin a series of discussions about reopening negotiations on the PFT.⁹⁰ Later, in February Japan concluded an eight year \$20 billion trade agreement with the PRC, the timing of which may have been designed to use the solvent of economics on LDP hardline opposition to the PFT.⁹¹ Clearly, Fukuda was gradually building momentum within the LDP that would allow him finally to sign the PFT and collect the political dividends associated with such a highly visible act of statesmanship.

This momentum was, however, temporarily sidetracked by the sudden appearance on the evening of 12-13 April 1978 of 100 plus Chinese fishing boats off the Senakaku Islands. Speculation abounded over Peking's motives for so obtusely raising the question of sovereignty over these uninhabited islets at a time when it appeared Japan was on the verge of scrapping its equidistant strategy in favor of closer ties with China. Theories ran the gamut from Chinese impatience over Japanese procrastination about signing the PFT to local Chinese radical elements trying to embarrass Vice Premier Ten Hsiao-ping and his pragmatic non-ideological approach to

foreign policy.⁹² Regardless, the Fukuda government sought to minimize any advantage anti-treaty groups within the LDP might derive from this incident by quickly accepting the lame but official explanation that the fishing boats had intruded "accidentally" into the Senkaku area.⁹³

In fact, Sonoda took advantage of the Senkaku incident to chastize hawkish LDP members for endangering Japan's sovereignty over the islands by inferring that the Chinese action was a protest against those party elements blocking the prompt conclusion of the PFT.⁹⁴ The Foreign Minister used the Senkaku incident to weaken the position of the LDP anti-treaty forces by immediately agreeing with China to disassociate the question of ownership of the Senkakus from any negotiations on the PFT and by suggesting that a friendly China was less likely to challenge Japan's claims to these islands than a hostile China.⁹⁵

With Tokyo and Peking agreeing that the territorial dispute over the Senkakus was peripheral to the more important issue of the PFT, the only obstacles to an LDP consensus on commencing serious negotiations with China were doubts about Peking's reluctance to officially terminate the anti-Japanese Sino-Soviet alliance of 1950 and Peking's insistence on the inclusion of an unqualified anti-hegemony clause. Since the Sino-Soviet treaty was due to expire in April of 1980 with little chance of extension, the Fukuda regime apparently encountered little difficulty in gaining tacit acceptance for the unofficially stated Chinese position

that the Sino-Soviet pact was "virtually extinct."⁹⁶ Concurrently, right-wing LDP resistance to an anti-hegemony clause wording similar to that used in the Chou-Tanaka communique was being eroded by worsening Japanese-Soviet relations, reflected by Moscow's ominous warnings to Tokyo about the serious implications of concluding the PFT, Russian restrictions on Japanese fishing activity, and Soviet military muscle flexing in the vicinity of Etorofu during June 1978.⁹⁷

Furthermore, Hanoi's growing identification as a Soviet surrogate with a commensurate increase in tensions along the Sino-Vietnamese border, caused Peking to signal its willingness to Tokyo that China was ready to be more flexible on the anti-hegemony clause issue to get Japanese agreement on a treaty⁹⁸ to counterbalance Moscow's increasing efforts to encircle the PRC.

Anti-PRC LDP members were also appeased somewhat in June 1978 by the House of Councillors' passage of the Japan-South Korea Continental Shelf Joint Development Agreement, which delimits offshore drilling rights in the East China Sea and had been opposed by Peking on the grounds that it infringed on China's seabed rights in this area.⁹⁹ Fukuda was also representing President Carter's wish for "success" conveyed during their May summit as American support for the PFT.¹⁰⁰

In this pro-treaty atmosphere the LDP leadership on 23 June sanctioned Fukuda's third proposal for renewing

negotiations with China on the conclusion of a peace and friendship treaty.¹⁰¹ After some short delays associated with the Bonn economic summit and the intensification of tensions along the Sino-Vietnamese border, China and Japan ended a three-year hiatus on 21 July 1978 when PFT negotiations recommenced in Peking.

The only major issue to be resolved in these negotiations was the anti-hegemony clause. Consequently, the Peking sessions came to fruition quickly on 12 August, when China accepted Japan's position that the anti-hegemony clause, which seemed targeted directly at the Soviet Union, be softened with a third country caveat stating that "the present treaty shall not affect the position of either contracting party regarding its relations with third countries."¹⁰² Knowing in advance that this third country clause would not placate Soviet animosity towards the PFT,¹⁰³ its more likely purpose was to at least passively reconcile hawkish LDP members who, for three years, had argued against inclusion of the anti-hegemony clause in the treaty.¹⁰⁴

Fukuda's artful orchestration of PFT issues to gain the grudging agreement of the LDP right is a textbook demonstration of the rigors of Japanese consensus politics. The political maneuvering of the Prime Minister not only provides an insight into the dynamics of consensus building, it also exposes an interesting linkage between Japanese foreign policy decisions and domestic politics. Specifically,

the domestic machinations associated with the conclusion of the PFT support the generalization that foreign policy issues are a convenient instrument for LDP factions to use in their competition for party ascendancy and control of the government.¹⁰⁵ The reason for this is the domination of Japanese electoral politics by local bread and butter issues; consequently, Japanese Dietmen have greater latitude of action on foreign policy questions than on domestic issues such as employment and social welfare programs, which are uppermost in the Japanese voter's mind.¹⁰⁶

B. THE PFT AND THE INTERRELATIONSHIP BETWEEN JAPANESE DOMESTIC POLITICS AND FOREIGN POLICY

From the outset there has been speculation that Fukuda's interest in the PFT was motivated by considerations of LDP politics and by the treaty's potential value for prolonging his own premiership. As early as March 1978, one veteran observer of Japanese politics reported that "the LDP itself is beginning to feel it needs the treaty for reasons of popularity. And there is a feeling that only Fukuda can prevail over LDP opponents to get the treaty, precisely because he is identified with the hawks and elders."¹⁰⁷

After the Senkakus incident, however, opposing faction leaders sensed that Fukuda's strong position in favor of the PFT might be a political liability that they could use to frustrate his plan to ride the treaty to a second term as Prime Minister. By May of 1978, "it [was] impossible to

discuss the China-Japan treaty without hearing about the ambitions of Fukuda's rivals in the LDP, particularly Masayoshi Ohira and Yasuhiro Nakasone."¹⁰⁸

Nakasone, former Defense Agency Director and Chairman of the LDP Executive Board known for his conservative polemics, quickly branded any friendship treaty with China that did not resolve the status of the Senkakus as a fraud.¹⁰⁹ Conversely, Ohira, who was Secretary General of the LDP under Fukuda and who by prior arrangement was the Prime Minister's heir apparent, commented that "the China treaty is blown out of all proportion."¹¹⁰ Ohira was Tanaka's Foreign Minister in 1972, when relations with China were normalized, so he favored the signing of the PFT as the capstone to the Chou-Tanaka communique, but he did not want Fukuda transforming the PFT into a political advantage that would prevent his accession to the premiership.

Despite their philosophical differences over closer relations with China, both Nakasone and Ohira shared a concern that the momentum Fukuda had achieved with the August signing of the PFT might terminate any chance they had for unseating him in the December elections for LDP party president.¹¹¹ Ohira's stunning victory over Fukuda in these party elections suggests that all of the candidates may have overestimated the electoral value of the PFT.

Examining Japan's decision to conclude the PFT highlights both the consensual nature of Japanese politics and the strong influence LDP factional politics can have on substantive

foreign policy matters. The unfolding of the PFT decision testifies to how easily one segment of Japan's consensus forming coterie, in this case the right-wing of the LDP, can hamstring governmental action by simply withholding its approval. The new treaty also emphasizes the Prime Minister's function as a formulator of consensus rather than a decisive policy maker.

Prime Minister's Fukuda's dependence on the PFT to compensate for domestic political liabilities, such as the faltering economy and the violence associated with the opening of Narita Airport, proved to be misplaced. That an incumbent Prime Minister could not translate the public euphoria over the PFT and the prestige of Teng's October visit to Tokyo into an electoral victory documented the overwhelming influence domestic issues have on Japanese politics.

None of these phenomena are new to students of Japanese politics, so that while the PFT may represent a new, more independent, foreign policy for Japan, the treaty is not a precursor of change in the mechanics of Japanese decision making. Consequently, nations dealing with Japan for the foreseeable future must be prepared to allow the Japanese leadership sufficient time and maneuvering room to build a consensus before any significant change in foreign policy can be realistically expected.

V. THE IMPACT OF THE PFT ON CONTEMPORARY
ISSUES IN JAPANESE FOREIGN POLICY

The preceding historical analysis discussed the impact of Japan's cultural context and decision making process on Japanese foreign policy formation. It showed that geographic location, cultural homogeneity, pragmatic adaptability, modernization, and consensus politics have historically played key roles in shaping Japanese foreign policy and can be related to Japan's more recent journey towards the conclusion of the PFT.

Because cultural context and the decision making process are independent variables not susceptible to precipitous change, they define the broad framework within which current Japanese national interests must fall. Any qualitative assessment of the PFT's potential impact on Japan's relations with China, the Soviet Union, and the United States must take cognizance of these boundaries. Certainly, it would be unrealistic to expect the PFT to: significantly change the sense of security or fear of isolation arising from Japan's insular geography; to dampen the Japanese perception of uniqueness based on ethno-linguistic homogeneity; to undo Japan's traditional affinity for China and historical suspicions of Russia; or to modify the passive nature of Japan's decision making by consensus. Intuitively, it appears that the PFT by itself will not immediately alter

the fundamental nature of Tokyo's present relations with Peking, Moscow, or Washington.

Being more a product than a modifier of the interaction between Japan's cultural context and political process, the search for the PFT's broadest impact should focus on the current problematic issues of Japanese foreign policy, which generically continue to be security, prosperity, and influence. According to an official policy statement by the Japanese Foreign Ministry "the ultimate goal of Japan's diplomacy is to assure the security and growth of Japan and to contribute to the peace and progress of the international community."¹¹² The following discussion will attempt to discern how the PFT specifically affects Japan's security, economic, and political relations with China, the Soviet Union, and the United States.

A. THE PFT'S IMPACT ON JAPANESE SECURITY RELATIONS

Major ground wars in Korea and Vietnam have already been fought since World War II, and today potentially explosive situations exist on the Sino-Soviet border, along Korea's 38th parallel, in the waters of the East China Sea, and in the jungles of Southeast Asia. Japan has to date successfully pursued a minimalist national defense policy driven by economic logic, underwritten by the U.S., and eschewing force. This approach to national security was, however, formulated in the cauldron of Cold War bipolarity, where security issues for Japan were relatively simplistic.

Since the early 1950's, when Sino-Soviet conventional aggression posed the only credible threat to Japan's peace and prosperity, Tokyo's security problems have been multiplied factorially by the Soviet attainment of nuclear parity with the U.S., the announcement of the Nixon Doctrine, the growing scarcity of raw materials, the rapid political and economic developments taking place in Southeast Asia, and the success of Japan's own economic policies; but the erosion of the 1950 Sino-Soviet alliance has altered the Japanese security calculus more than any other event. While the direct threat of aggression against the home islands is now considerably reduced, the threat to Asian stability posed by the Soviet-American rivalry has been augmented by the volatile polemics associated with the deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations.

American military strength in Asia remains the cornerstone of Japan's current "omnidirectional" foreign policy for maintaining a peaceful equilibrium in the region but the security options available to Tokyo are no longer as straightforward as they once were. Given the growing number of variables affecting Asian stability, which remains Japan's basic security goal, a key question becomes how the PFT's call for friendlier relations between Tokyo and Peking will affect the future development of Japan's security policy towards China, the Soviet Union and the U.S.

1. Sino-Japanese Security Relations

By virtue of its geographical and cultural proximity, Japan's foreign policy has historically fixated on China. Since the Meiji Restoration, security considerations have played a dominant role in this fixation. From the Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895) to World War II, Japan's security policy towards China was characterized by the harsh employment of military superiority to weaken China and force Peking's capitulation to Japan's broader international and economic interests. During the Cold War from 1949 to 1971, Japan's security relations with China merely echoed Washington's containment policy. After President Nixon's surprising 1972 visit to China, Japan moved quickly and independently to make diplomatic amends for its past abuses of China, with the Chou-Tanaka communique setting forth new guidelines for the development of Sino-Japanese relations.

Even though the PFT text makes no direct reference to Sino-Japanese security issues, security continues to be a crucial determinant of Sino-Japanese relations. Japan's resistance to the anti-hegemony clause and the fact it took nearly six years to negotiate the PFT can be attributed to Japan's sensitivities about the treaty's impact on Japan's overall security posture, particularly the possibility that closer ties with China might embroil Tokyo in the Sino-Soviet dispute.

Most students of security questions in East Asia do not see China and Japan as representing a formidable military

threat to each other's homelands. Nonetheless, Japan and China do have differing if not conflicting interests in East Asia that could be potentially disruptive to regional stability. Since 1972 Tokyo and Peking have deemphasized points of friction in Southeast Asia, the Senkaku Islands, the ocean resources of the East China Sea, Korea and, of course, Taiwan in order to improve the overall tenor of Sino-Japanese relations. The mutual deferment of these volatile issues was necessary to bring the PFT to completion, and now that the treaty is signed Japan is hopeful that it will engender an atmosphere of political and economic cooperation that will ameliorate Sino-Japanese security differences.

In Southeast Asia, China has shown little interest in challenging Japanese economic dominance,¹¹³ but because the region is a traditional Chinese buffer zone Peking has expressed some low keyed anxiety about the possibility of Tokyo's eventually translating its regional financial strength into political influence.¹¹⁴ Japan, for its part has worried about Chinese-fomented "wars of liberation" that might give the Chinese more leverage in Southeast Asian capitals and threaten Japanese investments. Through closer bilateral relations, the PFT protects Japanese economic interests in this area by implicitly assuring Peking that Japan's regional concerns are with economic access to raw materials and markets, not with threatening China's security. As long as China

perceives Japan to be sincere about its economic motives, the PFT will be an effective lubricant to Sino-Japanese friction in Southeast Asia. By establishing a political framework for averting serious economic competition between China and Japan, the treaty should also dampen the momentum for a destabilizing trade war in Southeast Asia that could develop from China's present push for rapid industrialization.¹¹⁵

This straightforward analysis of how the PFT should affect Japanese security interests in Southeast Asia is, however, complicated by the Peace and Friendship Treaty that Vietnam concluded with the Soviet Union on 3 November 1978. By bringing the Sino-Soviet dispute to Indochina, this de facto military agreement¹¹⁶ between Hanoi and Moscow cancels out a good deal of the soothing effects of the PFT in Southeast Asia for Japan. Having tilted towards Peking, Tokyo must now delicately reassess its expanding economic ties with Hanoi. Besides its own domestic economic interests, Japan must consider whether a continuation of its economic links with Vietnam will offend China or if the curtailment of financial assistance for Vietnamese development projects will exacerbate anti-Japanese sentiments in the Kremlin.¹¹⁷ With military tensions persisting along the Chinese-Vietnamese border after the demise of Cambodia, and Hanoi's alliance with Moscow, the PFT limits Japanese options for dealing with the new security situation in Southeast Asia. Most ominously, the PFT could force Japan eventually into a choice between foregoing all its investments in Southeast Asia, as well as

the other benefits accruing from cordial relations with China, or supporting Peking's anti-Vietnamese policy. In short, the PFT makes it expensive, if not difficult, for Japan to feint neutrality towards Peking and Moscow's escalating competition for influence in Southeast Asia.¹¹⁸

The Senkaku Islands are the only unresolved territorial dispute extant between China and Japan. Sovereignty over these five uninhabited islands northeast of Taiwan is difficult to determine and potentially explosive because their possession could govern the allocation of seabed rights in the East China Sea, between Japan and China. Even though the Chinese and Japanese have prepared comprehensive legal briefs to bolster their claims,¹¹⁹ there is little chance of international jurisprudence solving this dispute because of the national prestige associated with territorial claims, the importance of oil to both economics, and the distraction of Taiwan's assertion of sovereignty.

Realizing the contentious nature of these issues, both sides decided after the Chou-Tanaka summit to lay aside the question of ownership of the Senkakus so that it would not interfere with the improvement of relations. Despite a pressing need to develop indigenous energy sources, Japan suspended geological survey operations in the area and China muted its sovereignty claims to avoid precipitating a crisis. Clearly, Cina and Japan were both hopeful that improving political and economic relations would lead to a workable compromise on the Senkakus issue.

On this basis, Peking and Tokyo moved quickly to defuse the April 1978 Senkaku incident so that it would not derail the progress being made towards meaningful PFT negotiations. Believing the ultimate solution to this territorial question depended on the larger issue of solidifying Sino-Japanese ties, the Fukuda government accepted uncritically the Chinese explanation that its intrusion was accidental. With the conclusion of the PFT on 12 August 1978 the Senkaku question was again anesthetized by Teng's reported comment that Japan's administrative control over the island should remain frozen for two or three decades.¹²⁰ Eventually, the PFT should make it easier for Japan's need for oil and China's lack offshore technology to permanently resolve their territorial rights in the Senkakus. In the mean time, the current policy of agreeing to disagree, which allows either China or Japan to express its displeasure with the other by challenging its claims to the Senkakus is potentially unstable and might restrain the Japanese desire to develop seabed resources in the East China Sea.

Strategic location, plus fish and petroleum resources, make the East China valuable to both Tokyo and Peking, who differ over how these resources should be shared. In general, China has consistently supported law of the sea principles that would protect its options for maximizing its jurisdiction over the resources of the East China Sea. Peking endorses the idea of exclusive coastal state control over a 200-mile economic zone and asserts that China's continental

shelf rights, by virtue of the natural prolongation precedent established by the 1969 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, extend beyond 200 miles, all the way to the Okinawa Trough.¹²¹

As a major fishing and maritime nation, Japan's rights are not served by legal principles which extend a coastal state's seaward jurisdiction. Japan rejects the natural prolongation concept, contending instead that all resource rights in the East China Sea should be allocated on the basis of the median line solution called for by the 1958 Geneva Continental Shelf Convention.¹²² For this reason, sovereignty over the Senkaku's is particularly important to Japan, since ownership of these islands would push the base points for a Sino-Japanese median line as far to the west as possible, thereby giving Japan a larger share of the East China Sea's oceanic resources.

Coupling the importance of fish and petroleum to the economies of both Japan and China with the political implications of Taiwan and both Korea's claims, the potential for conflict over economic jurisdictional matters in the East China Sea presents a considerable danger to regional stability. This danger was cooled by the improving Sino-Japanese relations that led to the PFT.

To get Japanese accession to the PFT, which Peking saw as crucial to containing Soviet influence in East Asia, China demonstrated a willingness to be flexible on the Senkaku sovereignty question, softened its criticism of Japan's decision

to engage in joint continental shelf development projects with South Korea,¹²³ and inferred a readiness to compromise on its natural prolongation claims to jurisdiction over most of the East China Sea's continental shelf.

In this improving atmosphere, the Japanese are becoming more concerned about access to the fishery and oil resources of the East China Sea than in establishing their jurisdictional rights in the basin. Reflecting this emerging attitude about offshore resources, Saburo Okita, the director of the Japanese Overseas Cooperation Fund, points out

We used to feel more strongly about controlling our sources of oil than we do now after OPEC. Now getting the oil seems more important to us than developing it ourselves. ...the main things is the supply of oil. It all right with us if China develops it. ¹²⁴

Having cautiously measured for six years the potential benefits of pressing its own claims in the East China Sea, the Japanese have apparently concluded that they are likely to get a larger share of the offshore resources through cooperation rather than confrontation with the Chinese. Tokyo probably agreed to the PFT, optimistic that it would create an economic and political rubric useful for assuring the flow of offshore resources, particularly oil, to Japan. Lacking Japan's sophisticated offshore technology, the Chinese have justified this optimism by quickly following

the PFT with invitations for extensive Japanese participation in the joint development of offshore oil fields in the Chukiang River estuary, the Pohai Gulf, and the Yellow Sea.¹²⁵ The Chinese have also indicated to the Japanese since the signing of the PFT that they are prepared to renew the 1975 Japan-China fisheries agreement with minimal changes and without declaring a 200-mile fishing zone.¹²⁶

Superficially, China's and Japan's unilateral claims to ocean resources in the East China Sea on the mutually exclusive terms of natural prolongation and a median line solution, respectively, are abrasions that if left untreated could infect the overall health of Sino-Japanese relations. Strengthened Sino-Japanese ties make it unlikely that Peking and Tokyo will not be able to resolve the allocation of ocean resources between them on the basis of common interests. It should be remembered, however, that China and Japan agreed only to defer settling the complex issues associated with their conflicting jurisdictional claims in the East China Sea in order to induce the spirit of cooperation needed to conclude the PFT. While closer ties should facilitate a resolution on fishing and offshore drilling rights now that the PFT is signed and ratified, a breakdown in Sino-Japanese relations could be signaled by either party growing intransigent about protecting its own ocean resources from infringement.

Perhaps even more detrimental to Japan's security interests than diplomatic bickering between Tokyo and Peking

over law of the sea issues would be a Chinese anti-Soviet gambit to restrict the fishing, maritime, and naval operations of non-littoral states in the East China Sea by declaring it a semi-enclosed international body of water. China could justify such an action as being in accordance with Article 129 of the pending Third United Nations Law of the Sea Conference Revised Single Negotiating Text as necessary to protect the "legitimate" economic and security interests of the coastal states. The Soviets, of course, are unlikely to countenance any inferred limitations on naval access to the East China Sea, since there is no alternative route for Russian naval units deploying to or from Vladivostok via the Tsushima Straits, the Sea of Japan's only year-round portal. If the Chinese do attempt by resort to international law to restrict the Soviet Pacific Fleet's access to the East China Sea, then Japan's participation in offshore development projects made possible by the PFT could result in Soviet counter pressures against Japanese fishing boats, oil rigs, etc. This might induce Tokyo to lobby for Chinese policies that would not impede Soviet naval mobility.

Stated briefly, the PFT reduces the likelihood of Japan being drawn into a conflict with China over economic rights in the East China Sea, a plus for Japanese economic and security interests. In the negative ledger, Moscow might view the resolution of complex jurisdictional issues in the East China Sea between Japan and China as prejudicial to

Soviet economic and security interests in Northeast Asia, which would aggravate Soviet-Japanese relations even further.

The Korean peninsula has historically been a confluence point for Japanese and Chinese security interests. Going back to the Mongol attempts to invade Japan, the peninsula has figured prominently in many East Asian military conflicts. In 1592 Hideyoshi embarked on his abortive campaign to conquer China by way of Korea; after the Meiji Restoration the Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895) and the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905) were fought, in part, to establish Tokyo's mastery over Korea; the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931 was launched from Korea. China's assistance to Kim Il-sung during and after the Korean War (1950-1953) also shows that the peninsula remains as strategically important to the Chinese Politburo as it was to the Chinese Emperor. Because history supports the proposition that Korea is simultaneously an invasion corridor to China and a "dagger" pointed at Japan, both Tokyo and Peking have similar, but mutually exclusive, traditional security interests in preventing a hostile regime from controlling Korea.

Divided along the 38th parallel after the 1953 armistice, with Pyongyang and Seoul still glaring at each other with large superpower-equipped armed forces, the Korean peninsula remains a clear danger to peace and stability in East Asia. Throughout the 1950's and 1960's China's and Japan's differing security interests in Korea were manifested

in Peking's strong support for eliminating the unfriendly U.S. influences on the peninsula by unification of North and South under Kim, and by Tokyo's strong support for the status quo with a strong American presence in Korea to protect the South from North Korean military adventurism. The 1969 Sato-Nixon communique is expressive of this Japanese policy, declaring that "the security of the Republic of Korea is essential to Japan's own security." Chinese and North Korean reaction to the inclusion of South Korea within the Japanese defense perimeter was vitriolic and forceful. In April 1970, Chou En-lai met Kim Il-sung in Pyongyang. Both leaders issued a statement condemning the revival of Japanese militarism under the active patronage of the U.S. as a dangerous force for aggression in Asia.¹²⁷

The improvement of Sino-Japanese relations following the breakdown of the Sino-Soviet alliance has, however, caused Peking to moderate its position on Korea, making it more compatible with Tokyo's. According to the 1977 Japanese Defense Agency White Paper, the Japanese continue to see the Korean balance of power as tenuous and its maintenance vital to Japan's national security.¹²⁸ Japan's security interests in the stability of the Korean peninsula have also been complicated by a rapidly increasing economic stake in South Korea and a growing financial interest in North Korea. Japan's basic policy on Korea is "maintaining and developing friendly and cooperative relations with the Republic of Korea and promoting a gradual interchange with

North Korea in such fields as trade, culture, and person to person contact."¹²⁹

Fearful that a crisis could provide Moscow with the opportunity for expanding its influence in Korea, Peking and Tokyo have, since the Chou-Tanaka summit, become more concerned with preserving the present situation than with pressing for political change on the peninsula. Privately, the Chinese leadership has indicated a more tolerant attitude towards the American military presence in Korea, seeing it now as an effective counter to Soviet armed strength in the Far East.¹³⁰ Because of North Korea's continuing importance as a Chinese buffer state, Peking remains a staunch political backer of Kim Il-sung, but is now emphasizing that the goal of reunification must be achieved peacefully. North Korea's surprisingly positive response in January 1979 to South Korean appeals to reopen mutual talks on peaceful reunification may be a direct effect of China's new position on Korea, and attributable to the PFT.¹³¹

More importantly for Japan's interests, the PFT augers well for the prospects of longterm peace in Korea. Recognizing the primacy Japan places on Korean stability, Teng Hsiao-ping in talks with Prime Minister Fukuda, after the 23 October 1978 exchange of ratification instruments in Tokyo said China's support for Kim's policy of reunification is "well known, but what must be done is for Japan and China to work together so that North and South Korea can come to the conference table."¹³² Failing a negotiated settlement

of Korea's future status, Teng pointed out to the Tokyo press corps that "divided countries are ultimately unified ... if these problems can't be solved in 10 years, they will be solved in 100 years. If not in a century, then in 10 centuries." These remarks have fueled speculation that the PFT may lead to a freezing of Korea's divided status and eventual cross recognition of Seoul by Peking and Moscow in return for Tokyo and Washington recognizing Pyongyang.¹³³

Regardless, there is little question that the reduction of tensions in Korea is fundamental to Japan's basic security goals of peace and stability for East Asia. Making this point in his explanation before the Diet of potential ramifications from the PFT, Foreign Minister Sonoda reiterated that "there can be no peace in Asia without stabilization of the Korean peninsula."¹³⁴ Since any scheme to defuse the Korean time-bomb will require Chinese concurrence, the spirit of cooperation engendered by the PFT seems essential for the establishment of long term Korean stability.

The beneficial effects of the PFT on Japan's security interests in Korea must be tempered, however, by the realization that China's present toleration of Japan's and the United States' support for South Korea is motivated by a consuming fear of the Soviet Union. In pursuing a stabilization formula for Korea, Japan would be well advised to remember that the PFT does not alter Korea's strategic importance as a Chinese buffer state. Should there be a limited Sino-Soviet rapprochement, it would not be surprising to see

Peking's historical need to dominate the peninsula overtake its present shared interest with Japan in maintaining a status quo balance of power there. Consequently, Japan is actually in a very delicate position as far as its security interests in Korea are concerned, because Peking's desire to work with Tokyo in averting a destabilizing situations on the peninsula stems directly from the antipathy of the Sino-Soviet dispute -- the continuation of which is far more threatening to the stability and peace of Asia than the Sino-Japanese rivalry for influence in Korea.

Since the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty, the nature of Tokyo's relations with Taiwan have been sensitive issues in Sino-Japanese relations. Backed by the U.S. and motivated by historical links, economic ties, and traditional security interests, Japan actively reinvolved itself in Taiwan during the 1950's and 1960's, despite Peking's protests that Taiwan was not a sovereign state but an unliberated Chinese province. The conflict potential between Japan and China abated considerably, however, with Tokyo's recognition, as expressed in the Chou-Tanaka communique, that "Taiwan is an inalienable part of the territory of the People's Republic of China." The fact that Taiwan's status was not a major issue in the PFT negotiations, with Article 1 of the treaty calling for the development of peaceful relations on the basis of "...non-interference in each other's internal affairs..." indicates that China and Japan have, at least for the time being, achieved a modus vivendi on Taiwan's future.¹³⁵

From 1951 to 1971 Sino-Japanese relations were of an adversary type, with Peking seeing Tokyo as a puppet of the U.S. in a conspiracy against its interest in Taiwan. Japan had serious reservations about suturing itself off from China, but Prime Minister Yoshida's letter of 24 December 1951 to Secretary of State Dulles pledging to sign a peace treaty as soon as possible with the Nationalist Chinese on Taiwan, and to refrain from establishing diplomatic relations with Peking, was prompted by the fear that to do otherwise might cause the U.S. Senate not to ratify the Occupation-ending, San Francisco Peace Treaty.¹³⁶ Despite Tokyo's concern about Chinese intervention in Korea, and Japan's almost total dependence on the U.S. for security and economic staples, the Yoshida Letter deftly cleared the way for a "two China" policy by insisting that any peace treaty between Japan and Taiwan applied only to the territory actually under Nationalist control. The Treaty of Peace between Japan and Nationalist China, signed on 28 April 1952 locked Japan into officially supporting the anti-communist, pro-Taiwan American security system in Asia. By strictly separating politics from economic issues, however, the Japanese were able to establish lucrative trade relations with both the People's Republic of China and the Republic of China.

Many of the difficulties that beset Sino-Japanese relations before the Chou-Tanaka summit can be traced to this "two China" policy, which drove Tokyo into numerous contradictions and exposed it to retaliation by both Chinese

regimes. Domestic Japanese politics were also affected, as a succession of conservative administrations found themselves vulnerable to pressures on the one hand from Peking, pro-Peking opposition parties within the Diet, and growing public support for improved relations with the PRC, and on the other hand, from Washington, Taipei, and pro-Taiwanese business oriented factions within the LDP. This two-China approach kept Japan's options open for improved relations with Peking, but the policy was also a high media-interest item used by Japanese politicians for maneuvering within the political system and for questioning Japan's dependence on American foreign policy leadership.

Conflicting national security interests, however, remained through the 1950's and 1960's as the primary determinant of China and Japan's differing attitudes on Taiwan. The Yoshida Letter, which set the tone for Sino-Japanese relations during the period, was drafted in the context of Peking's 1950 anti-Japanese alliance with the Soviet Union and naked Chinese aggression in Korea. To China, Japan's 1951 security treaty with the U.S., which authorized American bases on Japanese territory for the purpose of contributing "to the maintenance of the international peace and security in the Far East..." was particularly threatening, since it effectively committed Japan to support the defense of Taiwan in accordance with the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty between Washington and Taipei. In his joint communique of 21 November 1969 with President Nixon, Prime

Minister Sato publicly reconfirmed Japan's security interest in Taiwan, declaring it "a most important factor for the security of Japan."¹³⁷ The same communique, which stated that the "mutual security interests of the United States and Japan could be accommodated within arrangements for the return of the administrative rights over Okinawa to Japan" brought Peking's security apprehensions about Japan to a new peak.

Internally weakened by the effects of the Cultural Revolution, sobered by the Ussuri River clashes with the Soviets in the winter of 1969, and concerned about Tokyo's expanding economic influence, China viewed the Sato-Nixon communique with alarm, fearing that it indicated Japan's intention to embark on a new (possibly military) role in Asia with the full support of the U.S. Coupling the Sato-Nixon communique with the already announced Nixon Doctrine, the Chinese leadership was undoubtedly given pause by the possibility that Washington was grooming Tokyo to fill the vacuum left by the withdrawal of American forces from Korea and Taiwan.¹³⁸

Even though Peking intensified its propaganda campaign against Japan's "remilitarization" under the Fourth Defense Plan after the Sato-Nixon communique was released, the Chinese also began to move subtly towards improving Sino-Japanese relations by cultivating opinion makers opposed to Japan's close identification with Taiwan and increasing trade with

Japanese firms. Doak Barnett suggests one of the motivations behind these tactics was the Chinese belief that normalized relations with Japan could be used to undercut, or at least control, Tokyo's growing influence on Taiwan.¹³⁹ Never enamoured with America's hostile China policy, Japan leaped at the opportunity presented by the 1972 Nixon visit to the People's Republic to sever its formal ties with the Nationalists in return for Chinese toleration of Japan's continued economic interaction with Taiwan.

Realizing that China presented no credible military threat to Japan, then Foreign Minister Fukuda announced that in light of the Chou-Nixon Shanghai communique of 27 February 1972, the Taiwan references in the 1969 Sato-Nixon communique were no longer operative, thereby reducing Japan's interests in Taiwan primarily to economics.¹⁴⁰ As political and economic pressure within Japan pushed for normalization of relations with China, Prime Minister Sato was replaced in July 1972 by Tanaka, who immediately requested a summit with President Nixon. At their Honolulu meeting (31 August to 1 September), the new Prime Minister informed the American President that Japan was ready to pursue a China policy independent of the U.S. Four weeks later this affirmation became fact with the Peking signing of the Chou-Tanaka communique announcing the establishment of diplomatic relations between Japan and the People's Republic of China.

Like the Yoshida Letter, the Chou-Tanaka communique, despite showing an obvious preference for Peking, kept open

Japan's options for continuing its two China policy. Bowing to diplomatic reality, Japan recognized the People's Republic as the "sole legal government of China," but did not explicitly accept Peking's claim to Taiwan. Instead, Tokyo maintained that "the Government of Japan fully understands and respects" China's position on Taiwan and Foreign Minister Ohira noted that "Japan actually has not said that Taiwan is a territory of the People's Republic of China. There is no difference at all from the past."¹⁴¹ Furthermore, the Chou-Tanaka statement made no reference to Japan's 1952 peace treaty with the Nationalists, let alone the need to abrogate it; nor did the communique mention Japan's security relationship with the U.S.

An analysis of the Chou-Tanaka text suggests that both Peking and Tokyo wanted to immediately improve Sino-Japanese relations, but the careful wording used infers that the Japanese wanted to leave some latitude for determining their future policy towards Taiwan. In return for accepting Japanese vagueness in the communique on the future of Tokyo's relationship with Taipei, the Chinese apparently insisted that Tokyo clarify its intentions in a less binding forum. Immediately after the Chou-Tanaka communique, Foreign Minister Ohira partially fulfilled this assumed obligation by remarking that the 1952 Japan-Republic of China Treaty "has lost the basis for existence and is considered to have ceased to be effective"; that by virtue of Japan's previous acceptance

of the Cairo and Potsdam Declarations at the San Francisco Peace Conference that it was "natural" for Tokyo to consider Taiwan as a part of China; and that Japan would have to eventually close its embassy in Taipei.¹⁴² The Taiwanese government, in a move to save face, quickly severed relations, relieving Japan of this onerous task. The Japanese softened their position, however, by expanding economic ties with Taiwan, apparently with Peking's acquiescence.

Japan's post-1972 attitude on relations with Taiwan were summed by Ohira following the Chou-Tanaka summit, when he said, "we hope to continue economic and cultural relations with Taiwan. But that will depend on how Taiwan reacts to Japan's new relations with China."¹⁴³ In actuality the Chou-Tanaka communique did not represent a departure from the two-China policy laid down in the 1951 Yoshida Letter; it simply switched Japan's emphasis from Taipei to Peking. The PFT does nothing to change the nature of Japan's official relationship with the PRC or alter its non-official dealings with the Nationalists as reconstituted in 1972.

Concerning Japanese involvement in the defense of Taiwan through its security ties with the U.S., the Chou-Tanaka communique took no cognizance of the U.S.-Japanese security treaty. Moreover, Peking began to quietly air its approval of the security pact as a needed counterbalance to Soviet power in Northeast Asia. In early 1974, for example Teng, noting that "the U.S. is not so dangerous as the USSR",

pointed out to visiting Japanese dignitaries that "China does not affirm the Japan-U.S. security treaty in principle, but since a threat exists, we think it unavoidable for Japan to defend its own country [except] by maintaining ties with the United States."¹⁴⁴

Regarding the applicability of "the Far East Clause" in Article VI of Japan's security treaty with the U.S., both Peking and Tokyo have tended to soft peddle the issue since 1972 with ambiguity. Japan's position has been that the improved climate of Sino-American relations, China's acceptance of the need for the Japan-U.S. security pact, and the improbability that Peking might resort to force in the Taiwan Straits, makes it unlikely that Washington would ask to use Japanese bases to fulfill American defense commitments to Taiwan.¹⁴⁵ But the PFT has forced Tokyo to take a more definitive position on the security treaty's "Far East Clause" and its meaning for Taiwan. Replying to the questions from the Diet floor about the implications of the PFT, Prime Minister Fukuda expressed his view that the "Far East Clause" no longer applied to Taiwan as a result of the 1978 Sino-Japanese treaty.¹⁴⁶ The relevance of the "Far East Clause" has, however, been overtaken by events since President Carter's 15 December 1978 announcement that Washington was extending diplomatic recognition to Peking and terminating the Mutual Security Treaty with Taiwan.

In essence, the PFT has not modified the tacit agreement in the 1972 Chou-Tanaka communique that both sides

would accept deliberate ambiguities on the future status of Taiwan so the issue would not disrupt the evolvement of friendlier Sino-Japanese relations. For Tokyo, its security interests are best served by a continuation of the post 1972 status quo in Taiwan and the PFT tends to support this policy.

A few conservative Japanese leaders like Nakasone might favor an independent Taiwan, but such an eventuality could force Japan to choose between jeopardizing its Peking links and its unofficial but lucrative commercial ties with Taipei. Also, an independent Taiwan, resentful of Japan's improving relations with mainland China, might threaten Japanese shipping lanes in the East China Sea.

Ultimately, the question of whether or not Taiwan will seriously complicate Sino-Japanese relations hinges on Peking's tactics for pursuing its goal of reunification. Unquestionably, the majority of Japanese would prefer to see any reunification with the mainland government occur gradually and with minimum disruption to Japan's economic links with Taiwan. By fostering stronger political and economic ties with China, the PFT should give Japan increased diplomatic leverage to assure that any reunification would be evolutionary and more prejudicial to Japan's economic or security interests. Like the Chou-Tanaka communique, the PFT stresses the mutual benefit of improved relations for preventing Taiwan from becoming a major security issue in the future. Nonetheless, it must be remembered that the PFT does nothing

specifically to assuage the inherent conflict of interests between Peking's irredentist perspective on Taiwan and Tokyo's economic involvement with the Nationalists.

The PFT's potential for amicably resolving differing Sino-Japanese security interests in Southeast Asia, the East China Sea, Korea, and Taiwan rests on the priority each side places on the need for cooperation with the other. As long as Peking feels threatened by the Soviet Union and needs Japanese technology, the PFT will be a positive inducement for the Chinese not to forceably challenge Japanese security interest in East Asia. Conversely, Japan's overwhelming dependence on foreign raw materials and markets makes it more interested in cooperation than conflict with China. From these complementary needs, the PFT clearly contributes to the achievement of Japan's security goals of avoiding conflict and maintaining stability by deferring all of the volatile issues in Sino-Japanese relations.

The long range question for Japanese security planners is whether or not the current optimism about the future of Sino-Japanese relations generated by the conclusion of the PFT will create an atmosphere of mutual trust capable of permanently settling conflicting security interests between Japan and China that have persisted since the founding of the People's Republic.

2. Japanese-Soviet Security Relations

While the PFT appears supportive of Japan's security goals with China, the present animosity in Sino-Soviet

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relations makes closer ties with Peking a zero-sum game for Tokyo in regard to Japanese-Soviet security issues. Moscow has consistently argued with Tokyo that the PFT's anti-hegemony clause is pointedly anti-Soviet, and after the treaty was signed Soviet Premier Kosygin warned a visiting group of Japanese Dietmen that the treaty would prove to be an "historic error" for Japan since "it is easy to spoil a friendship, but it won't be easy to restore it."¹⁴⁷

Japan, naturally, insists that the PFT is pro-Chinese, not anti-Soviet, and that "Japan would be embarrassed if its Soviet policy is affected by the treaty."¹⁴⁸ According to the Japanese, Article IV of the PFT, which states the "treaty shall not affect the position of either contracting party regarding its relations with third countries" should alleviate the Kremlin's fear that a new anti-Soviet, Sino-Japanese alliance is in gestation. The Japanese contend that Moscow is misinterpreting the anti-hegemony clause and that the PFT in no way commits Japan to support China's foreign policy. In fact, Prime Minister Fukuda, in his speech to the Diet calling for swift ratification of the PFT, emphasized the importance of promoting friendly relations with the Soviet Union on the basis of "correct mutual understanding."¹⁴⁹

Rivals for power in East Asia over the past century, the Japanese and Russians neither like nor trust each other. The residual animosity from two wars, a history of clashes

in Siberia, Mongolia, and Manchuria, and Moscow's violation of its neutrality agreement with Tokyo near the end of World War II, has been aggravated recently by Soviet refusal to return the disputed "Northern Territories", to compromise on fishing quotas, and its support for Hanoi's militarist policies in Southeast Asia.

On the surface, it would appear that Japan's present tilt towards China would not be conducive to settling any outstanding differences with the Soviet Union, but with the Sino-Soviet confrontation intensifying, the specter of a Sino-Japanese axis developing in East Asia may give the Japanese additional leverage with the Kremlin. At present, however, it is unclear whether the PFT is a stimulant or a depressant to Japan's goal of establishing with the Soviet Union "stable relations of good-neighborliness and friendship based on mutual understanding and trust."¹⁵⁰

Concerning the disputed "Northern Territories", the Soviet refusal to even consider negotiations about the possible return of Etorofu, Kunashiri, Shikotan, and Habomai has, since the restoration of diplomatic recognition in 1956, been the most important impediment to the improvement of relations between Moscow and Tokyo. Japan, claiming that the four islands in question have never been historically or geographically considered part of the Kuril chain, and therefore not subject to the San Francisco Treaty's concession of this island chain to the Soviet Union, adamantly demands

the return of the "Northern Territories" as a precondition for opening negotiations with Moscow on a peace treaty. The Soviets contend "there is no territorial problem" between them and the Japanese as the status of the "Northern Territories" was resolved at Yalta and confirmed in San Francisco.¹⁵¹ The negotiations and signing of the PFT have done nothing to ease this impasse. In fact, the PFT has resulted in both Moscow and Tokyo reaffirming their past positions on the "Northern Territories" issue.

Throughout 1978, as the PFT negotiations moved towards fruition, the Kremlin added the "anti-Sovietism" of the treaty as another justification for rejecting Japan's petitions for the return of the disputed islands.¹⁵² In June, the Soviets responded to Fukuda's announcement that PFT negotiations would be reopened in July by conducting large scale naval maneuvers in the vicinity of Etorofu. The exercise of most of the Soviet Pacific Fleet and the airlift of 1,000 troops in a non-normal Soviet training area convinced most observers that the "Northern Territories" would be used by Moscow as a forum for protesting closer Japanese ties with China.¹⁵³ Since the conclusion of the PFT, the Soviets have emphasized that their position on the "Northern Territories" issue remains unchanged. Reflecting the sternness of their posture are reports that the Soviets are building a base for ground troops on Kunashiri Island and their curtailment of family visitation rights to "Northern

Territories" grave sites, owing to the "general circumstances" of Soviet-Japanese relations.¹⁵⁴

The PFT has resulted in no appreciable change in the Japanese position on the "Northern Territories" question. In February 1978, just after the initial indications that Japan and China were seriously considering a resumption of their stalled PFT talks, Brezhnev in a letter to Prime Minister Fukuda proposed a Treaty on Good Neighborhood and Cooperation between the USSR and Japan, pending the settlement of a peace treaty. Fukuda rejected the proposal, pointing out that the solution to the "Northern Territories" problem must be found before Japan will consider any bilateral treaties with the Soviet Union.¹⁵⁵ Even though the Japanese have made numerous statements since signing of the PFT about the need to "mend strained bilateral relations" with the Soviets, Tokyo continues to link the return of the "Northern Territories" to any improvement in Japanese-Soviet ties. Making this point, Cabinet Secretary Abe said to a group of Japanese businessmen in September 1978 that "it was an immediate diplomatic task of the Japanese government to restore the Soviet-held Japanese territory and conclude a long pending peace treaty with the Russians."¹⁵⁶

While the PFT thus far has resulted only in a restatement of each side's basic position on the "Northern Territories" issue, Japan may be forced to modify its stance because of the contradiction between its willingness to

conclude a peace treaty with China without settling the Senkaku's question and its refusal to even discuss a peace treaty with the Soviets until all territorial disputes are resolved. By establishing a model disallowing emotion laden territorial issues to stand in the way of improved diplomatic relations, the PFT could eventually cause Japan to drop its insistence on a return of the disputed islands as a precondition for concluding a peace treaty, as desired by the Soviets. This would undoubtedly reduce Soviet-Japanese tensions, but on terms more favorable to Moscow than Japan.

For the time being, however, Japan will probably continue to press its claims for a return of the "Northern Territories." Not only is this an emotional issue with the Japanese electorate, but the Chinese, who themselves have serious territorial claims against the Soviets and have steadfastly supported the Japanese position, might be miffed by Tokyo's giving way. More practically, many Japanese see the "Northern Territories" as a valuable negotiating chip, which should not be given up without major Soviet concessions in other areas, such as fishing quotas and resource development in Siberia. The "Northern Territories" have also taken on a new economic significance in view of Tokyo's and Moscow's overlapping claims to fishing and seabed rights in the Northwestern Pacific.

Though not as emotional as territorial differences, Japan's increasing competition with the Soviet Union over

fishing rights is potentially a greater source of conflict since fish are so important for meeting the protein needs of both nations. The fisheries issues between Japan and the Soviet Union have been further aggravated by the de facto international acceptance of a coastal state's right to establish a 200 mile economic zone. In the aftermath of the U.S. and Canada declaring 200 mile zones off their coasts, the waters of the North Pacific became particularly important to both the Russian and the Japanese fishing industries for making up the differences in their catches. In March 1977 the Soviets, attempting to compensate for their catch losses off North America, declared their own 200 mile economic zone and severely restricted Japanese fishing operations within it.

Inevitably, the fisheries issues became entangled with the territorial question as Moscow used the disputed "Northern Territories" to subtend the boundary lines of its economic zone. When Japanese attempts to negotiate an equitable catch quota in the Soviet zone broke down in April 1977 over the Kremlin's repeated attempts to get Tokyo to admit Russian sovereignty over the four disputed islands by accepting Soviet jurisdiction throughout its claimed economic zone, Japan countered with its own 200 mile zone based on the "Northern Territories" being Japanese. This represented a reversal of Japan's long standing policy of opposing exclusive national economic zones, and was done primarily

to improve Japan's negotiating position with the Soviet Union on catch quotas.¹⁵⁷ The fact that Japan specifically waived any restrictions on Chinese or South Korean fishing vessels within its zone made this point abundantly clear.

Subsequently, two temporary agreements setting catch quotas in each other's 200 mile zones were reached in summer 1977 when Japan, under considerable domestic pressure from the powerful fisheries lobby to conclude an arrangement with Moscow, agreed to reduce its catch in the Soviet zone by as much as 40 percent, to take no salmon or herring, and to accept de facto but no de jure Soviet control over the "Northern Territories" for purposes of regulating fishing rights only.¹⁵⁸ To the Japanese these initial fisheries agreements represented an arbitrary exercise of Soviet super-power status, with Moscow intent on demonstrating to Tokyo that Japan could not successfully challenge Soviet interests in Asia. Though never officially connected, the Soviet hardline attitude on the fisheries issue may well have been the kindling for Japan's renewed interest in early 1978 for concluding the PFT.

While there is a substantial economic rationale for Moscow severely restricting Japanese fishing rights in the Soviet economic zone, the Kremlin has used the fishing rights negotiations throughout 1978 as a means of expressing Soviet displeasure with Japan over the PFT. After drastically reducing Japan's highly profitable salmon quota and

instituting a "fishery cooperative fee" in April,¹⁵⁹ the Soviets reneged in June on an agreement reached earlier in 1978 to engage in four joint fishery operations within the Soviet 200 mile economic zone with private Japanese firms. The reason Moscow gave for backing out of the joint fisheries ventures, just as they were about to be implemented, was the announced resumption of Sino-Japanese PFT negotiations, which the Soviets claimed would be an obstacle to friendly Japanese-Soviet relations.¹⁶⁰ In an obvious diplomatic snub, the Soviets refused to renew the visas of the Japanese delegation sent to Moscow to see if the joint venture agreements could be salvaged.¹⁶¹ Since the PFT was signed, the Russians also stalled negotiating on 1979 catch quotas and rejected Japanese suggestions for replacing the current system of one year provisional fisheries agreements with a long term pact.¹⁶²

Japanese-Soviet competition for the northwestern Pacific fishing catch has historically been cantankerous because of the high economic stakes, and the possibility for a "Cod War" confrontation has increased considerably with the delimitation of 200 mile economic zones and the establishment of catch quotas. By binding itself politically and economically more closely with China through the PFT, the Japanese have brought Sino-Soviet polemics to the fisheries question and thereby stiffened Soviet resolve not to make concessions. With Japan dependent on fish products for 51 percent of its protein intake, and lacking the military strength to effectively challenge Soviet harassment of Japanese fishing

operations, the fisheries issue provides Moscow with a low risk, highly capable lever for moderating Japanese cooperation with China.¹⁶³

Because the PFT has reduced interest in a compromise on allocating northwestern Pacific fishing rights, which Tokyo needs more than Moscow, the new accord with China is not likely to help stabilize relations with the Soviet Union. As a result, Japan will have to delicately assess its need for Chinese raw materials against the possibility of further reduced catches in the Soviet 200 mile economic zone.

Indochina is another area where Moscow can express its displeasure with Japan's closer association with China. Southeast Asia is Tokyo's second largest trading partner, with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) accounting for twelve percent of Japan's total trade.¹⁶⁴ Consequently, Hanoi's June 1978 decision to join COMECON was as alarming to the Japanese as it was to the Chinese. This economic link between Moscow and Hanoi probably increased both Tokyo's and Peking's interest in concluding the PFT. For Japan there is the fear that Vietnam's new connections with the Soviet international economic system might develop into a conduit for trade between ASEAN and COMECON, a development which could be extremely detrimental to Japanese economic trading patterns.¹⁶⁵ China, of course, is an attractive alternative for offsetting any Japanese market losses in Southeast Asia. For China, Vietnam's association with COMECON

was correctly read as an indicator of growing Soviet involvement in Southeast Asia and a further deterioration in Sino-Soviet relations.¹⁶⁶

This deterioration continued with the signing of the Soviet-Vietnamese peace and friendship treaty in November 1978. The Japanese Foreign Ministry's assessment that this treaty "may have major adverse effects on stability in Asia"¹⁶⁷ proved to be timely and accurate when Vietnam invaded Cambodia and established the puppet regime of Kampuchea in January 1979. China retaliated in February with a "punitive" attack along Vietnam's northern border, demanding that Hanoi withdraw its forces from Cambodia. Timing alone makes it difficult to disassociate Hanoi's new treaty relations with Moscow from Peking's fully normalized relations with Tokyo and Washington, and the outbreak of a Sino-Vietnamese war.¹⁶⁸

Prior to the Sino-Vietnamese border war of 1979, the PFT was designed to serve both Japan's and China's interests in Southeast Asia of stabilizing the region politically for economic development, while limiting Soviet and Vietnamese opportunities for gaining greater influence in the area. Touting an Asian collective security system since 1969 as a means for outflanking China,¹⁶⁹ the signing of the PFT, with Peking and Hanoi at loggerheads, may have given the Soviets the leverage they needed to secure a toehold in Southeast Asia.¹⁷⁰

Moscow's new position in Vietnam is not only strategically threatening to China, but also an effective diplomatic

and economic counter to the PFT. According to sources in Tokyo, the Soviets are hoping to embarrass the Japanese over Chinese hegemonism in Southeast Asia, while pointing out that Japan has little room to complain since the Soviet-Vietnamese treaty, like the PFT, has a clause stating that the pact is not aimed against the interests of any third country.¹⁷¹

If relations between Peking and Hanoi continue to deteriorate, if Vietnam's policy of military expansionism goes unchecked, and if Soviet influence in Southeast Asia increases, then Japan's new relationship with China through the PFT could prove to be a liability. On the other hand, the ASEAN nations might seek closer ties with China and Japan as a means of offsetting Soviet and Vietnamese power in Southeast Asia. This could be a net plus for Japan. In any event, aggressive manifestations of the Sino-Soviet conflict through Cambodian and Vietnamese surrogates and open warfare along the China-Vietnam border are likely to cause Japan to rethink its strategy of offering economic aid, technological assistance, and diplomatic good offices to stabilize the situation in Southeast Asia.

Unquestionably, the greatest challenge to Japan's goal of promoting Asian stability resides in an eruption of the Sino-Soviet dispute. Aligning Japan's industrial strength with China's massive population and raw material base does little to relieve Moscow's apprehensions about

Peking's motives for seeking the PFT. On the positive side, continuation of the Sino-Soviet split at a level below open hostilities does provide Tokyo with the relative advantage of making Japan's friendship important to the security equation of its two most powerful neighbors. Furthermore, a reduction in Sino-Soviet tensions, which Robert Scalapino sees as inevitable,¹⁷² could leave Japan outside of the mainstream of Asian security issues and up against a Sino-Soviet dominated market and raw materials cartel in Asia.

Regardless of these factors, the harshness of Soviet policy towards Japan since the Chou-Tanaka summit made the PFT a diplomatic necessity for Japan. Further delay in concluding the treaty would have risked a serious decline in relations with China needlessly, since Moscow was not optimistic about any near-term improvement in relations with Tokyo and saw no reason to make any concessions because of Japan's precarious economic and military position. In the past, Japan has sought to neutralize Russian strength in Asia by allying itself with Moscow's major adversary -- Britain in 1902, Germany in 1941, and the United States in 1951 -- and the PFT is indicative of this diplomatic pattern continuing.

To the degree that the PFT stabilizes Sino-Japanese relations on the basis of the 1972 Chou-Tanaka communique, it should increase proportionately the possibilities of some form of Soviet retaliation against Japan. In its official response to the PFT signing, the Kremlin warned that Japan

would be held responsible for any "complications" that might arise in East Asia as a result of the treaty and for any "negative consequences" it might have on Soviet-Japanese relations.¹⁷³ Because of the Soviet Union's military reach, Japan's post-PFT policy must concentrate on convincing Moscow that Japan, is not interested in strengthening China against the USSR, and of the continued strategic and economic value a friendly Japan is to Soviet interests in the Far East.

Throughout the negotiating process leading to the PFT, the Japanese have been confident that Soviet reaction to the treaty would be restrained by Moscow's compelling need for Japanese capital and technology in developing Siberia. The Japanese also see the Soviets not wanting to antagonize Japan because of the home islands' strategic location athwart the sea and air lines of communication to the Soviet Maritime Province.¹⁷⁴

Even so, Japan's signing the PFT in the face of Soviet protestation is not likely to induce Moscow to be compromising on the "Northern Territories" question, the fisheries issue, or Southeast Asia, and could inadvertently draw Japan into the flak pattern of the Sino-Soviet dispute. It is not correct, however, to assume that had Japan not signed the PFT that relations with the Soviet Union would have automatically improved. This is simply not the case, because the PFT is more a result of the poor state of Japanese-Soviet relations than a cause of them.

3. Japanese-American Security Relations

The special relationship that has existed between Japan and the United States since the end of the Occupation in 1952 remains the principal determinant of Japanese foreign and security policy calculations. In an apt metaphor, Zbigniew Brezezinski, noted, "America has been both Japan's roof against the rain and its window on the world."¹⁷⁵ While Japan's renewed economic strength, the development of the Sino-Soviet conflict, and the Nixon Doctrine, have fostered a new sense of independence in Tokyo, the world remains bipolar in a strategic sense and Japan still needs the American nuclear umbrella to shield itself against the threat posed by the Soviet Union. Despite some current friction over trade policy and base rights, the growing Soviet military capability in the Pacific and the independence the security agreement with Washington gave Japan in negotiating the PFT, emphatically reminded the Japanese of the importance of retaining the American security guarantee.

The original pattern of Japan's post-World War II security policy was forged by the stark realities of emerging Cold War bipolarity, where both Moscow and Peking in tandem appeared ready to take advantage of Japan's weakened condition. A security pact with the U.S. was, at the time, the only viable option for dealing with the security threat posed to Japan. The self-confidence associated with Japan's economic recovery, the generally lowered American Asiatic profile

forecasted by the Nixon Doctrine, the broadening gulf between Moscow and Peking, the thaw in Sino-American relations signaled by the Shanghai communique, the cordiality of the Chou-Tanaka summit, and the U.S.-USSR agreement in strategic arms limitations (SALT), caused many Japanese in the early 1970's to not only question the credibility of the American security commitment but to also ask whether it had become anachronistic. According to popular Japanese reasoning at the time, many of the basic assumptions underlying the continuance of security ties with the U.S. appeared to lose their relevance after Japan and China reestablished diplomatic relations in 1972.¹⁷⁶

Even though the international climate was improving, from Japan's perspective, the 1973 "oil crisis" and Moscow's hardening attitude towards Tokyo because of its friendlier relations with Peking reminded the Japanese of their vulnerability and need for security. Consequently, there is little dispute among observers of Japanese politics that public support for the "American connection" is now more intense than ever before. According to an August 1978 opinion poll, 74 percent of Japanese young people in the 20 to 29 age bracket now favor the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty as compared to 38 percent in 1969.¹⁷⁷

There are numerous reasons for this renewed support, not the least of which is that, even with its new relationship with China, Japan has no alternative to the American defensive shield. Should the security treaty with the U.S.

be terminated, Japan would have a choice of unarmed neutrality, a rearmed independent Gaullist policy, or the development of some sort of regional security system.

None of these options are particularly suited for achieving Japan's basic goals of security, prosperity, and status. Unarmed neutrality would allow lesser military powers to take advantage of Japan economically. Furthermore, neutrality would be contingent upon the perception that Japan was in no position to threaten the interests of other nations; a circumstance which is hardly the case considering Japan's industrial strength.

An independent Gaullist policy would require a rapid expansion of military capabilities. Such a policy would entail heavy political and economic costs for Tokyo, with its sincere aversion to nuclear weapons. Additionally, a rearmed Japan might be a cause for considerable concern in Moscow and Peking, thereby increasing Japan's overall security problems. Multilateral security arrangements are hampered in Asia by an asymmetry of national interest, cultural values, and systems of government. Also, memories of the "Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere" would make other nations extremely cautious about joining a security group led by Japan. From Tokyo's perspective, regional security agreements could also reduce economic options by forcing a closer association between trade and foreign policy, and there is no regional alignment capable of effectively facing up to the Soviet conventional or nuclear threat.

By comparison with the other options, continuation of a close security relationship with the U.S. makes sense because it allows Japan to obtain maximum defense for minimum expenditure. This security linkage is also complementary to Japanese economic interests, since the U.S. is Japan's largest trading partner. Additionally, by minimizing the possibility that Japan will reconstitute itself as an autonomous, well armed military power, the American security treaty can also be seen as serving Soviet and Chinese regional security interests.

More significantly, the American commitment to defend Japan has given the Japanese reasonable leverage in its dealings with both the Soviet Union and China. Unquestionably, the security treaty has inhibited Moscow's response to Japan's policy of seeking closer economic and political ties with China. Without this defensive shield, Japan might have been forced to take greater heed of Soviet opposition to the PFT. Even though the security treaty is, in effect, underwriting Japan's new relationship with China, the Soviets have grown more tolerant of Tokyo's continued association with Washington because the security treaty prevents Japan from moving completely into the Chinese orbit.

There is little empirical evidence to dispute the contention that Japan's security ties with the U.S. were crucial to the pattern of negotiations leading to the signing of the PFT, but there is the possibility that the Sino-Japanese pact could adversely affect Tokyo's relations with

Washington. Even with President Carter's announcement that the PRC and U.S. would exchange ambassadors in 1979, many differences remain between Peking and Washington, and Japan could find itself forced to decide between supporting China or the U.S. on any number of issues.

Korea immediately assumes center stage as an area where such a dilemma might manifest itself. In the event of a military crisis on the peninsula, might not the political and economic advantages associated with the PFT cause Japan to seriously consider siding against the U.S. if Peking supported Pyongyang? The Japanese, naturally, dismiss such scenarios as extremely unlikely, contending closer Sino-Japanese relations reduce the possibility of confrontation in Korea or any other area, making such choices between the Chinese or American position moot.¹⁷⁸ What the Japanese, of course, do not say is that the PFT gives Tokyo an improved bargaining position with regards to American security policy in Northeast Asia.

In short, there appears to be a preponderance of evidence suggesting that the Japanese see the PFT as complementing their security ties with the U.S. First, the Japanese have no immediate alternative capable of providing adequate security, and it does reinforce existing patterns of trade for Tokyo. Second, the American security treaty is favored by the Chinese because of its anti-Soviet thrust and because it frees Japanese capital for investment in

China that might otherwise be used for defense. Third, it allows Japan to diversify its sources of raw materials and markets through closer relations with China, relatively free from fear of aggressive Soviet reaction. Fourth, the security treaty with the U.S. is accepted by the Soviets as a short-term device for checking Chinese influence over Japan. Fifth, the Japanese population in general sees alliance with America as necessary for maintaining Japan's security.

In the near term, especially with the normalization of Sino-American relations, there seems to be little chance of conflict between the Japanese-American Security Treaty and Japan's warmer relations with China. Over the longer run, however, the PFT could dilute the importance of the American security alliance if Sino-Japanese relations continue to flourish and if economics continues to play an increasing role in security decisions. In the atmosphere of growing economic competition between Japan and the U.S., the possibility certainly exists that Peking may be able to use the commercial advantages Tokyo derives from the PFT to play Japan off against the U.S. in much the same way that Japan has used its American security treaty to take advantage of Sino-Soviet differences over the past decade.

B. THE PFT'S IMPACT ON JAPANESE ECONOMIC INTERESTS

Japan is a manufacturing nation that must trade to survive. Because Japan's prosperity is dependent on a self-closing feedback loop of exchanging finished goods and technology

for raw materials and energy, a basic premise of Japanese foreign policy must be the assurance of access to natural resources and the expansion of export markets to generate balance of payment credits to pay for needed imports. By extension, Japan's continued economic development requires international stability and a free trade environment to prevent the disruption of the Japanese economic pattern of using exports to finance the escalating costs of imports.

The rapidity and magnitude of Japan's post World War II economic growth is well documented,¹⁷⁹ but the fragile Japanese dependence on foreign suppliers and buyers has been the basis of Japan's close economic ties with the U.S., and of China's and the Soviet Union's designs for improving relations with Tokyo.

In the wake of the 1973 oil crisis, Japan was shocked into intensifying its efforts to diversify both its sources of raw materials and its markets away from their heavy reliance on the U.S.; this diversification effort led eventually to China and the PFT. Representing a departure from Japan's successful formula for keeping foreign policy and international economics separate, the conclusion of the PFT is important because it initiated a potentially lucrative new pattern of trade with China, which also significantly affects political and economic relations between Japan, the Soviet Union, and the United States.

1. The PFT's Impact on Sino-Japanese Economic Relations

The complementary nature of the Japanese and Chinese economies is reflected by the long series of unofficial trade agreements dating back to 1952, which tacitly recognized the natural linkage between Japan's needs for raw materials and China's requirements for capital improvements. This relationship in which Japan accounted for 19 percent of China's foreign trade by 1972,¹⁸⁰ was, however, extremely unpredictable because of the diplomatic estrangement that existed between Tokyo and Peking. Even after diplomatic relations were renewed in 1972, Sino-Japanese trade was limited by a combination of rightwing LDP political pressures, Soviet warnings about strengthening China, and Peking's policies about foreign investment.¹⁸¹ What was lacking in Tokyo was a confidence that increased trade with China would contribute significantly to Japan's security, prosperity, and status.

The PFT represents a reversal of this view by committing Japan to a foreign policy that now presumes a friendly and cooperative relationship with China. This renewed identification of China with Japanese national interests resulted primarily from a unique sequence of events between 1975 and 1978. Japanese negotiations with the Soviets for rights to develop Siberian resources had already broken down and Moscow was becoming increasingly stubborn about the "Northern Territories" and Japanese fishing quotas. The U.S. began to pressure Japan about reducing its balance

of payment surplus by limiting exports and increasing imports -- a policy the Japanese did not believe they could afford, assuming the increased price for oil. Furthermore, a slumping domestic economy convinced the Fukuda government that it needed a foreign policy success to shore up its sagging domestic political fortunes. At the same time, Teng Hsiao-ping's policy of modernization was getting underway, forcing China to be more pragmatic about foreign investment. In this context, it became obvious that the benefits from signing the PFT -- even one with an anti-hegemony clause -- were beginning to outweigh the risks.

The decision to sign the PFT resulted in a trade bonanza for Japan. Published reports indicate that Japan-China trade between January and June 1978, in anticipation of the treaty signing, jumped 16 percent on a yen basis and 42 percent on a dollar index.¹⁸² The prognosis is for even larger increases. During his October 1978 Tokyo visit to exchange instruments of ratification, Teng said the \$20 billion, eight year trade agreement concluded in February 1978, should be "doubled and doubled again."¹⁸³ Along this same optimistic line, a Japanese brokerage house is predicting a "boom" on the basis of annual trade between Japan and China doubling to \$7 billion by 1981.¹⁸⁴

Besides the magnitude of the new China trade, it is well suited to Japan's economic needs. For example, under

the February 1978 trade agreement, the Japanese contracted to sell the Chinese \$7 to \$8 billion worth of plant and technology items plus an additional \$2 to \$3 billion worth of construction materials and equipment over the next year in return for increasing amounts of Chinese crude oil and coal.¹⁸⁵ With Chinese demand presently concentrated on procuring petrochemical processing, steel, heavy machinery, and electronics technologies, Japanese industrialists are hopeful that the expanding Chinese market will alleviate a recession, help offset mounting competition from new Asian industrial rivals like South Korea, and ease the balance of payments problem with the U.S. by reducing export pressures on the American market. Japanese willingness to provide offshore drilling technology, which China lacks, also increases the likelihood that both nations will come to an amicable solution for allocating continental shelf resources in the East China Sea.¹⁸⁶

Additionally, access to Chinese resources and markets gives Japan increased leverage with the Soviet Union by insulating the Japanese from Russian policy ploys based on Soviet military strength or economic power. Nor should the value of the political framework established by the PFT for codifying Sino-Japanese trade agreements be forgotten.

Thus far, Japan's only serious concern about the development of its post-PFT trade with China is in the area of finances. Even when the volume of Sino-Japanese trade

was minimal, Japan consistently ran a trade surplus and China's balance of payments deficit should increase if bilateral trade develops according to present forecasts. It was feared in Tokyo that traditional Chinese rejection of all foreign investment would be the single most formidable bottleneck on trade between the two countries.

This problem has failed to materialize, as China has demonstrated an unexpected degree of flexibility on the question of finances. Not only has Peking agreed to accept commercially based credit from the Japanese Export-Import Bank, but it has also shown a willingness to engage in joint development, processing on commission, and payment in kind for desired Japanese goods and technology. Nonetheless, to reduce its balance of payments deficit from this growing volume of trade, China must produce oil and Japan must buy it. Japan is presently committed to purchase 47.1 million tons of Chinese oil over the next five years and some Sinophiles in Tokyo would like to see the amount increased to 40 or 50 million tons annually, or approximately 10 percent of Japan's oil imports.¹⁸⁷

The difficulty with this proposition is that the Japanese refining industry lacks the heavy cracking facilities needed to profitably refine paraffinated Chinese crude. Because of the importance of Chinese oil to the smooth acceleration of Sino-Japanese trade, Tokyo is already considering either subsidizing the refining industry to make the necessary improvements for handling China crude or

building new, specially equipped, government-owned refineries.¹⁸⁸ Despite the increased refining costs, which could limit Sino-Japanese trade volume from a balance of payments standpoint, the importation of Chinese crude, along with the availability of increased petroleum supplies from Mexico and Malaysia, would seriously challenge the OPEC cartel's hold on Japan.¹⁸⁹ While it is doubtful that China would be interested in seriously undercutting the OPEC price structure, the opportunity to decrease its dependence on Middle East oil gives Japan increased economic and political leverage in the international arena. If the PFT results in greater competition for the sizeable Japanese oil market, then the treaty will have significantly improved Japan's security posture and its prospects for continued prosperity.

Even though the PFT has opened up new vistas for trade between both countries, there are legitimate reasons, besides a growing Chinese trade deficit, for pessimism about the long term effects that large scale trade with China might have on Japanese national interests.

In the first place, cautious Japanese are skeptical as to whether or not this initial surge of buying by the Chinese is creating a false impression about the size of the Chinese market. Not only is there a limit on how much technology China can absorb, but Tokyo can also expect keen competition from the British, French, West Germans, and the Americans for sales in this market. A potentially serious

side effect of this competition could be a deterioration in economic and political relations between Japan and any or all of its major western trading partners.

Not to be overlooked is the possibility that the sale of plant technology, such as the Paoshan steel mill, which will be capable of producing six million tons a year when complete in 1981, may be counter productive to the continued growth of Japanese exports to China. Once the Chinese have turnkey technology there is no reason for them to buy it again, and it is only logical to assume they will use the technology purchased to increase their indigenous productive capacity to limit their dependence on imported goods. Furthermore, as China's industrial demands develop, Peking may no longer have sufficient raw material surpluses for export.

The Chinese also have a history of using trade relations to pressure Japan politically. Throughout the 1950's and 1960's Peking regularly curtailed trade to signal its displeasure with Japan's alliance with the U.S. and diplomatic recognition of Taiwan. The abrupt and almost complete severance of economic relations associated with the 1958 Nagasaki Flag Incident is perhaps the most celebrated use of Chinese economic leverage to protest Japanese foreign policy.¹⁹⁰ More recently, the Chinese refusal to allow the continued appearance of the Nationalist flag on Taiwanese airliners serving Japan complicated the

negotiations surrounding the 1974 Sino-Japanese aviation agreement and reminded Tokyo that Japanese financial ties with Taiwan could still be exploited by Peking.¹⁹¹ Peking may choose to use this same technique again to pressure Japan into a more anti-Soviet stance as Japanese economic involvement in China increases as a result of the PFT.

Certainly, a strong argument can be made that the political rapport accompanying the PFT and the complementary nature of the Japanese and Chinese economies should be sufficient to overcome immediate obstacles to the development of a strong, mutually beneficial, trading relationship. But over time, the drastic differences in Japanese and Chinese economic philosophies virtually eliminates any possibility of a Sino-Japanese trading block emerging. Japan is a resource-poor, capitalistic, stable democratic polity, which, by necessity, is committed to a system of free trade and economic interdependence. Conversely, China is a resource rich, socialist, autocratic, revolutionary state, which historically has valued economic independence to international interdependence. Unless there is a philosophic catharsis, it would seem that while the capacity of each nation to meet the other's immediate economic needs have put them in the same bed, the Japanese and Chinese dream different dreams about the economic future of their relationship. In the wake of the PFT, Japan is euphoric about the long term possibilities of trading technologically intensive products

for Chinese raw materials; for its part, China is hopeful that the PFT will provide increased access to Japanese technology, which will put China on the road to economic self-sufficiency.

Regardless of the ultimate limits placed on Sino-Japanese relations by their antithetical economic systems, the PFT has accentuated the positive by quantitatively boosting the level of bilateral trade and rekindling a warm spirit of diplomatic friendship between Tokyo and Peking. For the foreseeable future, this emphasis on the positive and mutuality of economic needs will continue to push Sino-Japanese trade toward record levels. On this basis the PFT must be viewed as contributing to Japan's prosperity.

2. The PFT's Impact on Japanese-Soviet Economic Relations

With the PFT signed and Sino-Japanese trade exceeding all expectations, the Japanese government has announced its intentions to concentrate on improving Japan-Soviet relations through expanded economic activity.¹⁹² As with the Chinese, there is a symbiotic relationship between Japanese interest in access to the natural resources of Siberia and the Soviet desire for Japanese capital and technology to promote the more rapid development of the Soviet Far East. Unlike the Chinese, however, the Japanese neither like nor trust the Russians, making Tokyo inclined to insist on a show of good faith before entering into any major agreement with the Kremlin.

The restrained response thus far by the Soviets to the signing of the PFT, has raised hopes in Japanese business and political circles that Moscow will be receptive to economic initiatives as a basis for improving the overall nature of Japanese-Soviet relations. Moscow, of course, denounces the PFT as being patently anti-Soviet, but it has directed the brunt of its criticism at China while officially informing Tokyo that the Soviet Union will "base its judgment on Japan's practical actions, not on its words" in formulating future policy towards Tokyo.¹⁹³

Already the PFT is apparently having the desired effect of giving the Japanese added leverage with the Soviets. Not only have Premier Kosygin and Foreign Minister Gromyko conveyed to various Japanese officials the Soviet Union's strong interest, despite the political complications associated with the PFT, in developing mutual trade relations on the basis of reciprocity and equality; but during a November 1978 visit to Moscow, Satoshi Sumita, the president of the Export-Import Bank was approached by Russian trade representatives about the availability of large scale Japanese bank loans for resource exploitation in Siberia under Moscow's next five year plan.¹⁹⁴ Japanese steel producers were also contracted to export 200,000 tons of large diameter pipe to the Soviet Union during the last quarter of 1978,¹⁹⁵ and Moscow has dropped threats made during the course of the PFT negotiations to retaliate against such a treaty by

denying Japan any fishing rights in the Soviet 200 mile economic zone unless Tokyo rescinded its claim to the "Northern Territories."¹⁹⁶

Their tough talk about "grave consequences" aside, the actual conclusion of the PFT probably forced the realization amongst the Soviet leadership that a policy of intimidation was not likely to be effective against a Japan allied with the U.S. and aligned with China. In fact, Soviet concerns that a continued atmosphere of confrontation might lead Tokyo to seriously consider the benefits of an anti-Soviet tripartite pact with Washington and Peking are far from groundless.¹⁹⁷ As a result, the Kremlin has decided, for the time being at least, that the deferment of difficult political issues, such as the "Northern Territories" dispute, while offering the Japanese an array of economic opportunities is the best way to overcome the anti-Soviet connotations of the PFT.

This strategy has the added advantages of playing to the Japanese desire to demonstrate that the PFT is not directed against Moscow, and of providing the Soviets with the technology and capital they need for the development of Siberia. Along these same lines, any technology or capital made available to the Soviets means a reduction in the amount the Japanese could offer to the Chinese. From this perspective, the Soviets may be optimistic that increased trade with Japan might drive a wedge between Tokyo and Peking

by reducing Japan's ability to contribute to the fulfillment of Chinese modernization and strengthening the Soviet military-economic infrastructure in the Far East.

The Japanese are anxious to show the Soviets, as well as the Chinese, that they are sincere in their professions about an omnidirectional foreign policy designed to promote friendly relations with all nations. This not only makes good political sense in terms of avoiding the Sino-Soviet conflict, but it also maximizes Japan's economic options by diversifying its sources of raw materials and markets. The improved economic relations the Soviets are seeking has the additional advantage for the Japanese of checking Chinese temptations to use Japan's trade dependency as a means of forcing Tokyo into an anti-Soviet foreign policy or to extract unreasonable prices for Chinese resources.

Responding to the Soviets' measured reaction to the PFT, the Japanese have decided to reverse a previous decision and to negotiate a long term economic cooperation agreement with the Soviet Union. Such an agreement was first proposed by Brezhnev in 1976 but rejected by the Japanese for fear that their claims to the "Northern Territories" might be forgotten in the rush of economic success.¹⁹⁸ In explaining this new policy, Prime Minister Fukuda indicated, that for the sake of improved relations with the Soviet Union, Japan would separate economic matters from political and territorial issues, but in return would expect a senior Soviet official to visit Japan in 1979.¹⁹⁹

Analogizing to the PFT, the Japanese are apparently hopeful that the natural economic forces drawing Japan and the Soviets together can be used not only for financial profit, but to establish the basis for a political settlement returning the four "Northern Territories" islands, which in turn would clear the way for negotiations on a Japanese-Soviet peace treaty needed for full normalization of relations.

Under the present circumstances of Japan wanting to participate in Siberian resource development projects to prove that the PFT is not anti-Soviet, and Moscow's desire to use economics to prevent Japan from becoming enmeshed in China's strategy of containing the Soviet Union, traditional political-economic analysis would predict a substantial increase in Japanese-Soviet trade as a result of the PFT.

A rapid improvement in Japanese-Soviet economic cooperation was also predicted after the unexpected warming of Sino-American relations in 1971, as both Moscow and Tokyo expressed concern over the future direction of American policy in Asia. This momentum toward increased economic cooperation was stifled, however, by Prime Minister Tanaka's visit to Peking in September 1972, resulting in renewed Soviet intransigence on the return of the "Northern Territories" and the economic terms Moscow was insisting on as the price for Japanese participation in Siberian resource development projects. Not only was the Kremlin requesting an excessive amount of credits at low interest rates normally reserved for

third world nations, but it also wanted to repay these loans with goods in kind on a deferred basis.²⁰⁰

Besides the investment risks, Tokyo was also apprehensive about participating in any economic projects that would enhance Soviet military power in the Far East. The strategic implications of the Tyumen Oil Fields Project and the construction of the Baikal-Amur Railroad (BAM)²⁰¹ for easing the logistics burden on Soviet troops deployed along the Chinese border and naval units operating from Vladivostok, indicated to the Japanese leadership that the Soviets were trying to use Siberian resources to involve Japan in Moscow's anti-China strategy.²⁰² As a result of these factors, plus Tokyo's belief that Moscow needed Japanese capital and technology more than Japan needed Russian resources, serious discussions on joint economic projects came to a halt by 1975.²⁰³

These same conditions which brought earlier schemes for Japanese investment in Siberia to abeyance still persist. Consequently, the continued identification of national pride with the "Northern Territories" question, the minimal guarantees on return of investment offered by the Soviets, the strategic implications on the Asian military security equation, and the mutual overestimation by each side of its importance to the other, suggest that old stumbling blocks in Japanese-Soviet relations will considerably dampen any new impetus the PFT might have for significantly increasing bilateral trade.²⁰⁴

Nonetheless, the failure of Moscow's harsh attitude towards Japan since the Chou-Tanaka summit to either entice Japanese investment or prevent the improvement of Sino-Japanese relations, and Tokyo's current desire to take advantage of the leverage provided by the PFT and the Sino-American normalization to improve relations with the Soviet Union, the volume of Japanese-Soviet trade should increase as a result of the PFT. This expectation is given further substance by post PFT statements from Tokyo and Moscow that economics holds the key to the future of Japanese-Soviet relations. To the degree that the PFT forces the Soviet Union to seek Japanese trade to foster Siberian development as well as to maintain a balance of power in East Asia, the treaty will add to Japanese prosperity, while also enhancing Japan's security and status in East Asia.

3. The PFT's Impact on Japanese-American Economic Relations

Japan and the U.S. are the two largest market economies in the world, with America being Japan's foremost trading partner (21%) and Japan being the United States' second leading trading partner (11%).²⁰⁵ Despite the magnitude of this bilateral trade, competition between Japan and the U.S. for resources and markets is increasing, and the friction caused by Japan's growing trade surplus is becoming acute. Because of the new trading opportunities with China and the Soviet Union made possible by the PFT, a central issue for the future of the Japanese economy will be whether the treaty

helps to move Japanese-American economic relations in a more cooperative or competitive direction.

There is no questioning the central role the U.S. played in stimulating Japan's post World War II "economic miracle", but since 1976 the Japanese have been smarting under Washington's increasing criticism of Tokyo's failure to reduce its balance of payments surplus with the U.S. From 1975, the U.S. deficit rose from \$1.7 billion to a staggering \$11.6 billion in 1978²⁰⁶ and has become a significant irritant in Japan's overall relations with the U.S. Besides straining economic relations, the deficit is beginning to taint the American security commitment. Business, labor, and political leaders in the U.S. point out that the \$1 billion a year it costs to maintain 47,000 servicemen in Japan amounts to a "free ride" on American defense coat-tails, and in effect is a subsidy for the Japanese economy. As a result, rightwing Japanese are growing concerned about whether or not a lightly armed Japan can, in all instances, forfeit its defense to an American disenchanted with Japan's economic policies.²⁰⁸

In the immediate future, the PFT is not likely to improve Japanese-U.S. economic relations, despite the optimism in Tokyo that PFT generated trade, primarily with China and secondarily with the USSR, will reduce the balance of payments problem by relieving the pressure to maintain as high a level of export trade with the U.S. as in the past.

In fact, the Japanese trade surplus with the U.S. is a multifaceted economic problem that could be worsened, rather than improved by the new trading patterns associated with the PFT.

The Japanese economy must be institutionally structured to encourage the formation of sufficient trade surpluses so that enough capital will be available to pay for essential imports of food, raw materials, and energy. As a result, the Japanese - U.S. trade gap is a function of Tokyo's concentration on exports, the economics of trading finished goods for raw materials, a tight import policy, the yen's appreciation in value, and Japan's slowed rate of economic growth. In terms of improving economic relations with the U.S. by decreasing the bilateral trade deficit, the PFT can only help marginally by allowing Japan to voluntarily meet Washington's demands for a reduction in Japanese exports.

Peking's decision to use large purchases of expensive Japanese manufactured goods and technology to implement its modernization program should mean that Tokyo can easily improve its balance of payments situation with the U.S. by diverting a larger share of its exports into the expanding Chinese market. But these same Sino-Japanese trade agreements that lessen the importance of the American export market to the Japanese may also lead to an increase in the U.S. trade deficit with Japan by further reducing the American share

of Japan's tightly controlled import markets. As a workshop nation, food, raw materials, and energy account for 78 percent of Japan's total imports, meaning that as the importation of Chinese natural resources increases, Japanese demand for American raw material imports, particularly coal, will decline.²⁰⁹

Because of strong protectionist measures for Japanese agricultural plus the intense competition from Western Europe and the emerging industrial states in Asia for a share of Japan's limited market for imported manufactured goods, there is little opportunity for the U.S. to recoup its share of the Japanese import market lost to Chinese natural resources. Consequently, because the PFT will probably result in a net reduction of U.S. imports to Japan by giving preference to Chinese raw materials so Peking can afford Japanese finished goods, the treaty is not apt to have a positive effect in immediately easing the tensions associated with Japan's large trade surplus with the U.S.

Besides not encouraging any increase in U.S. imports, the PFT will not give Tokyo any new options for attacking the other causes of U.S. trade deficit problem. The removal of trade barriers, the yen's appreciation in value, and the domestic economic growth rate are all areas where Japan's new treaty relations with China will have only a minimal impact at best.

Trade barriers to foreign imports are a function of Japanese domestic politics and the dynamics of Japan's

complex distribution system. Once needed to protect key sectors of the Japanese economy from foreign competition while Japan recovered its strength from World War II, these barriers are now used to protect Japan's balance of payments situation. Obviously, nations like the U.S., which allow Japanese goods to enter duty free, see these non-tariff barriers as unfair and a root cause of their balance of payments deficit with Tokyo. But, because China will probably never be an exporter of food, and is some years away from being able to offer manufactured goods for export, the PFT puts little if any pressure on the Japanese Diet to reduce protective tariffs for the politically powerful agricultural lobby or cause the entrenched Japanese retail system to curtail its practice of marking up the price of imported goods at each stage of distribution.

Appreciation of the yen is another area where the PFT is ineffective in adjusting Japan's trade surplus. Over time, yen appreciation will increase domestic Japanese demand for foreign imports by making them relatively cheaper, and decrease the demand for Japanese exports by making them comparatively more expensive. In the short run, however, this shift in trade volume lags considerably behind the rise in the yen value, resulting in an increase in Japan's trade surplus account as the yen appreciates faster than exports fall off. Clearly, the PFT and its associated trade agreements can do little to arrest the upward valuation of the yen, which is a function of the declining dollar and the

desirability of Japanese goods, or to accelerate the surplus reducing effect of this appreciation, which normally takes as long as two years.

An increase in the rate of economic growth is probably the single most important variable for increasing Japanese demand for imports and improving the Japanese-U.S. economic relations. The sale of finished goods and technology to China as a result of the PFT should stimulate Japanese growth, but this effect will hardly be noticed because of the current business recession and the dampening effect of Prime Minister Ohira's decision to reduce government spending in order to control the national debt. Not only has Japan failed to meet Fukuda's pledge to President Carter of achieving a 7 percent overall growth rate in 1978, but Ohira is now projecting a 6.3 percent increase in the GNP as the target for 1979.²¹⁰ Even with the projected increase in China trade, some private Japanese economic research organizations are less optimistic about Japan's economic growth potential, predicting an increase of between only 4 to 5 percent for 1979.²¹¹ Rather than a stimulant to economic growth, the PFT is probably more accurately characterized, at present, as a needed prop for an economy sagging from overcapacity. In the long run, Japan's new trading agreements with China should contribute to the renewal of strong economic growth necessary to meet foreign demands for increasing Japan's import levels. Until the anticipated China trade matures,

however, the PFT will not be a source or cause of imports needed to reduce Japan's trade surplus with the U.S.

Consequently, in a bilateral setting, the prospects of the PFT contributing to Japan's efforts to meet American demands for reducing the Japanese balance of payments surplus are not promising. This is not surprising because the PFT and its economic fallout do not represent any shift away from the basic Japanese concept of exporting high priced technologically intensive manufactured goods to pay for less expensive raw materials. Furthermore, as Tokyo diversifies its sources of raw materials, which account for the bulk of Japanese imports, the U.S. opportunities for closing the bilateral trade gap with Japan become more and more limited to retaliatory protectionism.

None of this analysis should be construed to mean, however, that if the PFT were not signed Japan's economic relations with the U.S. would have automatically improved. With or without the PFT, Tokyo's protective trade policies, the escalating value of the yen, and Japan's reduced rate of economic growth are important features of the Japanese economic system and would work to maintain the momentum towards a large Japanese surplus with the U.S. Though not likely to ease the pressure from any of these economic factors causing this surplus, the PFT does give Tokyo added bargaining power with which to resist unilateral American schemes to reduce its trade deficit that might be burdensome to the

Japanese economy or politically unacceptable to the Japanese electorate.

In a multilateral longer ranged setting, the economic aspects of the PFT take on a more positive tone for Japanese-American trade relations. As China's new trade links with Japan hasten industrial modernization, the enormity of the Chinese market will, even in Tokyo's eyes, be sufficient to accommodate a large influx of American manufactured goods and investment capital without detriment to Sino-Japanese arrangements.²¹² With the normalization of Sino-American relations, many Japanese now see the possibility of a cooperative division of labor developing between Japan and U.S. interests for the efficient cultivation of the Chinese import market. From the Japanese perspective, the degree to which the U.S. can establish its own balance of payment surplus with China, or any other major Japanese trading partner, the less Washington has to be concerned about its bilateral trade deficit with Tokyo.²¹³ In fact, the economic impact of the PFT and the normalization of Sino-American relations should allow the negative impact of Japan's trade surplus with the U.S. to be offset in the future by China recycling some appreciated yen it receives from the sale of its natural resources to purchase relatively cheaper American manufactured goods priced in dollars.

Japan's economic relationship with the U.S. has been growing progressively more competitive in the 1970's, and the PFT has no significant potential for easing this tension,

because it is a product of this competitiveness. By establishing China as an alternate source of supply and demand for the Japanese economy, the PFT signals Tokyo's intention to become more independent of American economic policy. This suggests that Japan's trade surplus problem with the U.S. will not improve because of Japanese reluctance to tamper with the profitable structure of their export led economy. Tokyo contends that its lack of natural resources leaves it little choice but to promote exports in order to pay for needed primary imports.

The economic inroads to China made possible by the PFT, reduce Japan's reliance on the U.S. and diversifies its trading patterns, but the treaty does little more to solve the problem of Japan's worsening trade surplus problem with the U.S. than give Tokyo some additional time before Washington considers serious unilateral corrective measures. PFT or not, the U.S. continues to be the major market for Japanese exports and the guarantor of Japanese security. Consequently, the key question in Japanese-U.S. economic relations is, to what degree and for how long can Tokyo maintain a balance of payments surplus with Washington before the American leadership institutes protectionist retaliation against Japanese imports or reassesses its security commitment?

With a trade surplus of \$9.8 billion projected for 1982,²¹⁴ the same economic difficulties Japan is currently experiencing with the U.S. could be repeated with China. The

PFT in tandem with the full normalization of Sino-American relations, however, presents Tokyo with an opportunity to contribute to the formation of a new system of multilateral trade that stresses the complementary aspects of Japan, China, and the United States' economic interdependence. Within such a trading network, where sufficient supplies of raw materials, energy, manufactured goods, technology, investment capital, and food would be available to all three countries, Japan could easily maintain the prosperity of its export led economy, reduce the pressures of bilateral trade surpluses with two of its most important trading partners, minimize the likelihood of American protectionist tactics, insulate itself against drastic alterations in the value of the yen, and stabilize its access to export markets and sufficient supplies of necessary raw materials.

On the whole, the PFT is an emphatic statement of Japan's growing economic independence from the U.S., which for the immediate future will not alleviate the causes or resulting problems from Tokyo's increasing trade surplus with Washington. Nor, however, does the treaty diminish the mutual interdependence that exists between the Japanese and American economies, suggesting that in the long run that the PFT could provide an avenue along which Tokyo, Peking, and Washington might pursue their common interests in a politically stable expanding system of international trade. To the extent that the PFT can accelerate the shift of Japanese-American

trade relations from bilateralism to multilateralism, it will ease economic and political tensions between Tokyo and Washington, while contributing to the continued prosperity of Japan.

C. THE IMPACT OF THE PFT ON JAPAN'S INTERNATIONAL STATUS

Since the Meiji Restoration, a persistent theme in Japanese foreign policy has been to displace the influence of the western powers in Asia and establish Japan as the preeminent state in the western Pacific. This leadership aspiration was suppressed by Japan's political stigmatization and economic devastation after World War II, which resulted in Tokyo retreating from controversial political issues in order to maximize its economic options. But Japan's "trading company" approach to foreign policy has been so successful that like a multinational corporation, Tokyo can no longer ignore the international ramifications of its economic decisions. Denied the luxury of divorcing politics from economics, Japan's traditional interests in being recognized as a shaper of Asian events is experiencing a resurgence.

The PFT is reflective of Tokyo's renewed interest in expanding its influence in Asia, with the treaty regarded by many observers as the first indication that Japan is ready to claim at least the mantle of regional economic leadership and accept the political responsibilities incumbent upon this position.²¹⁵ To promote and finance trade with China, as well as with other Asian nations, Japan has already assumed a more

visible posture in international economic circles such as the Tokyo Round of the Multilateral Trade Talks, where it is suggesting its own strategies, independent of the U.S. or Western Europe, for stabilizing the international monetary system.²¹⁶ Furthermore, the formulas devised to finance the expansion of Sino-Japanese trade will probably serve as a model for Japan's trading relations with other less developed countries in Asia.²¹⁷

The PFT is noteworthy alone because it represents Chinese recognition of Japan's de facto economic leadership in the eastern hemisphere. During his October 1978 Tokyo visit, Teng left no doubt that China needed Japanese assistance to modernize its economy. Commenting directly on Chinese backwardness the First Vice Premier said, "when your face is ugly you should not pretend to be beautiful" and "we have many things we can learn from Japan."²¹⁸ The prestige of China, the historical center of Asian culture, politics, and economics, seeking a more cooperative relationship with Japan for security and economic reasons will undoubtedly enhance Tokyo's influence throughout the Pacific basin. China's desire to acquire Japanese technology also lifts Japan's international confidence by reversing the historical pattern of Japan borrowing from China.

Besides strengthening the economic basis for increased Japanese regional influence, the PFT also establishes a fundamental framework for future relations with China that

not only improves Japan's strategic security, but also increases Tokyo's opportunity to play a broader role in maintaining regional stability. Complementing the security treaty with the U.S., the PFT makes it less likely that the Soviet Union would threaten the use of force against Japanese interests, because Tokyo is now closely connected with Moscow's two most powerful adversaries. In addition to reducing the Soviet military threat, the PFT simultaneously makes Tokyo less dependent on the American defense commitment. Conversely, Japan's tilt towards China increases the possibilities of Japanese involvement in some aspects of the Sino-Soviet dispute, but from Tokyo's vantage point, improved Sino-Japanese relations will stabilize the balance of power in Asia and thereby reduce the chances of a serious confrontation between Peking and Moscow. The Kremlin's controlled response, thus far, to the conclusion of the PFT tends to substantiate Tokyo's belief that the PFT will be a stabilizing influence for Asia.

The PFT is also central to Japan's omnidirectional foreign policy of maintaining stability by promoting friendly relations with all nations. The economic and political advantages resulting from the PFT should serve as an inducement to other countries, particularly the Soviet Union, to follow the Chinese example and seek friendlier ties with Japan.

Furthermore, by developing closer ties with Peking, Tokyo is hopeful of being able to mediate Soviet and American

differences with the Chinese. The importance Japan attaches to being identified as a great power mediator is reflected in Foreign Minister Sonoda's self-congratulatory interpretation of Japan's consultative role in Peking and Washington's decision to normalize Sino-American relations.²¹⁹ Japan's new desire to play a more active role in Asian politics was further confirmed by Tokyo's offer to involve itself in the Sino-Vietnamese conflict as a mediator.

Additionally, Japan's closer alignment with China adds considerable independence and flexibility to Japan's foreign policy. By providing Japan with an alternative source of raw materials and markets, along with a creditable counter to Soviet conventional power, the PFT ended Tokyo's client-patron relationship with the U.S. Japan's considerable trade and the continuance of its security pact with the U.S., however, means that Peking will not be in a position to dominate the future development of Sino-Japanese relations. The Soviets, with their vested strategic interest in not wanting to see China strengthened by closer ties to Japanese industry and technology, are encouraged by the PFT to outbid the Chinese for greater influence in Tokyo. Amazingly, the PFT has expanded Japan's area for diplomatic maneuver at very little cost, since economic competition was already driving Japanese-U.S. relations in the direction of greater independence and Japanese-Soviet relations were in decline since the Chou-Tanaka summit.

In general, the PFT contributes to Japan's prestige and influence in Asia by allowing Tokyo a freer hand in designing its own foreign policy. The treaty accomplishes this by strengthening Japan's economic base, bolstering its security, promoting regional stability, and increasing Japan's diplomatic options. But the latitude Japan enjoys as a result of the PFT only serves to underscore the contradiction between Japan's cultural insularity and the contemporary requirements for an energetic international involvement if the Japanese are to have the security, prosperity, and status they seek. Unfortunately, the PFT offers Tokyo no ready solution to this contradiction or how Japan can use its new position of importance to maximum advantage.

In any event, the experiences surrounding the conclusion of the PFT have proven to the Japanese that they can influence the outcome of major economic and political issues on a regional as well as a global scale. The PFT has also shown that Japan has sufficient strength and prestige to deal effectively with the superpowers. Furthermore, Japan's new linkage with a modernizing China, guarantees that Tokyo's potential reaction to any policy changes in Asia will be carefully considered by Washington and Moscow. Nor should it be forgotten that the dramatic diplomatic breakthrough represented by the PFT was achieved without Japan having to alter its security relations with the U.S., reconsider its constitutional postscript against the use of military force as

an instrument of national policy, or change the structure of its export led economy. This infers that Japan's international position is strong and that the rest of the world may have to adjust to the way Japan conducts its foreign policy, while the Japanese move cautiously towards the more activist diplomatic tradition required by the interdependent multipolar nature of today's international environment.

VI. CONCLUSIONS

The PFT is a benchmark in the evolution of Japan's foreign policy. By codifying the recommendations of the Chou-Tanaka communique, the 1978 Tokyo-Peking accord formally ended the American domination of Japanese diplomacy, revitalized Japan's historical closeness to China, and served notice on Moscow that the Japanese considered the Soviet Union to be the major threat to their security. The decision to sign the PFT also indicated that Japan's almost complete dependence on foreign raw materials and export markets for its national survival was, after 100 years, beginning to modify its culturally induced xenophobia. By signing the treaty despite American ambivalence and Soviet opposition, the Japanese signaled the superpowers that it was ready to depart from its past international reticence in order to play a more active and independent role in shaping a pattern of regional and global stability compatible with Japanese national interests.

An analysis of why Tokyo pursued the PFT to fruition highlights, in a contemporary setting, the basic national interests that have driven Japan's foreign policy since the Meiji Restoration. By aligning Japan with China, the treaty provides an implicit complementary security alternative to the American alliance; contributes to Japan's prosperity by diversifying its sources of raw materials and opening up

the China market to Japanese manufactured goods; and enhances Japan's international prestige by demonstrating its diplomatic independence and underscoring Peking's recognition of its need for Japanese assistance in achieving the "four modernizations."

As a reflection of the continuing centrality of security, prosperity, and status in Japan's foreign policy, the PFT also manifests three recurring thematic patterns in Tokyo's pursuit of its national interests.

First, there is the dominance of China in Japanese foreign policy considerations, based on size, proximity, and a cultural affinity. Through diplomacy, trade, and war Japan has, since the seventh century, consistently sought to strengthen itself through closer ties with China.

Second, Tokyo since the Restoration has viewed the Russians as Asian interlopers, competitors for influence in China, and an ominous threat to Japanese security. As a result, modern Japan has periodically attempted to neutralize Moscow's power in Asia by allying itself with Russia's strongest adversary. The PFT is actually the fourth such agreement concluded in the past 77 years, with the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902 setting the precedent for the Tripartite Pact with Germany in 1940, and the American Security Treaty of 1951.

Third, Japan's foreign policy is subordinate to domestic issues and the rigors of consensus politics. Prime Minister

Fukuda was able to build a consensus for the PFT only because virtually every participant in Japan's policy making process -- the LDP, the opposition parties, the governmental bureaucracies, the business community and public opinion -- saw increased commercial contact with China rejuvenating the Japanese recession burdened economy. The fact that it took six years to create this consensus and that Fukuda could not translate such a monumental foreign policy success into electoral victory, testifies to the priority domestic issues have over foreign policy concerns. This same phenomenon of foreign policy issues serving domestic interests was also at the root of Japan's isolation during the Tokugawa period, its imperialistic behavior after the Meiji Restoration, and its "trading company" approach to international relations following the American Occupation.

In addition to confirming the basic attributes of Japanese foreign policy, the PFT also portends significant alterations for the matrix of strategic, economic and diplomatic relations in East Asia. The basis for these changes is the broadened array of policy options made possible by Japan's closer ties with China, and Tokyo's reawakened desire to use its growing international influence.

Strategically, the PFT represents a dramatic tilt towards China, and by implication associates Tokyo with Peking's policy of Soviet containment. This has obviously further sensitized already raw Soviet-Japanese relations, making doubtful Russian concessions on the "Northern

Territories", fishing rights, and Siberian investment projects. On the other hand, Japan's importance to China's containment strategem and economic modernization program have induced Peking to at least appear to be more considerate of Japanese interests in Korea, the East China Sea, Taiwan, and Southeast Asia. To avoid being trapped into supporting Peking's anti-Soviet policies, Tokyo must maintain its strong security ties with the United States and affirmatively use its economic influence at every opportunity to convince the Kremlin that the PFT is not an alliance directed against the Soviet Union.

Besides affecting Japan's bilateral relations with its two communist neighbors, the PFT's most serious long-range impact will probably be on the future course of Sino-Soviet relations. Without a serious rift existing between Moscow and Peking, the PFT could not have occurred, but this continuing hostility, which makes Japan important to the security calculations of both China and the Soviet Union, also represents the greatest threat to the stability Japan needs for its security and prosperity. The most immediate danger is that by enhancing China's strategic position, the PFT could trigger a region wide conflict by inadvertently encouraging precipitous Chinese actions -- as in Vietnam, or by a pre-emptory Soviet attack to prevent China from translating its Japanese acquired technology into military strength. Furthermore, the more successful the treaty is at increasing Japan's

influence in the western Pacific, the greater the chance that Peking and Moscow will find it mutually beneficial to put aside their differences and concentrate on jointly containing Japan. For these reasons, Japan's security ties with the United States take on added significance. Not only does a strong American military presence dampen the impetus for armed conflict between the Soviets and the Chinese, but it also insulates Japan against the effects of either a Sino-Soviet confrontation or rapprochement.

Economically, the PFT is already a financial bonanza for Japan. Besides reducing Japanese dependence on Middle East oil, the increasing Chinese demand for Japanese goods has allowed Tokyo to respond voluntarily to American pressures for a reduction of Japanese imports without fear of a domestic backlash. The potential for mutual economic stimulation, that caused both sides to defer the settlement of difficult issues between them so that the PFT could be concluded, is however, not likely to last. Consequently, these unresolved issues, such as sovereignty over the Senkaku's, will resurface as significant friction points the more rapidly China assimilates Japanese industrial technology. As China modernizes, the less it will need Japanese imports and the more it will need its own natural resources. By provisioning China with the technology and financing it needs to modernize its industrial base, the PFT may also be laying the foundation for a serious Chinese challenge to Japan's economic leadership in Asia.

Perhaps the most certain and lasting impact of the PFT will be on Asian trading patterns. Since raw materials account for the bulk of Japanese imports, Tokyo's agreement in principle to buy Chinese resources so that Peking will have sufficient foreign exchange to pay for Japanese imports, means that Tokyo's demand for natural resources from Southeast Asia and the United States will drop, unless the new China trade results in a large and unexpected spurt in economic growth for Japan. Any significant decline in Japan's importation of high priced raw materials from Southeast Asia or the United States is certain to increase Tokyo's trade surplus and exacerbate pressures in ASEAN and Washington for protectionist measures against Japanese goods. The threat of such a disruption in its established markets could cause Japan's business and political elites to consider lowering existing barriers to foreign agricultural and manufactured goods.

In another vein, Japan's position as the second largest market for Middle East oil after the United States, means that the PFT could have a major impact on the international oil economy. If Japan can obtain 15 percent of its oil requirements from China by 1990 as called for by current projections, such a reduction in demand could cause a glut of Middle East oil on the world market, which would moderate the price of crude and the cartel behavior of OPEC. If the PFT can lower the price of energy by encouraging the return of a

more competitive system for oil pricing, this would amount to a de facto stimulant for economic growth in Japan and all other industrialized western nations.

Diplomatically, the PFT signifies an end to Japan's tacit acceptance of its client-patron relationship with the United States, and reestablishes Tokyo's pre-World War II position as a political power center in East Asia. Allied with Washington, aligned with Peking, and courted by Moscow, the PFT makes Japan probably the best diplomatically connected nation in the world. The complementary aspects of the PFT and the American Security Treaty bolster Japan's international position, reduce the likelihood of Tokyo having to choose between Washington or Peking, and assure the Japanese government that neither power will be able to dictate Japan's foreign policy. This informal American-Chinese-Japanese federation also allows Tokyo to more effectively resist Soviet attempts at political or economic intimidation and encourages the Kremlin to negotiate in good faith on outstanding issues in Soviet-Japanese relations -- not the least of which is the conclusion of a formal peace treaty. Additionally, the Japanese are hopeful that as a result of the PFT they will be able to offer their good offices with Peking and Washington as an honest broker for reducing tensions associated with Sino-Soviet, Sino-American, and Soviet-American relations. In short, the PFT has increased Japan's diplomatic access to the nations most crucial to ultimate stability in the Pacific basin.

Another way of assessing the impact of the PFT is to speculate on what might have been had Japan not signed the treaty. To begin with, if Japan had bowed to Soviet pressure not to commit itself to any anti-hegemonic treaty with China, this probably would have only marginally improved Soviet-Japanese relations, but would have exasperated China's patience, and caused a sharp deterioration in Sino-Japanese relations. Without a political agreement, China could not depend on Japanese technology and capital for its "four modernizations." Consequently, if Peking had not induced Japan to put aside its concerns about Soviet reaction and sign the PFT, this might have caused the Chinese either to scrap their modernization program, at great political expense to its leadership, or turn to the west, or even to the Soviet Union, for the necessary industrial expertise and financing.

None of these options would be particularly attractive to Japan. If Teng's moderate pragmatic policies were discredited, he would probably be replaced by a radical ideologue more concerned with fomenting revolution than creating stability. Greater European and American involvement in Chinese development would increase competition within the western bloc for the lion's share of the China trade and further antagonize economic relations between Japan, the United States, and Western Europe. The worst scenario, of course, would be the threat posed to Japanese security and economic interests by a Sino-Soviet accommodation.

Southeast Asia is another area where the non-existence of the PFT could have significantly altered developments. Sufficient reasons exist for believing that Vietnam may not have agreed to conclude a peace and friendship treaty with the Soviet Union had China not come to terms with Japan. The PFT identified Japan with China's interests and this, coupled with Tokyo's close association with ASEAN, made an alliance with Moscow Hanoi's only plausible strategy for countering China's growing strength and avoiding economic isolation. Without the PFT it is less likely that the Soviets would have been able to establish a beachhead in Southeast Asia, and it is doubtful whether Vietnam would have moved aggressively against Cambodia in the latter part of 1978 without such strong Soviet support. Surely there must be some bureaucrats in the Japanese foreign ministry wondering if the PFT was the catalyst for the chain reaction of events that culminated with China's "punitive" invasion of Vietnam in February 1979.

More positively, it is just as reasonable to wonder if the current thaw in North and South Korean relations would have occurred without the PFT. Another curious question is, what affect did the PFT have on the timing of President Carter's December 1978 decision to normalize relations with Peking? Undoubtedly the pressure to normalize would have been less intense had the American business community not been inundated with publicity about the lucrative deals

Japanese firms were able to negotiate as a result of the PFT.

From this brief hypothetical discussion of what the effects might have been on Sino-Soviet relations, the hostilities in Southeast Asia, stability in Korea, and the American decision to recognize China had the PFT not been signed, the conclusion seems inescapable that the treaty significantly changed the international context in East Asia. More normatively, the contextual changes wrought by the PFT, with the exception of Southeast Asia, also appear to be conducive to creating the stable environment Tokyo needs for enhancing Japanese security, prosperity, and status.

In summation, the preceeding analysis shows that the PFT opened a new chapter in Japanese foreign policy. Being a departure from its previous "trading company" approach of maximizing economic opportunities by maintaining a vague non-committal attitude on complex international issues, the PFT raised Japan's diplomatic voice and flashed a budding willingness to use its economic strength to achieve greater international influence. By expanding Japan's security, economic, and diplomatic options, the improvement of bilateral relations with Peking allows Tokyo the latitude of action needed to paly a central role in determining events in Asia instead of reacting to them. How Japan intends to apply its newfound influence and what type of regional contextual setting it sees as most suitable to its national interests remains to be seen. What does not remain to be seen is the

international significance of the PFT and its compatibility
with Japan's national interests.

APPENDIX A

TREATY OF PEACE AND FRIENDSHIP
BETWEEN JAPAN AND THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

JAPAN AND THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, RECALLING WITH SATISFACTION THAT SINCE THE GOVERNMENT OF JAPAN AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA ISSUED A JOINT COMMUNIQUE IN PEKING ON SEPTEMBER 29, 1972, THE FRIENDLY RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO GOVERNMENTS AND THE PEOPLES OF THE TWO COUNTRIES HAVE DEVELOPED GREATLY ON A NEW BASIS,

CONFIRMING THAT THE ABOVE MENTIONED JOINT COMMUNIQUE CONSTITUTES THE BASIS OF THE RELATIONS OF PEACE AND FRIENDSHIP BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES AND THAT THE PRINCIPLES ENUNCIATED IN THE JOINT COMMUNIQUE SHOULD BE STRICTLY OBSERVED,

CONFIRMING THAT THE PRINCIPLES OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS SHOULD BE FULLY RESPECTED,

HOPING TO CONTRIBUTE TO PEACE AND STABILITY IN ASIA AND IN THE WORLD,

FOR THE PURPOSE OF SOLIDIFYING AND DEVELOPING THE RELATIONS OF PEACE AND FRIENDSHIP BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES,

HAVE RESOLVED TO CONCLUDE A TREATY OF PEACE AND FRIENDSHIP AND FOR THAT PURPOSE HAVE APPOINTED AS THEIR PLENIPOTENTIARIES:

JAPAN: MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS
SUNAO SONODA

PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA: MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HUANG HUA

WHO, HAVING COMMUNICATED TO EACH OTHER THEIR FULL POWERS, FOUND TO BE IN GOOD AND DUE FORM, HAVE AGREED AS FOLLOWS:

ARTICLE 1

1. THE CONTRACTING PARTIES SHALL DEVELOP RELATIONS OF PERPETUAL PEACE AND FRIENDSHIP BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES ON THE BASIS OF THE PRINCIPLES OF MUTUAL RESPECT FOR SOVEREIGNTY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY, MUTUAL NON-AGGRESSION, NON-INTERFERENCE IN EACH OTHER'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS, EQUALITY AND MUTUAL BENEFIT AND PEACEFUL CO-EXISTENCE.

THE TWO SIGNATORIES AFFIRM THAT IN MUTUAL RELATIONS ALL DISPUTES WILL BE SOLVED BY PEACEFUL MEANS AND THAT THEY WILL NOT RESORT TO ARMS OR THREAT OF ARMS ALONG WITH THE AFOREMENTIONED VARIOUS PRINCIPLES AND THE PRINCIPLES OF THE UN CHARTER.

ARTICLE 2

THE TWO SIGNATORIES WILL NOT SEEK HEGEMONY IN THE ASIAN AND PACIFIC AREA OR ANY OTHER AREAS AND SHALL EXPRESS OPPOSITION TO ANY ATTEMPT BY ANY OTHER COUNTRY OR GROUP OF COUNTRIES TO ESTABLISH SUCH HEGEMONY.

ARTICLE 3

THE TWO SIGNATORIES, BASED ON THE SPIRIT OF GOODNEIGHBORLINESS AND FOLLOWING THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUALITY, RECIPROCITY, AND NONINTERFERENCE IN EACH OTHER'S DOMESTIC AFFAIRS, WILL STRIVE TO DEVELOP THEIR ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL RELATIONS AND PROMOTE INTERCHANGE BETWEEN THEIR PEOPLES.

ARTICLE 4

THIS TREATY WILL NOT AFFECT THE STATUS [CHII] OF EITHER SIGNATORY IN ITS RELATIONS WITH THIRD COUNTRIES.

ARTICLE 5

THIS TREATY WILL BE RATIFIED AND TAKE EFFECT ON THE DAY WHEN RATIFICATIONS ARE EXCHANGED IN TOKYO, AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE DATE.

THIS TREATY WILL BE EFFECTIVE FOR 10 YEARS AND REMAIN IN EFFECT THEREAFTER UNTIL IT GOES OUT OF FORCE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE FOLLOWING RULE:

EITHER OF THE SIGNATORIES SHALL BE ABLE TO TERMINATE THIS TREATY AT THE TIME WHEN THE FIRST 10-YEAR TERM EXPIRES OR AT ANY TIME THEREAFTER, GIVING A YEAR'S NOTICE IN WRITING.

FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER I

1. Figures for 1975 show Japan's GNP at \$485 billion, trailing only the U.S. (\$1500 billion) and the USSR (\$790 billion). For comparative purposes West Germany's GNP in 1975 was \$420 billion; France's \$340 billion; China's \$260 billion; and Britain's \$230 billion. Figures extracted from Ray S. Cline, World Power Assessment 1977 (Boulder: Westview Press, 1977), p. 58.
2. According to the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a basic policy of Japanese diplomacy "... is to actively promote international cooperation and play a role befitting Japan's international standing in order to contribute to the solution of the common problems facing the countries of the world..." Diplomatic Bluebook for 1975, (Tokyo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1976), p. 67.
3. Masataka Kosaka, Options for Japans' Foreign Policy, No. 97: Adelphi Papers (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1973), p. 3.
4. "Japan's three principal goals have been to promote its prosperity, to insure its security, and to gain recognition as a leading world power." Frank C. Langdon, Japan's Foreign Policy (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1973), p. 191.

CHAPTER II

5. Geographic proximity, cultural affinity, complementary economies and mutual suspicions of the Soviet Union make complete normalization between China and Japan seemingly in the best interests of both nations. The importance attached by both sides to concluding a peace and friendship treaty is reflected by a call for such negotiations being included in the Chou-Tanaka communique. Furthermore, subsequent governments in both Peking and Tokyo have reaffirmed this joint statement as the principal guidance for Sino-Japanese relations; and agreements on trade (1974), civil aviation (1974), navigation (1974), and fisheries (1975) have been concluded. Despite the six year interim, Hua Kuo-feng and Takeo Fukuda continued to stress the importance of negotiating an acceptable peace and friendship treaty. During the Fifth National People's Congress in March 1978, Hua reportedly stated that an early conclusion of such a treaty was in the best interests of both China and Japan. See "Sonoda Welcomes Hua's Call for Early Amity Treaty," 7 March 1978; reported in FBIS - Asia and Pacific IV (8 March 1978): C3. Fukuda, despite the controversy over the Senkakus, reaffirmed at a Tokyo press conference his intentions to continue pursuing the possibility of peace treaty negotiations with China. See "Fukuda Press Conference on Carter Meeting, Senkakus," JOAK Television 27 April 1978; translated by FBIS - Asia and Pacific IV (28 April 1978): C1.
6. "Text of Fukuda Policy Speech to Diet," 21 January 1978; translated in FBIS - Asia and Pacific IV (23 January 1978): C6.
7. Frank M. Teti, "The National Interest: A Search for an Operational Definition" (Naval Postgraduate School National Security Affairs Handout #7), p. 3.
8. John M. Collins, Grand Strategy, Principles and Practice, (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1973), p. 1.
9. Fred A. Sondermann, "The Concept of the National Interest," Orbis 21 (Spring 1977): 128.
10. See Charles A. Beard, The Idea of National Interest (New York: Macmillan, 1934) and John L. Chase, "Defining the National Interest of the United States," Journal of Politics (November 1956): 720-724 as major proponents of this approach.
11. Apparently the scars left from the foreign powers' use of debt manipulation to keep China weak, during the final years of the Manchu Dynasty and War Lord period have not

- yet healed. The Chinese also had some unpleasant experiences after World War II with the Soviet Union using economic credits to gain concessions from Peking. See Jerome Alan Cohen, "Implications of Detente for Sino-American Trade," in Sino-American Detente, ed. Gene T. Hsiao (New York: Praeger, 1974), p. 47 and Harold Hinton, China's Turbulent Quest (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1973), p. 40.
12. The question of equidistance has been a key element in Japan's foreign policy since her emergence as a world economic power in the 1960's. For an interesting perspective on "East Asia's Political Geometry" see Peter G. Mueller and Douglas A. Ross, China and Japan -- Emerging Global Powers (New York: Praeger, 1975), pp. 142-144.
 13. Major proponents of this school include Robert E. Osgood, Ideals and Self-Interest in America's Relations (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953) and Hans Morgenthau, "Another Great Debate: The National Interest of the United States," The American Political Science Review (December 1952).
 14. Hinton, China's Turbulent Quest, p. 165.
 15. See Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, White Paper on Foreign Policy, 1975.
 16. William H. Overholt correctly points out there are numerous contradictory pressures associated with closer Sino-Japanese relations such as widely differing economic and political values which may place a definite limit on the degree of accommodation possible between China and Japan. See "Japan's Emerging World Role," Orbis 19 (Summer 1975): 414. The subject of factors which may temper closer Sino-Japanese relations is further developed by Joachim Glaubitz, "Balancing Between Adversaries: Sino-Japanese Relations and Soviet Influence," Pacific Community 9 (October 1977) and will be discussed in greater detail.
 17. Sondermann, "The Concept of the National Interest," p. 127.
 18. Ibid., pp 126-134.
 19. Susumu Awanohara, "Japan's Chinese Word Game," Far East Economic Review 99 (3 March 1978): 18.
 20. "An Ill Wind from the Senkakus," Far East Economic Review 99 (28 April 1978): 10.

21. Yung H. Park, "The Politics of Japan's China Decision," Orbis 19 (Summer 1975): 563.
22. Sonderrmann, "The Concept of the National Interest," p. 133.
23. Ibid., p. 135.
24. Teti, "The National Interest: A Search for an Operational Definition," pp. 10-11.
25. Peter Weintraub and Melinda Liu, "China Buys Its Way Towards a Vision of Self Reliance," Far East Economic Review 101 (7 July 1978): 34-35.
26. Teti, "The National Interest: A Search for an Operational Definition," p. 22.

CHAPTER III

27. Zbigniew Brezezinski, "Japan's Global Engagement," Foreign Affairs 50 (October 1971): 270; and Donald C. Hellmann, Japan and East Asia (New York: Praeger, 1972), p. 61.
28. Robert A. Scalapino, ed., "Perspectives on Modern Japanese Foreign Policy," in The Foreign Policy of Modern Japan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), p. 392.
29. William H. Forbis, Japan Today (New York: Harper & Row, 1977), p. 4.
30. Albert M. Craig, John K. Fairbank, and Edwin O. Reischauer, East Asia (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1978), p. 324.
31. In 1281, a Mongol invading force of 150,000 was beaten back by a significantly inferior Japanese army with the aid of a fortuitous typhoon. According to Japanese tradition, this typhoon was the kamikaze or "divine wind" protecting the land of the gods from foreign invaders. Reischauer notes that this event looms large in Japan's historical memory and in part contributed to the irrational conviction held by most Japanese that their land was sacred and inviolate. See Edwin O. Reischauer, Japan Past and Present, 3rd ed revised (Tokyo: Tuttle, 1964), p. 64. The Tokugawa policy of isolation, for its part, was designed to protect Japan's Confucian structured society, which happened to support the legitimacy of the ruling feudal elite, from the destabilizing influences of Christianity. The Tokugawas were fearful that the coming of Christian missionaries and European trading companies might be the precursor of European military expansionism as had been the case with Southeast Asia. See Craig, Fairbank, and Reischauer, East Asia, pp. 408-409. Journalist Russel Spurr's observation that "until recently, the very subject of defense remained politically unmentionable ["Japan Digs In," Far Eastern Economic Review 99 (26 August 1977): 20] is corroborated by Ako Watanabe's findings based on a study of public opinion polls that "... the problem of national defense is not yet the object of serious discussion in Japan..." See Akio Watanabe, "Japanese Public Opinion and Foreign Affairs 1964-1973," in The Foreign Policy of Modern Japan, p. 133.
32. Despite a growing debate over the size and capability the Japanese Self Defense Force, there is little mention in the current literature of any serious movement to amend Article IX of the Japanese Constitution, which

renounces the state's right to use war or threat of force to resolve international disputes. See Spurr, "Japan Digs In," pp. 20-23; Hideaki Kase, "The New Debate on Defence," Far East Economic Review 100 (2 June 1978); 28-29; and Bernard K. Gordon, "Loose Cannon on a Rolling Deck? Japan's Changing Security Policies," Orbis 22 (Winter 1979): 967-1006. Concerning the likelihood of Japan rearming, former Prime Minister Fukuda stated on numerous occasions in 1977 and 1978 that, despite an obvious capability to do so, "Japan will not become a great power." See Osamu Kaihara, "Japan's Military Capabilities: Realities and Limitations," Pacific Community 9 (January 1978): 129-142. On the question of continuing the American security alliance Gaston Sigur points out "... the Japanese public is, if anything, more positively supportive of the 'American Connection' than it was at any previous time. Even the opposition parties, with the exception of the Communist Party, have moderated their criticism of the United States - Japanese security treaty..." See Gaston J. Sigur, "Northeast Asia: Area of Confrontation or Accommodation," Orbis 21 (Spring 1977): 55.

33. Donald P. Whitaker et al., Area Handbook for Japan (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1974), p. 80.
34. Forbis, Japan Today, p. 15.
35. Reischauer, Japan Past and Present, p. 8.
36. Guiford A. Dudley, A History of Eastern Civilizations (New York: John Wiley, 1973), p. 191; and Kano Tsutomu, "Introduction: Why Search for Identity," in The Silent Power, Japan's Identity and World Roll, ed. by the Japan Center for International Exchange (Tokyo: Simul Press, 1976), p. 2.
37. According to Reischauer, the prestige of all things Chinese remained, but by the early ninth century, Heian Japn (794-1185) became less anxious to learn from China because there was little left to assimilate with T'ang entering a period of dynastic decline. Contact with the Chinese continued, of course, through the travels of Buddhist monks and merchants but the Japanese began to reassess their three centuries of Chinese inculturation in terms of national independence. See Craig, Fairbank, and Reischauer, East Asia, pp. 347-348.
38. A. Doak Barnett, China and the Major Powers in East Asia (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1977), p. 89.

39. For a more extended treatment see Marius B. Jansen, "The Meiji State: 1868-1912," in Modern East Asia: Essays in Interpretation ed. by James B. Crowley (New York: Harcourt, 1970).
40. According to Donald C. Hellmann, Washington's belief that sustained economic growth is conducive to peaceful international behavior was paired with a New Deal reformist zeal during the occupation in an unparalleled attempt at nation building. See Hellmann, Japan and East Asia, pp. 116-117.
41. Japan Area Handbook, p. 81.
42. Reischauer offers a dissenting opinion, suggesting that the concept of a cultural inferiority complex is "a little too slippery to be of much use." Instead of cultural borrowing fostering an inferiority complex, he maintains that it has intensified Japan's self-consciousness about its separateness from foreign nations. See Edwin O. Reischauer, The Japanese (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1977), p. 40.
43. Joachim Glaubitz, "Balancing Between Adversaries: Sino-Japanese Relations and Soviet Interference," Pacific Community 9 (October 1977): 36.
44. The Emperor's position was greatly weakened by the court intrigues of the Fujiwara family during the later years of the Heian period. As a result, Yoritomo was able to fashion a feudal military coalition capable of dominating Japan, which forced the Emperor to recognize him as Shogun in 1192. Yoritomo was strong enough to make accession to Shogun hereditary and establish the precedent of the Emperor ruling de jure while the Shogun ruled de facto. After a century of civil strife between daimyos seeking greater power and attempting to end the Fujiwara dominance of the Shogunate, Tokugawa Ieyasu completed the reunification of Japan in 1603 and reestablished the de jure - de facto relationship between the Emperor and himself as Shogun. See Reischauer, Japan Past and Present, chapters 6 and 7.
45. The Japanese produced a few products for export that interested western traders. The chief economic attraction of Japan at this time for western commerce was as a potential market for European goods. The cash sale in Japan of European products from their Asian colonies generated sufficient capital for western traders to finance the profitable purchase of Chinese silk. See Dudley, A History of Eastern Civilizations, p. 201.

46. Arthur Tiedeman, Modern Japan, A Brief History (New York: Van Nostrand, 1955), p. 97.
47. Japan's four feudal classes were the governing daimyo class, the warrior samurai class, the townsmen class of artisans and merchants, and the peasant class. A fifth grouping known as eta was comprised of social outcasts. The farmer was the only regular taxpayer in feudal Japan, owing a portion of his rice crop to his feudal lord to support the governing and military aristocracy. The eventual stratification of the peasant class into rich and poor that followed from the cultivation of cash crops and related village industry (sake brewing, silk weaving, food preparation, etc.) resulted in the poor farmers becoming tenants of their richer neighbors. These tenants, of course were forced to bear a disproportionate share of the region's taxes while being forced to grow rice in the least fertile fields because the best land was reserved for the cash crops. It is interesting to note that Tokugawa's agrarian tax system, because of the relatively light burden it imposed on the commercial sector, encouraged the growth of the merchant class at the expense of rural interests. See Thomas C. Smith, "The Land Tax in the Tokugawa Period," Journal of Asian Studies 18 (1958): 3-19.
48. The Meiji Restoration returned the Emperor to prominence, but it did not mean he was to rule. Instead, the real power resided with the young dynamic samurai such as Saigo Takamori, Okubo Toshimichi, Iwakura Tomomi, Kidō Koin, Ito Hirobumi, and Yamagata Aritomo, who ended the Tokugawa reign. As Reischauer points out, "the Japanese were much too accustomed to figurehead emperors ... to return to personal rule. Nor were the emperor and his court prepared for actual political leadership, since the Emperor was only 15 years old at the time of the Restoration. See Craig, Fairbank, and Reischauer, East Asia, p. 502.
49. For a complete translation of all five articles of the Charter Oath see Tiedeman, Modern Japan, A Brief History, pp. 99-100.
50. Barnett, China and the Major Powers in East Asia, p. 91.
51. By paying the indemnity, China technically recognized Tokyo's claim to sovereignty over the Ryukyus. This view was resisted by Peking, which continued to demand tribute from the Ryukyans. President Grant's efforts to mediate this sovereignty dispute were unsuccessful and in 1879 Japanese forces removed the Ryukyuan king to Tokyo where he was granted a title of nobility and his

his island kingdom incorporated into Japan as the prefecture of Okinawa. See Burton F. Beers and Paul H. Clyde, The Far East, 6th ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1975), p. 190.

52. Under Article I of the Treaty of Saint Petersburg, Japan ceded its holdings on Sakhalin Island, making the La Perouse Strait the boundary between Japan and Russia. Article II relinquished the Kuril Islands to Japan, specifically naming the individual islands to be transferred. According to the Japanese view, since Etorofu, Kunashiri, Shikotan, and Habomai were not specified in the Saint Petersburg Treaty, this is proof that Russia never considered these islands (often referred to now as the "Northern Territories") as part of the Kuril chain. See J.A. Harrison, Japan's Northern Frontier (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1953), pp. 171-174.
53. George A. Lensen, The Russian Push Toward Japan (Princeton: Princeton Press, 1959), pp. 442-443.
54. For a more detailed account of Japanese-Korean relations during this period see Hilary Conroy, The Japanese Seizure of Korea (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1960).
55. The Li-Lobanov Treaty (1896), which granted the Russians permission to build the Chinese Eastern Railroad trunk across Manchuria, and Moscow's demand in 1898 for a 25 year lease on the Liaotung Peninsula suggests that Russia's strategy at the time of the Triple Intervention (1895) was to establish a political and commercial empire in northern China based on easy rail access to the Pacific Ocean. See Craig, Fairbank, and Reischauer, East Asia, p. 625.
56. The Ito faction of the Japanese Genro favored seeking an agreement with Russia that would recognize Manchuria as a Russian sphere of influence and Korea as a Japanese protectorate. The Yamagata faction, ascendant at the time, saw war with Russia as inevitable and opted for the British alliance. This alliance, signed 30 January 1902, pledged the signatories to "support the status quo and general peace in the Extreme East," recognized the special interests of both powers in China as well as Japan's special interest in Korea, and promised neutrality if a contracting party became involved in a bilateral conflict or to come to each other's aid in the event either signatory was attacked by more than one state. See Beers and Clyde, The Far East, p. 249.

57. Beers and Clyde claim Theodore Roosevelt intervened because he believed that America's "future history will be more determined by our position on the Pacific facing China than our position on the Atlantic facing Europe." Ibid., p. 262.
58. With the lessons of the Triple Intervention close at hand, Tokyo immediately sought to protect its territorial gains from the Russo-Japanese War through a series of bilateral agreements, some of which were concluded even before the Portsmouth Treaty. In the Taft-Katsura Agreement (1905), Washington recognized Japanese suzerainty over Korea in return for Tokyo's disavowal of interest in the Philippines; The Sino-Japanese Treaty (1905) secured Peking's assent to the transfer of Russian holdings in Manchuria to the Japanese; the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was renewed in 1905, maintaining Japan's security umbrella; the France-Japanese Agreement (1907) recognized each nations' spheres of influence in China; and the Russo-Japanese Agreement (1907) acknowledged Moscow's paramount interests in northern Manchuria and Outer Mongolia in order to defuse any potential for a war of revenge by the Russians. Ibid., chapter 18.
59. Though China did partially submit to some of these demands by recognizing Shantung as a Japanese sphere of influence, extending the Japanese Liaotung lease hold from 25 to 99 years, and granting Tokyo a privileged investment position, this diplomatic victory convinced both the United States and Britain that Japan's expansionist policies were becoming inimical to western interests in Asia. In Washington's view, Japan was now threatening the "open Door" policy and London was fearful of losing its concessions in China and the Japanese fomenting Indian nationalism. See W.G. Beasley, The Modern History of Japan, 2nd ed. (New York: Praeger, 1974) pp. 203-204.
60. Reischauer, Japan Past and Present, pp. 140-141.
61. James W. Morley, ed. Japan's Foreign Policy 1868-1941 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974), p. 382.
62. See George A. Lensen, Japanese Recognition of the U.S.S.R.: Soviet-Japanese Relations 1921-1930 (Tokyo: Sophia University Press, 1970).
63. Beers and Clyde, The Far East, p. 357.
64. Zaibatsu refers to the "captains of Japanese industry." Interrelated by family and financial ties, this closely knit clique of industrialists dominated the Japanese business community until 1945.
65. Beers and Clyde, The Far East, p. 326.

66. See Herbert Feis, The Road to Pearl Harbor: The Coming of the War Between the United States and Japan (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1950).
67. After negotiating in 1935 the purchase of Russian interests in the Chinese Eastern Railroad by its puppet regime in Manchukuo, Japan joined with Germany and Italy in the Anti-Comintern Pact (25 November 1936) directed against the Soviet Union. This agreement lost its strategic value for Japan when Hitler and Stalin agreed to a non-aggression pact in September 1939. During this time frame, latent Russo-Japanese animosities erupted in a serious border confrontation along the Manchukuo-Siberian frontier during the summer of 1939. At Nomonhan (August-September) the Russians using superior mechanized forces, soundly defeated the Japanese Kwantung Army and gave pause to those proponents in Tokyo calling for a "strike north" offensive against the Soviet Union. With its diplomatic feeler for improved relations with the United States and Britain getting no response, Japan turned back to Germany, now the conqueror of Europe, in order to improve relations with Moscow and to obtain Berlin's approval for Japanese hegemony over the European colonies in Southeast Asia whose metropolitan centers had fallen to the Nazis. Japan signed the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy in September 1940, and with Berlin's assistance the Soviets agreed to a five year Russo-Japanese Neutrality Pact on 13 April 1941. Its northern flank secured, Japan was now in position to "strike south" against the defenseless resource-rich European colonies in Southeast Asia. Ibid. For additional details see Hosoya Chihiro, "Policies Toward Russia," in Morley, Japan's Foreign Policy 1868-1941, pp. 382-406.
68. On 8 August 1945, two days after the nuclear attack on Hiroshima, the Soviet Union abrogated its 1941 Neutrality Pact with Japan, invaded Manchuria, and was poised to occupy Hokkaido. This so-called "stab in the back" continues to color Japanese perceptions, with Tokyo highly suspicious of any agreements made by Moscow. See Savitri Vishwanathan, Normalization of Japanese-Soviet Relations 1945-1970 (Tallahassee, FL: The Diplomatic Press, 1973), p. 15.
69. Hellmann, Japan and East Asia, pp. 4-5.
70. Donald C. Hellman, ed. "Japan and American: New Myths, Old Realities, in China & Japan: A New Balance of Power, vol XII: Critical Choices for America (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1976), p. 34.
71. Scalapino, "Perspectives on Modern Japanese Foreign Policy," p. 397.

72. Yamamoto Mitsuru, "Resource Diplomacy Runs Into a Stone Wall," Japan Quarterly 22 (October-December 1975): 323.
73. Yoshida's decision not to extend diplomatic recognition to Mao's China was forced by the mood of the United States Senate, which threatened not to ratify the occupation ending San Francisco Peace Treaty unless Tokyo clearly identified itself with America's China policy. See Peter G. Mueller and Douglas A. Ross, China and Japan - Emerging Global Powers (New York: Praeger, 1975), p. 117.
74. Donald F. Lach and Edmund S. Wehrle, International Politics in East Asia (New York: Praeger, 1975), p. 261.
75. On 15 August President Nixon imposed a ten percent surcharge on all imports and freed the dollar from the Bretton Woods fixed exchange rate. Both actions were aimed at reducing the American trade deficit with Japan and West Germany.
76. Edwin O. Reischauer, "Forward," to Scalapino's (ed.) The Foreign Policy of Modern Japan, p. xvii.
77. Masataka Kosaka, "Japan's Major Interests and Policies in Asia and the Pacific," Orbis 19 (Fall 1975): 803.
78. Glaubitz, "Balancing Between Adversaries," pp. 33-37.
79. From the Preamble of the Treaty of Peace and Friendship Between Japan and the People's Republic of China: Jiji Press, 12 August 1978.

CHAPTER IV

80. "Fukuda Prepared to Resume Talks," Kyodo, 27 March 1978 in Asian & Pacific FBIS 4 (27 March 1978): c-1.
81. Hellmann, "Japan and America: New Myths, Old Realities," p. 20.
82. David Bonavia, "Peking Plays a Waiting Game," Far Eastern Economic Review 100 (12 May 1978): 25.
83. Ibid., p. 25; see also Barnett, China and the Major Powers in East Asia, p. 127; Hellmann, "Japan and America: New Myths, Old Realities," p. 25; and Glaubitz, "Balancing Between Adversaries," p. 36. The pro-Taiwanese lobby within the LDP is known as the Asian Problems Study Group. For additional background on the evolvement of the LDP's China policy see Yung H. Park, "The Politics of Japan's China Decision," Orbis 19 (Summer 1975): 562-591.
84. See Chae-Jin Lee, Japan Faces China, Political and Economic Relations in the Postwar Era (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976), chapter 1.
85. Glaubitz, "Balancing Between Adversaries," p. 36.
86. Nihon Keizai, 30 May 1977 reported by Glaubitz, "Balancing Between Adversaries," p. 36.
87. Some cynics suggested that Fukuda's interest in the quick conclusion of the PFT was in reality a charade to get the controversial joint oil development agreement between Tokyo and Seoul through the Diet. It is argued that Fukuda artfully manipulated the pro-treaty press into supporting action on the joint development legislation by indicating that the PFT would be dealt with as soon as the Korean-Japanese offshore oil question was settled. See Susumu Awanohara, "Japan's Chinese Word Game," Far Eastern Economic Review 99 (3 March 1978): 18.
88. Susumu Awanohara, "Fukuda Deals a New Hand," Far Eastern Economic Review 99 (9 December 1977): 11.
89. "Text of Fukuda's Policy Speech to Diet 21 January," Asian & Pacific FBIS 19 (23 January 1978): c-6.
90. "Japanese Envoy Discusses Renewing Treaty Talks," Kyodo, 6 March 1978 in Asian & Pacific FBIS 24 (6 March 1978): c-1.
91. Tracy Dahlby, "Peking Opens the Door to Japan," Far Eastern Economic Review 100 (3 March 1978): 40.

92. David Bonavia and Susuma Awanohara, "An Ill Wind From the Senkakus," Far Eastern Economic Review 100 (28 April 1978): 10-12.
93. "Government Accepts PRC 'Accidental' Violation of Senkakus," Kyodo, 22 April 1978 in Asian & Pacific FBIS 4 (24 April): c-1.
94. "Sonoda Speculates on PRC Motives," Kyodo, 15 April 1978 in Asian & Pacific FBIS 4 (17 April 1978): c-2.
95. "Sonoda: No Amity Treaty Link," Kyodo, 18 April 1978 in Asian & Pacific FBIS 4 (18 April 1978): c-1.
96. "Sonoda on Anti-Japanese Clause in Sino-Soviet Treaty," Asahi Shimbun, 9 March 1978 translated by Asian & Pacific FBIS Annex 4 (14 March 1978): 2.
97. According to a major Japanese wire service, Defense Agency sources confirmed on 7 June that the Soviets conducted large scale joint service amphibious exercises on Etorofu Island, the largest of the four southern Kuril Islands claimed by Japan. The report indicated that these were the most extensive military maneuvers ever held in the area, involving 10 AN-12 transports airlifting in approximately 1,000 troops supported by a naval task force composed of two Kresta II class missile cruisers, two missile equipped frigates (a Kashin and a Krivak), and an unidentified type of submarine. See "Defense Agency Reports on Soviet Maneuvers in Kuril Islands," Kyodo, 7 June 1978 in Asian & Pacific FBIS 4 (7 June 1978): c-1. These reports were later down played as not verifiable by Foreign Minister Sonoda and Self Defense Force Bureau Chief Keiichi. See "Foreign Minister Comments on Soviet Military Maneuvers," Kyodo, 14 June 1978 in Asian & Pacific FBIS 4 (14 June 1978): c-1. Japanese intelligence sources, however, confirmed in January 1979 that Soviet military construction is taking place on Kunashiri and Etorofu. The Japanese Defense Agency is stressing the defensive nature of the construction, but other sources report that a 10,000 foot jet capable runway is being completed on Kunashiri and artillery pieces normally associated with brigade size infantry units are arriving on Etorofu. See John Lewis, "The Soviets Show a Mailed Hand," Far Eastern Economic Review 103 (16 February 1978): 23-25.
98. Tracy Dahlby, "Looking for a Fancy Phrase," Far Eastern Economic Review 101 (18 August 1978): 11. Prime Minister Fukuda originally expressed this optimism about agreement on the anti-hegemony clause in 29 May 1978 telecast. See "Fukuda Remarks," Kyodo 29 May 1978 in Asian & Pacific FBIS 4 (30 May 1978): c-1.

99. "Diet Completes Action on ROK Continental Shelf Accord," Kyodo, 14 June 1978 in Asian & Pacific FBIS 4 (14 June): c 1-2. For additional background on the quest for off-shore drilling rights in the East China Sea see Selig S. Harrison, China, Oil, and Asia: Conflict Ahead? (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977).
100. Gordon, "Loose Cannon on a Rolling Deck?" p. 996.
101. The Fukuda government officially approached China on 22 June about resuming PFT negotiations in July; the LDP announced public support for this policy on 23 June. See "Talks Endorsed by LDP," Kyodo, 23 June 1978 in Asian & Pacific FBIS 4 (23 June 1978): c-2.
102. Tracy Dahlby, "Peace Friendship ... and Some Uncertainty," Far Eastern Economic Review 100 (25 August 1978): 11.
103. "USSR Sends Statement on PRC Treaty Negotiations," Kyodo, 19 June 1978 in Asian & Pacific FBIS (19 June 1978): c 1-3.
104. Prior to opening negotiation on 21 July, the Japanese Foreign Ministry released a pamphlet entitled "Merits and Problematic Points of Concluding the Japan-China Treaty," which clearly articulated the Fukuda government's terms for concluding the PFT. According to this position paper, which was obviously aimed at the hardline domestic opposition to the treaty, any PFT draft would have to be compatible with the following conditions: (1) each country must be free to pursue its own foreign policy while respecting the sovereign rights of the other; (2) the treaty must clearly stipulate that it is not directed specifically against any third nation; and (3) each nation must be free to apply the hegemony clause independently from the other in accordance with its own foreign policy. The pamphlet also noted that the Senkakus were inherently Japanese and consequently there was no need for their status to be considered during the treaty negotiations. Authored by Yosuke Nakae, the head of the Asian Affairs Bureau of the Japanese Foreign Ministry and acknowledged architect of Japan's emerging Asian policy, this pamphlet firmly indicated to the Chinese the constraints domestic politics placed on Japan's PFT negotiating posture. This paper was also a useful tool for creating a consensus amongst Japan's ruling elite. See "Foreign Ministry Pamphlet Clarifies PRC Treaty Stance," Tokyo Shimbun, 16 July 1978 in Asian & Pacific FBIS Annex 4 (21 July 1978): 7-8.
105. Chae-Jin Lee, Japan Faces China, p. 19.

106. Yung H. Park, "The Politics of Japan's China Decision," p. 590.
107. Susumu Awanohara, "Japan's Chinese Word Game," Far Eastern Economic Review 100 (3 March 1978): 19.
108. David Bonavia, "Peking Plays a Waiting Game," Far Eastern Economic Review 100 (12 May 1978): 25.
109. "LDP Official Criticizes Government Stance on PRC Talks," Kyodo, 29 June 1978 in Asian & Pacific FBIS 4 (30 June 1978): c-2.
110. Paul E. Sriejstrup, "Interview: The Diet of Sukiyaki Politics," Far Eastern Economic Review 101 (25 August 1978): 31.
111. For an explanation of the LDP's new internal election procedures and their impact on Japanese domestic politics see Margaret A. McKean, "Japan's Beleaguered Ruling Party," Current History (November 1978): 162.

CHAPTER V

112. Japanese Foreign Ministry, Diplomatic Bluebook, p. 66.
113. United Nations trade figure for 1974-1976 show that 41 percent of Indonesia's, 29 percent of Thailand's, 29 percent of the Philippines, 20 percent of Laos', and 19 percent of Vietnam's foreign trade is with Japan. Far Eastern Economic Review, Asia 1978 Yearbook (Hong Kong, 1978), p. 4.
114. In 1973, for instance, Chou En-lai pointed out that "if Japan is to pursue profits, too intensively, this will lead to 'exploitation' and cause repulsion among the people in the area..." Quoted by Barnett, China and the Major Powers in East Asia, p. 132.
115. Ibid., p. 135. On this point Barnett speculates that under the rubric of political cooperation, Peking and Tokyo might be prone to a tacit division of labor in trade relations with Southeast Asia, were Japan concentrated on capital, high technology intensive commodities while China stressed the export of low cost, labor intensive goods.
116. Article VI of the treaty reads, "In case either party is attacked or threatened with attack the two parties signatory to the treaty shall immediately consult each other with a view to eliminating that threat and shall take effective measures..." Nayan Chanda, "A Bear Hug From Moscow," Far Eastern Economic Review 102 (17 November 1978): 8.
117. For an analysis of Japan's economic assistance to Vietnam see Susumu Awanohara, "Tokyo's Embarrassing Guest," Far Eastern Economic Review 102 (21 July 1978): 18.
118. Commenting on the Soviet-Vietnamese Peace and Friendship Treaty, the Japanese Foreign Ministry said it expected the agreement to have little impact on Japan's basic posture towards Moscow or Hanoi. Japan is committed to extending ten billion yen in credits to Vietnam on the condition it remains nonaligned and the Japanese have been circumspect about the meaning of Hanoi's new links with Moscow. See "Foreign Ministry Officials View USSR-SRV Treaty," Kyodo, 4 November 1978 in Asian & Pacific FBIS 4 (6 November 1978): c-2. Japan's exposed diplomatic position in Southeast Asia has become more obvious since the collapse of the Chinese backed Pol Pot regime in January 1979 and the commencement of open hostilities along the China-Vietnam border. Tokyo has

- already had to dodge Chinese requests for a joint statement condemning Vietnamese aggression in Cambodia and point out to Peking that the PFT does not require joint Sino-Japanese action. John Lewis, "Japan Learns a Hard Lesson," Far Eastern Economic Review 103 (26 January 1979): 13-14.
119. Choon-ho Park, "Oil Under Troubled Waters, The Northeast Asia Seabed Controversy," Harvard International Law Review 14 (1973).
 120. "Sonoda: Teng Approves Status Quo for Senkaku Islands," Kyodo, 18 September 1978 in Asian & Pacific FBIS 4 (19 September 1978): c-1.
 121. Harrison, China, Oil, and Asia: Conflict Ahead? pp. 216-217.
 122. Park, "Oil Under Troubled Waters," p. 220. Article 6(1) of the Geneva Convention provides that:
the boundary of the continental shelf appertaining to such states shall be determined by agreement between them. In the absence of agreement, and unless another boundary line is justified by special circumstances, the boundary is the median line, every point of which is equidistant from the nearest points of the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea of each state is measured.
 123. The Diet's upper chamber completed ratification action for the 1974 negotiated South Korean-Japan Agreement on Shelf Development on 14 June 1978. This lengthy delay was related to Japanese fears of offending China, which also claimed areas designated by the agreement for joint development by Tokyo and Seoul. See "Diet Completes Action on ROK Continental Shelf Accord," Kyodo, 14 June 1978 in Asian & Pacific FBIS 4 (14 June 1978): c 1-2. For the text of this agreement see U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Oil and Asian Rivals; Sino-Soviet Conflict; Japan and the Oil Crisis, Hearing before the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs. 93rd Congress, 1st and 2nd sessions, September 1973-March 1974, pp. 219-220.
 124. Harrison, China, Oil, and Asia: Conflict Ahead? p. 167.
 125. "Joint Oil Exploration," Kyodo, 3 November 1978 in Asian & Pacific FBIS 4 (6 November 1978): c-5.

126. "PRC Proposes Consultations on Fisheries Accord," Kyodo, 2 November 1978 in Asian & Pacific FBIS 4 (3 November 1978): c-2.
127. For complete quote and further discussion of China's and North Korea's reaction to the Sato-Nixon communique see John Emmerson, Arms, Yen and Power the Japanese Dilemma (New York: Dunellen, 1971), pp. 269-271.
128. Japanese Defense Agency, Defense of Japan (Tokyo, 1977), p. 23.
129. Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Diplomatic Blue-book for 1975, p. 24.
130. Barnett, China and the Major Powers in East Asia, p. 146.
131. David Bonavia, "A Surprisingly Sudden Thaw," Far Eastern Economic Review 103 (2 February 1979): 11.
132. Tracy Dahlby, "A Great Alliance as the Lion Awakes," Far Eastern Economic Review 102 (3 November 1978): 11.
133. Ibid., p. 11; and Susumu Awanohara, "Pyongyang Ponders the New Alliance," Far Eastern Economic Review 102 (12 October 1978): 14.
134. "Sonoda Questioned in Diet on Ramifications of PRC Treaty," The Daily Yomiuri, 19 August 1978 in Asian & Pacific FBIS Annex 4 (25 August 1978): 2.
135. Barnett, China and the Major Powers in East Asia, p. 143.
136. Mueller and Ross, China and Japan - Emerging Global Powers, p. 117.
137. The Sato-Nixon communique identified Japanese security interests with both Korea and Taiwan, but there was a subtle distinction in wording with South Korea being "essential to Japan's own security" and Taiwan being "a most important factor for the security of Japan." On this basis, some observers have interpreted this to mean that Japan was signalling Peking that it would not automatically support an American military defense of Taiwan. See Wolf Mendl, Issues in Japan's China Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), p. 78. For the complete text of the Sato-Nixon communique check The Department of State Bulletin LXI (15 December 1969): 555.
138. Barnett, China and the Major Powers in East Asia, p. 110.
139. Ibid., p. 143.

140. Mendl, Issues in Japan's China Policy, p. 61. Barnett reports, however, that Ohira, who succeeded Fukuda as Foreign Minister, stated in late 1972 that Japan had no intention of explicitly renouncing the Sato-Nixon communique's reference to the importance of Taiwan to Japan's security. See Barnett, China and the Major Powers in East Asia, p. 143.
141. Press reports quoted by Barnett, China and the Major Powers in East Asia, p. 114.
142. Japan Times, 30 September 1972 quoted by Model, Issues in Japan's China Policy, p. 65.
143. Ibid., p. 65.
144. Japanese press commentary quoted by Barnett, China and the Major Powers in East Asia, p. 116.
145. This interpretation was reaffirmed as recently as 18 August 1978. See "Foreign Ministry Official: No Change in Taiwan Policy," Kyodo, 18 August 1978 in Asian & Pacific FBIS 4 (22 August 1978): c-2.
146. "Fukuda, U.S.-Japan Security Treaty's Taiwan Clause Null," Asahi Evening News 12 October 1978 in Asian & Pacific FBIS Annex 4 (17 October 1978): 2.
147. "Kosygin Says Japan Errored in Signing Treaty with PRC," Kyodo, 8 September 1978 in Asian & Pacific FBIS 4 (8 September 1978): c-2.
148. "Foreign Ministry Pamphlet Clarifies PRC Treaty Stance," Tokyo Shimbun, 16 July 1978 in Asian & Pacific FBIS Annex 4 (21 July 1978): 7.
149. "Leaders Address 85th Extraordinary Diet Session," Kyodo, 20 September 1978 in Asian & Pacific FBIS 4 (20 September 1978): c-1.
150. Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Diplomatic Blue-book for 1975, pp. 39-40.
151. For an historical summary of the "Northern Territories" issue see Emmerson, Arms, Yen and Power The Japanese Dilemma, pp. 230-238; Young C. Kim, Japanese-Soviet Relations: Interaction of Politics, Economics, and National Security, vol II no. 21: The Washington Papers (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1974), pp. 17-54.
152. As an example see "Soviet Maritime Minister Refutes Japanese Island Claims," Asahi Shimbun, 31 March 1978 in Asian & Pacific FBIS Annex 4 (7 April 1978): 2.

153. Russell Spurr, "Ominous Implications of Red Power Plays," Far Eastern Economic Review 100 (23 June 1978): 73. Officially the Japanese Foreign Ministry refused to acknowledge any linkage between the timing of these Soviet military maneuvers and Japan's movement toward resumption of PFT negotiations. See "Foreign Ministry Reaction," Kyodo, 7 June 1978 in Asian & Pacific FBIS 4 (7 June 1978): c-1.
154. "Sources Contend USSR Building Army Base on Kunashiri Island," Kyodo, 1 November 1978 in Asian & Pacific FBIS 4 (2 November 1978): c-4; Lewis, "The Soviets Show a Mailed Hand," p. 23; and "USSR Again Refuses to Allow Visits to Northern Grave Sites," Kyodo, 10 August 1978 in Asian & Pacific FBIS 4 (10 August 1978): c-3.
155. "Brezhnev Letter to Fukuda Proposes Concluding Treaty," Kyodo, 22 February 1978 in Asian & Pacific FBIS 4 (22 February 1978): c-1.
156. "Abe Says 'Positive Efforts' Underway for Treaty with USSR," Hong Kong AFP, 17 September 1978 in Asian & Pacific FBIS 4 (17 September 1978): c-2.
157. Frank Langdon, "Japan-Soviet 200 Mile Zone Confrontation," Pacific Community 9 (October 1977), p. 48.
158. Article 8 of the temporary Japan-Soviet Fishing Agreement states, "no provision of this agreement shall be construed in such a way as to prejudice the position or view of the government of either country on various problems of the law of the sea under consideration at the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea and also on various problems concerning mutual relations." The phrase - "various problems concerning mutual relations" is a veiled reference to the "Northern Territories" dispute, and in Japan's view limits the fisheries agreement to fishing rights only. According to Tokyo interpretation, Moscow is precluded from using the temporary fishing agreement to support its claim of sovereignty over the four disputed islands. Ibid., pp. 51-52.
159. "Japan-Soviet Fishing Agreement Reached," The Daily Yomiuri, 22 April 1978 in Asian & Pacific FBIS Annex 4 (1 May 1978): 3.
160. "Soviet Union Rejects Joint Fishery Agreement," Kyodo, 23 June 1978 in Asian & Pacific FBIS 4 (23 June 1978): c-1.
161. "Soviet Official Says Fishery Agreement Unlikely," Kyodo, 7 August 1978 in Asian & Pacific FBIS 4 (8 August 1978): c-6.

162. See "Fishery Talks with USSR to Begin 17 November," Kyodo, 10 November 1978 in Asian & Pacific FBIS 4 (13 November 1978): c-4; and "USSR Rejects Japanese Bid for Long Term Fishery Accord," Kyodo, 20 November 1978 in Asian & Pacific FBIS 4 (21 November 1978): c-1.
163. In 1956, Soviet imposed fishing restrictions caused Japan's powerful fishing lobby to pressure the government into negotiating with Moscow to restore diplomatic relations. See Emmerson, Arms, Yen, and Power, pp. 238-239.
164. Bernard K. Gordon, "Japan, the United States, and Southeast Asia," Foreign Affairs 56 (April 1978): 583.
165. Rodney Tasker, "Rivals for ASEAN's Hand," Far Eastern Economic Review 101 (15 September 1978): 20.
166. David Bonavia, "China on the Defensive," Far Eastern Economic Review 101 (14 July 1978): 9.
167. Chanda, "A Bear Hug From Moscow," p. 10.
168. David Bonavia, "Changing the Course of History," Far Eastern Economic Review 103 (2 March 1979): 8-10.
169. An Asian Collective Security System was first proposed by Brezhnev shortly after the Sino-Soviet border conflicts occurred in March 1969. While its major provisions call for (1) renunciation of the use of force between states; (2) respect for sovereignty and existing borders; (3) non-interference in other nation's internal affairs; and (4) mutual economic cooperation, its clear purpose is the containment of China. For a more detailed discussion see Harold C. Hinton, "The Soviet Campaign for Collective Security in Asia," Pacific Community 7 (January 1976).
170. Lewis, "Japan Learns a Hard Lesson," p. 12.
171. Chanda, "A Bear Hug From Moscow," p. 11.
172. Scalapino sees the Chinese driven to at least a limited rapprochement with the Soviets because of China's political, economic, and geographic circumstances. Unable to afford the expenditures needed to catch up with the Soviets militarily, and leery of America's ability to counter Soviet power, Peking may eventually see considerable merit in reducing tensions along the Sino-Soviet border. Nonetheless, he does note that despite the inescapable logic of this argument, the emotions of contempt, prejudice, and fear, which characterize Sino-Soviet

relations, do not easily succumb to common sense. See Robert A. Scalapino, "The Sino-Soviet Relationship: Reflections Upon Its Past and Future," Strategic Review V (Fall 1977): 77.

173. "Soviet Union Reacts to Japan-PRC Treaty," Kyodo, 23 August 1978 in Asian & Pacific FBIS 4 (23 August 1978): c-1.
174. According to Young C. Kim, the Japanese perceive the Soviet Union attaching strategic value to Japan for the following reasons: (1) Japan could be used by a hostile power for launching offensive operations against Siberia; (2) conversely, Japan could be an important ally for supporting Soviet military and diplomatic goals in Asia; and (3) Japan controls all the sea lanes to Vladivostok, giving the Japanese the potential for bottling up the Soviet Pacific Fleet in the Sea of Japan with minimum force. See Kim, Japanese-Soviet Relations, p. 4.
175. Brzezinski, "Japan's Global Engagement," p. 270.
176. Mueller and Ross, China and Japan-Emerging Global Powers, p. 97.
177. Sigur, "Northeast Asia: Area of Confrontation or Accommodation," p. 55.
178. The Japanese have made no official pronouncements to this effect and the scenario presented is an extrapolation from Japanese thinking on the possibility that the United States may need to resort to force to protect Taiwan from violent reunification. See Barnett, China and the Major Powers in East Asia, p. 144.
179. Since 1965, Japan's GNP increased six fold from approximately \$100 billion to \$584 billion in 1977, with its growth rate remaining slightly above six percent in 1977 and 1978. Department of State Bulletin (June 1978): 4. For details and specifics on the Japanese economy see Hugh Patrick and Henry Rosovsky, ed. Asia's New Giant (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1976).
180. Halph N. Clough, East Asia and U.S. Security (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1975), p. 78.
181. The domestic constraints effecting Japan's policy towards China are discussed by Yung H. Park, "The Politics of Japan's China Decision," pp. 562-590.
182. "Japan-China Trade," Asahi Evening News, 21 August 1978 in Asian & Pacific FBIS Annex 4 (28 August 1978): 3.

183. Dahlby, A Great Alliance as the Lion Awakes," p. 10.
184. "Increased Trade with China Forecasted by Private Survey," The Japan Times, 22 August 1978 in Asian & Pacific FBIS Annex 4 (24 August 1978): 6.
185. Tracy Dahlby, "Peking Opens the Door to Japan," Far Eastern Economic Review 99 (3 March 1978): 4041.
186. "Teng Hsiao-ping Says PRC Interested in Oil Contract with Japan," Kyodo, 7 September 1978 in Asian & Pacific FBIS 4 (7 September 1978): c-1. For details on the East China Sea controversy see Harrison, China, Oil, and Asia: Conflict Ahead?; and Park, "Oil Under Troubled Waters."
187. Susumu Awanohara, "Japan: Caught Between Two Giants," Far Eastern Economic Review 102 (6 October 1978): 65-66.
188. Ibid., p. 66.
189. George Lauriat, "Asia's Rapidly Changing Role in the Oil World," Far Eastern Economic Review 103 (26 January 1979): 39.
190. For a discussion of the details surrounding the Nagasaki Flag Incident see Gene T. Hsiao, The Foreign Trade of China: Policy, Law, and Practice (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), pp. 41-51.
191. Barnett, China and the Major Powers in East Asia, p. 119. According to Barnett, Japan's financial stake in Taiwan amounts to approximately \$3 billion in annual bilateral trade, \$750 million in direct-indirect investment, and over 500 link-ups between Japanese and Taiwanese enterprises.
192. "Government Plans to Promote Soviet Economic Relations," Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 21 November 1978 in Asian & Pacific FBIS Annex 4 (24 November 1978): 2.
193. Ibid., p. 3.
194. "USSR Asks for Japanese Cooperation in Siberian Development," Kyodo, 22 November 1978 in Asian & Pacific FBIS 4 (22 November 1978): c-2.
195. "USSR Seen Refraining From 'Retaliatory' Trade Moves Against Japan," Kyodo, 1 September 1978 in Asian & Pacific FBIS 4 (1 September 1978): c-1.

196. Tracy Dahlby, "A Most Pleasant Surprise," Far Eastern Economic Review 102 (29 December 1978): 15; and Dahlby, "A Great Alliance as the Lion Awakes," p. 10.
197. Moscow has consistently viewed the PFT as a potential foundation for a U.S.-PRC-Japan axis designed to encircle the Soviet Union. See Glaubitz, "Balancing Between Adversaries," p. 34.
198. "Fukuda Explains Policy on USSR at Tehran Talks," Asahi Shimbun 7 September 1978 in Asian & Pacific FBIS Annex 4 (19 September 1978): 2-3.
199. Ibid., p. 3.
200. Kim, Japanese-Soviet Relations, p. 72.
201. As initially proposed in the late 1960's, the Tyumen Oil Fields Project called for Japan to provide over a billion dollars for oil exploration and for the construction of a new pipeline from Tyumen to Nakhodka on the Sea of Japan. In return, the Japanese were to receive 25 million tons of crude per year for 20 years. Arthur J. Klinghoffer, The Soviet Union and International Oil Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977), chapter 12. The Baikal-Armur Mainline Railroad (BAM), referred to as the "construction project of the century: by Brezhnev, will extend approximately 2000 miles across Siberia from Taishet (west of Lake Baikal) to Komsomolsk, where it will link up with existing trunks to reach the coast at Sovetskaia Gavan. The project is scheduled for completion in 1983 at a cost of \$15 billion. See Theodore Shabad and Victor L. Mote, Gateway to Siberian Resources (The BAM) (Washington, D.C.: Scripta Publishing, 1977). For a fascinating account, complete with color photographs, of the human effort involved with the construction of this second rail link across Siberia see Howard Sochurek, "'Construction Project of the Century': A New Railroad to Tap Siberian Riches," Smithsonian 8 (February 1978).
202. Joseph M. Ha. "Moscow's Policy Toward Japan," Problems of Communism 26 (September-October 1977): 69.
203. Klinghoffer, The Soviet Union and International Oil Politics, p. 261.
204. According to press accounts, Japanese business and government leaders meeting with the Soviet First Deputy Foreign Trade Minister, during his February visit to Tokyo, agreed to promote cooperation on economic projects pending or in progress, but shied away from making

any commitments on new Soviet proposals for joint ventures in constructing an integrated iron works, a copper smelting plant, and an asbestos mining works. Japanese reluctance is reportedly based on growing concern over the Soviet military build up in the "Northern Territories" and the unfavorable contractual terms being offered by Moscow. See Tracy Dahlby, "Japan Cools Its Moscow Fever," Far Eastern Economic Review 103 (2 March 1979): 92-93.

205. Far Eastern Economic Review, Asia 1978 Yearbook, p. 14.
206. U.S. Department of Commerce, reported by Associated Press, 30 January 1979.
207. Stephen Barber, "Reassuring Words From Tokyo," Far Eastern Economic Review 101 (7 July 1978): 18.
208. For an example of this type of thinking see Kaihara, "Japan's Military Capabilities," and Kase, "The New Debate on Defense."
209. James C. Abegglen and Thomas M. Hout, "Facing Up To The Trade Gap With Japan," Foreign Affairs 57(Fall 1978): 154.
210. Tracy Dahlby, "Ohira Tries to Find More Room to Maneuver," Far Eastern Economic Review 103 (12 January 1979): 61.
211. Ibid., 62.
212. Susumu Awanohara, "The Fever Is Spreading," Far Eastern Economic Review 103 (29 December 1978): 42.
213. Abegglen and Hout, "Facing Up To The Trade Gap With Japan," p. 168.
214. The projection of a \$9.8 billion trade surplus with China is made by the Uamaichi Securities Company. By comparison, Japan's trade surplus with China in 1975 was only \$7.3 million. See "Increased Trade with China Forecast by Private Survey," Japan Times, 22 August 1978 in Asian & Pacific FBIS Annex 4 (24 August 1978): 6.
215. Gene Gregory, "The New Asian Prosperity: Towards an Asian Common Market," Far Eastern Economic Review 102 (13 October 1978): 45.
216. Gene Gregory, "Japan Takes A Broader View of the Yen's Role," Far Eastern Economic Review 103 (5 January 1979): 36-39.

217. Susumu Awanohara, "Japan Searched for a Magic Formula to Finance Its Trade with China," Far Eastern Economic Review 102 (14 July 1978): 38.
218. Dahlby, "A Great Alliance as the Lion Awakes," p. 10.
219. Dahlby, "A Most Pleasant Surprise," p. 14.

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